

The Classical Review

FEBRUARY 1903.

SOME FRIENDS OF THE CLASSICS.

OF the pamphlets published in the last twelve months, two claim attention as proceeding from scholars who hold high positions in the classical world, and who have had the problems of the classical education of to-day brought in different ways under their notice.

'Archaeology in Schools' by Professor P. GARDNER and Mr. J. L. MYRES¹ is a valuable and timely contribution to a department of classical instruction which has but lately won its way to proper recognition. The text is from the pen of Prof. Gardner, a dissentient opinion of Mr. Myres upon a particular point being recorded in a note.

It consists partly of advice to classical teachers upon the best mode of introducing archaeology into their instruction, a province in which Prof. Gardner's knowledge and experience enable him to speak with weight, partly of a more general treatment of principles and methods. Here also there is much that is valuable. Prof. Gardner is fully alive to the defects of modern classical education. He says :

¹ *Classical Archaeology in Schools*, by Percy Gardner, Litt. D. Lincoln and Merton Professor of Classical Archaeology in the University of Oxford; with an Appendix containing list of Archaeological Apparatus by Professor P. Gardner and J. L. Myres, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Oxford. (Printed by request of a Committee of the Head Masters' Conference.) Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1902. Pp. 35. 1s. net.

'In my experience young men coming to the Universities from the great schools are remarkably deficient in the power of observing accurately and recording their observations. And they are usually entirely unversed in the weighing of evidence or discerning degrees of probability' (p. 16).

He recognises, as many do not, the high qualifications demanded by elementary teaching.

'As is the case in many other subjects, these most elementary teachings are perhaps the most difficult, and require the greatest care and skill' (p. 11).

The various series of illustrated classics he judges as follows.

'All that I have seen are incorrect or inadequate, and tend to mislead as much as to help...the illustrated classics of which mention has been made are produced with a quite insufficient knowledge, and are in most cases full of bad blunders and show great want of judgement' (p. 7).

Coming from one in Prof. Gardner's position this is very depressing. I wonder if he realised when he wrote it how very depressing it is. Let us hope that the judgment is somewhat too severe. But if not, it rests with archaeologists to find a remedy. We do not indeed expect Prof. Gardner to abandon his other employments and illustrate school classics as he thinks they should be illustrated; but surely there is by this time a sufficient supply of younger men, some of them, it may be, pupils of the Professor himself, who would be able and

willing to help in a matter of such vital importance to elementary classical teaching? There is danger too of the illustrations in these books being gauged by inapplicable standards. They should of course be correct as far as they go, but that a consummate archaeologist should find them inadequate is not such a serious objection. The information which is described as 'scrappy' and of little use for methodic study in the subject may for all that greatly help a beginner in getting some real hold of the ancient culture and forms of thought, so different from our own. The illustrated dictionary of Anthony Rich, to take a single instance, has probably done much more than any book of its size to make antiquity real to the student. Its merits are acknowledged in Germany; yet I have read a lofty condemnation of it by an eminent English archaeologist. A new edition is badly wanted, and we look to professed experts in archaeology to supply it.

Mr. Myres' Appendix, we need hardly say, should be of the greatest use to classical teachers. It supplies a long-felt want. An estimate of its utility and completeness in detail is outside my province. But chance enables me to offer one suggestion. Ought not the list of diagrams, etc., of Roman antiquities (p. 33) to include Dr. Albert Müller's useful models of Roman soldiers with the accompanying pamphlet in which the ancient sources are cited and explained?¹

Professor G. G. RAMSAY'S address² as first president of the Classical Association of Scotland, the formation of which the

¹ These models, with the pamphlet *Die Ausrüstung u. Bewaffnung des Römischen Heeres in der Kaiserzeit* (pp. 32), may be obtained from the manufacturer, J. E. Dubois (Zinnenfigurenfabrik), Seilwinderstrasse, Hanover. Price in Germany, 3 M. 75 pf. (Booksellers are asked to order several at a time.) If the pamphlet were translated into English (not what passes with a German publisher's hack for such) they might have some considerable sale in England and America.

² *Efficiency in Education*. Inaugural Address delivered at the First Annual Meeting of the Scottish Classical Association, 29th November, 1902, by the President, G. G. Ramsay, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D., Professor of Humanity in the University of Glasgow. Jas. MacLehose and Sons. 1902. Pp. 41.

Classical Review noted last year, will be read with interest in many quarters. We are glad to see on the first page a disavowal of all professional and personal motives on behalf of members of the Association: the battle of Classics is lost if it is to be fought upon the field of material interests. Prof. Ramsay does well to point out what may be learned from studying contemporary experience in Europe and America. The increasing vitality of Greek and Latin in the United States is already known to readers of this Review. Prof. Ramsay adds to this facts relating to France and Germany which deserve the widest currency and from which I regret I can select but two. In the year 1898-99 out of a total of 152,019 pupils in Prussian Secondary Schools only 39,323 were in non-classical schools, while no less than 83,272 were pupils in the Gymnasien whose school-course embraces both the classical tongues. In France not only teachers and professors but the majority of the Chambers of Commerce and of the Conseils Généraux have petitioned in favour of the retention of Latin.

The weak point of Prof. Ramsay's address is its dearth of practical proposals; for the proposal that schools should be divided into two main types—a literary and a scientific one—can hardly rank as such. The urgent need for improvement in our modes of teaching Latin and Greek he does indeed acknowledge; but his suggestions for reform are the merest generalities.

The situation, which he with many other teachers of Greek and Latin fails sufficiently to realise, is this. Classics are now being pressed on the one side by the advance of science, on the other by that of modern languages. The latter are its more dangerous opponents. They promise to a certain point the same advantages as the classics; their methods are up to date and their teachers alert and enterprising. How then can they be resisted if confronted only by antiquated methods and a defence which is both backward and supine? High aesthetic and intellectual considerations are all very well; but they are of no avail in a squeeze.

J. P. POSTGATE.

THE HOMERIC πολέμοιο γέφυραι.

THIS curious expression, occurring five times in the Iliad, has never been satisfactorily explained. Ebeling interprets it as 'spatium inter duas acies intercedens.' Dr. Leaf, in his note on Δ 371, where the words are first used, says that 'it is explained by the Scholiast τὰς διόδους τῶν φαλάγγων, the lines of open ground between the moving masses of men, who are perhaps likened to flowing water. It is especially used of the space between the hostile armies.' Similarly Ameis *ad loc.* understands it as 'die Dammwege des Kriegesgetümmels, die zwischen den einzelnen Heeresabteilungen gelassenen Zwischenräume': Dr. Monro's interpretation is different: 'the "dykes of war,"' he thinks, 'may mean the ranks or squadrons, thought of as stemming the tide of war. . . . But the phrase is used in so conventional a way that it is doubtful whether its meaning was really present to the poet's mind.'

The hypothesis that the poet did not know what he meant is not very attractive: and after all the words must at some time have had a meaning. It seems to me that we have in the known Homeric use of γέφυρα a perfectly intelligible sense which will suit all the instances of πολέμοιο γέφυραι. The scholiastic αἱ διόδοι τῶν φαλάγγων is founded no doubt on the later use of γέφυρα. But γέφυρα means of course in Homer not a bridge but a dam or dyke, a barrier: cp. E. 88-9: and πολέμοιο γέφυραι signifies 'the barriers of the war' in the sense of the outskirts or limits of the ground—always the plain between Troy and the sea—on which the battles are fought. The heroes fight, as it were, in the lists, hemmed in by boundaries, either natural (such as rising ground or river) or imaginary; beyond these limits the war does not pass.

Let me justify this interpretation by taking the five passages in detail. In Δ 371 Agamemnon is rebuking Diomedes for his supposed unwillingness to fight: τί πτώσσεις τί δ' ὀπιπείεις πολέμοιο γέφυρας; 'why do you shrink, and cast a sidelong glance at the barriers or outskirts of the battle,' evidently, that is, looking for a way to escape? In Θ 378 the phrase bears this as its most natural meaning. Athene invites Here to the battlefield 'that I may see whether

Hector will be glad when he beholds us ἀνὰ πολέμοιο γέφυρας,' on the skirts of the field, where of course Athene and Here would first be seen coming to the fray. The horses of Α 160 that κείν' ὄχρα κροτάλιζον ἀνὰ πολέμοιο γέφυρας are doing exactly what horses that have lost their drivers would do—escaping from the battle-ground, roaming outside the throng of combatants. Again, when Achilles says of himself and Hector (Υ 427) οὐδ' ἂν ἐτι δὴν ἀλλήλους πώσσοιμεν ἀνὰ πολέμοιο γέφυρας, he means 'no longer shall we shrink from each other about the limits of the battle,' like men anxious to keep as far apart as possible, outside the combat, in rear of their respective armies. In the above four passages I do not deny that the expression 'dams of war' might mean the spaces between columns. It might: though it would everywhere be strained and unnatural. But in the one remaining instance (Θ 553) I maintain that Ebeling's 'spatium inter duas acies intercedens,' and Dr. Leaf's 'lines of open ground between moving masses of men,' or 'space between the hostile armies,' and Dr. Monro's 'ranks or squadrons thought of as stemming the tide of war,' are all (I speak with deference to such high authorities) wholly untenable. Here the Trojans μέγα φρονέοντες ἀνὰ πολέμοιο γέφυρας εἶατο παννύχιοι: how can the warriors of one whole army be encamped among their own squadrons, or in the space between the two armies, or in the lines of open ground between their own columns? The thing is impossible. On the other hand the 'dams of the war,' in the sense of the outskirts of the battlefield, would be just the place where the Trojan army would naturally bivouac.

It is noticeable that Apion's synonym for πολέμοιο γέφυραι in Δ 371 is ἡ διάβασις καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα πολέμου, while Nicander explains the expression in Θ 553 as τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοῦ πολέμου συμβολὴ γίνεται (both quoted by Ebeling). The second explanation gives a meaning not wholly incompatible with mine: the first, in so far as τὰ ἔσχατα πολέμου is concerned, is identically the same as that which I have suggested.

A. D. GODLEY.

P. TEBTUNIS 4.

THIS new fragment of Homer, one of the four solitary literary papyri in the enormous volume just published by MM. Grenfell, Hunt, and Smyly,¹ is of considerable interest, even if its scantiness denies us the enlightenment that on various points might have been expected from a Homer of the century of Aristarchus.

The Papyrus contains B 95-210 with critical signs, and is according to the editors of about the end of the second century B.C.

The variants are as follows: B 132, otherwise οἱ με μέγα πλάζουσι καὶ τοῖς εἰώσ' ἐθέλοντα, commences... με κε π... This may point to οἱ μέ κε περ πλάζουεν ἰδ' οὐκ εἰώσ' ἐθέλοντα; cf. similar combinations of particles in Ebeling p. 163 b. In the next line (B 133) we have

...ν, i.e. Aristarchus' reading Ἰλιον ἐκπέρσαι εὖ ναύμενον πολέεθρον, with the vulgate Ἰλιον superscribed. This is not new, various mediaeval MSS. (and at Φ 443 the family *h*) have Ἰλιον. B 135 in the margin the editors give πεδ. This must either be part of ση]πεδ[όνα or the like, or if δ is doubtful, of σεσηπέναι which actually occurs in schol. T. B 137 [εἰατ ἐνι μεγάροισι ποτι]δεγ[μεν... the editors say that the vestiges of writing after μεν cannot be reconciled with the ordinary reading ἄμμι δὲ ἔργον nor with the quotation in Rhett. gr. viii. 581 Walz *vīas āchaiōn*. Perhaps the papyrus shewed the construction of ποτιδέγμεναι continued directly in such words as ἦν ποτ' ἀχαιοί/ ἔργον ἐπεκτελέσωμεν οὐ εἵνεκα δέῃρ' ἰκόμεσθα, of which the version partially quoted in the Rhett. gr. was a doublet (e.g. *vīas 'Achaiōn εἴποτε ἔργον ἀνοίτο κ.τ.λ.*). In the next line

the superscribed λ in ι]κομεσ[θ]α may be the remains of ἦλθομεν, but ἰκόμεσθα seems a familiar word to be glossed. The Papyrus adds another to the list of documents which omit B 206.

The papyrus is the earliest known MS. bearing the critical signs. The next is the Pap. B. M. 128 (Kenyon, *Classical Texts*, 1891, p. 100 *Journ. Phil.* 1893, p. 296) of the first century B.C., where the signs are very few. The Tebtunis papyrus has them regularly, and as it may have been written within fifty years after Aristarchus' death its testimony cannot but be important. The following is a comparison of the papyrus and the Venetus A:

¹ *The Tebtunis Papyri*; Part I., edited by B. P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt, and J. G. Smyly. 1902.

TEBT.	VEN. A.
B 95-120 Beginnings of lines lost.	
124 Obelus.	Obelus.
125 Om.	Diple.
130-2 Beginnings lost.	
133 Obelus.	Obelus.
143, 4 Beginnings lost.	
148 Om.	Diple.
156 Dotted diple.	Om.
158-171 Def.	
164 Dotted asterisk and obelus.	Dotted asterisk and obelus.
188-196 Def.	
197 Obelus.	Obelus.
203 Def.	Sigma and Stigme.
204 Antisigma.	Sigma and Stigme.
205 Om.	Sigma and Stigme.

If we make the papyrus a present of all the places where its reading can be called uncertain, it appears to have been regularly furnished with signs, and to agree for the most part with the Ven. A. The papyrus omits the diple on 125 and 148, and adds of its own a dotted diple on 156. As there is justification for signs at both 148 and 156 it would seem that the papyrus omitted one and Ven. A the other. The case at 203 sq. is more complicated. Ven. A has against 203, 204, and 205 three unique symbols, a stigma (actually a very small ring) inside a sigma. Aristarchean usage required three simple stigmata, and so Aristonius found (τούτω καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν δύο ἢ στιγμαὶ παράκειται). Why and when the sigma was added to the dot is, in the absence of a parallel, obscure, (it looks as though someone had combined the Aristophanic usage of sigma and antisigma with the Aristarchean of antisigma and dot), but the papyrus takes the original course of appicting an antisigma to 204 and no sign to the other two lines (203 is doubtful, 205 has no sign). This as the editors observe is the reverse of the usual rule. As B 192—to which the signs refer—has perished in the papyrus, we are unable to say if the scribe were consistent in his apparent reversal of custom and affixed a stigma to 192, or if he used antisigma in its later sense, as a simple mark of omission.

What was the nature of this second century copy of Homer? It was regularly supplied with the Alexandrian semeia, so much is manifest, but what text did it offer? Was the text Alexandrian also? The evidence is too slight to admit of an answer. The papyrus has the Aristarchean Ἰλιον in v. 133, and it would be captious to explain away the circumstance. It is the only

second century fragment containing an Aristarcheanism, and has so far the best claim to be considered Aristarchus' edition. Still *Ἰλιον* may be a clerical error, or the papyrus may be a copy of the edition from which Aristarchus took the reading, and this latter

supposition is somewhat confirmed by the apparent extensive variants on 132 and 137.

We still expect the long and well-preserved second century papyrus which shall tell us what Aristarchus' edition really was.

T. W. ALLEN.

NOTES ON SOPHOCLES'S *ANTIGONE*.¹

V. 178 ἐμοὶ γὰρ ὅστις κτέ.

The γὰρ ought to introduce either an argument or an explanation. It does neither. Professor Semitšlos, in his too little valued edition of the *Antigone*, has alone shewn where the trouble lies and how it is to be remedied. He restores v. 191 to its pristine seat between vv. 177 and 178, making the necessary changes in vv. 175 and 177. He is at fault in one minor detail, viz., that he does not restore ποίοις instead of οἷσις at the head of v. 191. I feel sure too that a future is demanded instead of αἶξω; and that future can only have been αἶξω, as will appear, if one consider the endings of vv. 191 and 178 and ask himself how v. 191 lost its place. But there are some interesting matters of symmetry in this great speech of Creon's that can be properly appreciated only if the speech be presented in full with certain indications of the divisions of the parts. This I now do, making here and there certain alterations proposed by various scholars which (particularly, besides Professor Semitšlos's, that in v. 190) seem to me to be, for various reasons, demanded. I would beg the reader to regard the present discussion as, in part—but only in part—a palinode of what I published on Creon's speech in this *Review*, vol. ix. (1895), 439 sq.

Ἀνδρες, τὰ μὲν δὴ πόλεος ἀσφαλῶς θεοί, 162
πολλῶι σάλωι σείσαντες, ὄρθωσαν πάλιν
ἡμᾶς δ' ἐγὼ πομποῖσιν ἐκ πάντων δίχα
ἔστειλ' ἰκέσθαι τοῦτο μὲν τὰ Λαίου 165
σέβοντας εἰδὼς εὖ θρόνων αἰεὶ κράτη,
τοῦτ' αὖθις, ἡνίκ' Οἰδῖπους ὄρθον πόλιν
κάπεῖ διώλετ', ἀμφὶ τοὺς κείνων ἔτι
παῖδας μένοντας ἐμπέδους φρονήμασιν 169
ὄτ' οὖν ἐκείνοι πρὸς διπλῆς μοίρας μίαν 170
καθ' ἡμέραν ὠλοντο παῖσαντές τε καὶ
πληγέντες αὐτόχειρι σὺν μίσματι,

ἐγὼ κράτη δὴ πάντα καὶ θρόνους ἔχω,
γένους κατ' ἀγχιστεία, τοῖν ὀλωλότοι. 174
Ἀμήχανον δὲ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ὃν μαθεῖν 175
ψυχὴν τε καὶ φρόνημα καὶ γνώμην, πρὶν ἂν
ἀρχαῖς τε καὶ νόμοισιν ἐντρίβῃ, φανῶ 177
ποίοις ἐγὼ νόμοισι τήνδ' αἶξω πόλιν. 191
Ἐμοὶ γὰρ ὅστις, πᾶσαν εἰθύνων πόλιν, 178
μὴ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπτεται βουλευμάτων
ἀλλ' ἐκ φόβου του γλῶσσαν ἐγκλήσας ἔχει 180
κάκιστος εἶναι νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι δοκεῖ
καὶ μείζον ὅστις ἀντὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ πάτρας
φίλον νομίζει, τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω—
ἐγὼ γὰρ—ἴστω Ζεὺς ὁ πάνθ' ὄρων αἰε—
οὐτ' ἂν σιωπήσασιν τὴν ἀτῆν ὄρων 185
στείχουσιν ἀστοῖς ἀντὶ τῆς σωτηρίας
οὐτ' ἂν φίλον ποτ' ἀνδρα δυναιμένη χθονὸς
θείμην ἐμαντῶι τοῦτο γινώσκων, ὅτι
ἡδ' ἐστὶν ἡ σώζουσα καὶ ταύτης ἐπὶ
πλέοντες ὄρθῃς πλοῦς καλοὺς ποιοῦμεθα. 190
Καὶ νῦν ἀδελφὰ τῶνδε κηρύξας ἔχω 192
ἀστοῖσι παίδων τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδῖπου πέρι. 193
Ἐτεοκλέα μὲν, ὃς πόλεως ὑπερμαχῶν 194
ὤλωλε τῆσδε πάντ' ἀριστεύσας δορί, 195
τάφωι τε κρύψαι καὶ τὰ πάντ' ἐφαγνίσαι
ἃ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἔρχεται κάτω νεκροῖς—
τὸν δ' αὖ ξύναιμον τοῦδε—Πολυνείκη λέγω—,
ὃς γῆν πατρώϊαν καὶ θεοὺς τοὺς ἐγγενεῖς,
φυγὰς κατελθὼν, ἠθέλησε μὲν περὶ 200
πέρσαι κατ' ἄκρας, ἠθέλησε δ' αἵματος
κοινού πᾶσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ δουλῶσας ἄγειν—
τοῦτον πόλει τῇδ' ἐκκεκρηῦχθαι λέγω
μήτε κτερίζειν μήτε κωκῆσαι τινα, 205
εἰάν δ' ἀθᾶπτον καὶ πρὸς οἰωνῶν δέμας
καὶ πρὸς κυνῶν ἐδεστὸν αἰκισθέν τ' ἰδεῖν 206
Τοιόνδ' ἐμὸν φρόνημα, κοῦποτ' ἔκ γ' ἐμοῦ 207
τιμῇ προέξουσ' οἱ κακοὶ τῶν ἐνδίκων,
ἀλλ' ὅστις εἰνους τῇδε τῇ πόλει θανῶν—
καὶ ζῶν ὁμοίως—ἐξ ἐμοῦ τιμῆσεται. 210

The symmetrical arrangement of these verses is as follows: After a proem of 13 verses (162–174, divided into 8+5; cf. the opening speeches of *O.T.* and *O.C.*) come 4 verses (175–177+191) that serve at once as

¹ Presented by title at the meeting of the American Philological Association at Union College, Schenectady, N. Y., July 1902.

transition from the preceding and as introduction to the core of Creon's speech. Then come 13 verses (178–190) about the principles (*νόμοι*) of rulership. These are followed by 2 verses (192 *sq.*) introductory of the exemplification by acts of the ruler (*ἀρχαί*) of the principles of rulership. These acts are set forth in 13 verses (194–206). The conclusion is made in 4 verses (207–210), an epilogue, as it were, balancing the prologue in vv. 175–177 and 191. The scheme is this: 13 (8+5) | 4. 13. 2. 13. 4.

It should, it seems, appear entirely probable that nothing has been lost after v. 168. It is true that we have here a harshness, an illogicalness; for *τοὺς κείνων παῖδας* (168) means Oedipus together with Eteocles and Polynices, whereas *ἐκείνοι* (170) means only Eteocles and Polynices. But the break between v. 169 and v. 170 may, perhaps, be thought to mitigate this hardness of expression.

It may be asked here how v. 191 came to be inserted after v. 190, after its likeness of ending to v. 178 had led to its being dropped out of its original place in the speech. This question can, I think, be answered best by assuming that the archetype of the MSS. of Sophocles had 38 verses to the page or column. For, if we count the verses from the beginning to v. 190, we shall find that the Aristotelian prologue contains (omitting the spurious vs. 24) 97 verses; that the parodos contains, if we count the glyconics separately and make the second strophic couplet have, as it should, in a right division of the verses,¹ 8 verses to the strophe, 64 verses; and that we have 29 verses of the first episodion to add. This makes a total of 190, which is = 38 × 5; that is, v. 190 was the last verse of the fifth page in our archetype. My assumption then is that v. 191 was added by the scribe of the archetype or the reviser of the archetype (more probably by the former) at the foot of the fifth page under v. 190 and was, by an error of the writer of the codex next in descent from the archetype, retained between

v. 190 and v. 192. Some person or persons botched vv. 175, 177, and 191 into their present form, wholly or partly in order to make them fit the new context better. It may be added here that vv. 495 and 496, which would read better after v. 493, may once have been at the end of p. 13.

Vv. 289–294 seem not to have been well explained. If we read very carefully we shall, I think, see that *ταῦτα* in v. 289 can not be the object of *ἐρρόθουν*. Unless I am mistaken, *ταῦτα* refers to Polynices's burying and is = *τὸ τὸνδε τὸν νεκρὸν θάψαι* or *πρόνοιαν ἴσχειν τοῦδε τοῦ νεκροῦ περὶ* (v. 283). If this is so, *ταῦτα* has no proper construction but is resumed by *τάδε* in v. 294. *ταῦτα* would have a construction of its own if v. 293 *sq.* were something like this: *καὶ νῦν* (answering to *καὶ πάλα* in v. 289) *τούτους παρήγαγον μισθοῖσιν ὥστ', ἐργάσασθαι*, so that the subject of *παρήγαγον* should be *ἄνδρες μάλιστα φέροντες ἐμοὶ* and *ταῦτα* the object of *ἐργάσασθαι*. The passage should, I think, be thus pointed:

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πάλα πόλεως
 ἄνδρες μάλιστα φέροντες ἐρρόθουν ἐμοὶ 290
 κρυφῇ, κάρα σείοντες οὐδ' ὑπὸ ζυγῶι
 λόφον δικαίως εἶχον ὡς στέργειν ἐμέ—
 ἐκ τῶνδε τούτους ἐξεπίσταμαι καλῶς
 παρηγμένους μισθοῖσιν εἰργάσθαι τάδε.

'No; that (*ταῦτα*, i.e. what you say the gods did—bury Polynices) I know full well that these guards (*τούτους*) did, seduced by hire by certain of the citizens (*πόλεως ἄνδρες*) that, vexed at me (*μάλιστα φέροντες ἐμοὶ*), had long been muttering in secret (*ἐρρόθουν κρυφῇ*, clam mussitabant Liv. 33. 31, 1), shaking the head and not holding the neck properly under the yoke (*οὐδ'...εἶχον = οὐδ' ἔχοντες*) so as to accept me (as their ruler).' I admit, of course, that the construction is extremely harsh; but there are many harshnesses in the *Antigone*.

In v. 504 *ἀνδάνει*, not *ἀνδάνειν*, is the reading of L. This may perhaps be right; for we may understand v. 504 *sq.* thus:

Τούτους (the chorus) τοῦτο πᾶσιν ἀνδάνει
 (this to Creon; then to the chorus with indignation)—

λέγοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ γλῶσσαν ἐγκλήμιο φόβος.

MORTIMER LAMSON EARLE.

¹ ἀντιτύπαι δ' ἐπὶ γῇ πέσε τανταλωθεῖς
 πυρφόρος δὲ τότε μαινομένην ἐν δρμῇ
 βακχεύων ἐπέπνει ῥιπαῖς
 ἐχθίστων ἀνέμων.
 εἶχε δ' ἄλλαι τὰ μὲν (corrupt),
 ἄλλα δ' ἐπ' ἄλλοις ἐπενώμα μέγας Ἀ-
 ρης στυφελίζων
 δεξιόσειρος.—Vv. 134–142.

ARISTOPHANICA.—III.

(Continued from Vol. XV. p. 391).

ACHARNIANS.

525 νεανίαί κλέπτουσι.

The compound verb used in the corresponding sentences (527 ἀντεξέκλεψαν) suggests that we should write νεανίαί 'κκλέπτουσι.

641 τὰτα ποιήσας πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος
ὑμῖν γεγέννηται
καὶ τοὺς δῆμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δείξας
ὡς δημοκρατοῦνται.

The poet sometimes and to some extent takes, or affects to take, the side of the suffering allies of Athens, oppressed, not indeed by the generous Athenian people, but by its unscrupulous and dishonest servants and supporters. Cf. such passages as *Peace* 759 τοιοῦτον ἰδὼν τέρας (Cleon) οὐ κατέδειο', ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πολεμίζων ἀντίχον αἰεὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νήσων. *ib.* 639 and 936: *Wasps* 669: *Knights* 1319 'Αθήναις καὶ ταῖς νήσοις ἐπικούρε and *ib.* 1408.

Taking such passages into account and also the significant fact that he goes on here to describe the admiration which his conduct will excite among the allies (643-5), I should suggest that τοῖς δῆμοις be read in 642 for τοὺς δῆμους and joined in construction to ὑμῖν. If his benefits are confined to Athens, there is much less reason for the allies' admiration than if the benefits are distinctly and truly stated to extend to them too. It is not at all against this that the preceding lines have spoken of the envoys of the allies trying to cajole the city, and of the poet exposing them. On this subject see Mr. Starkie's *Wasps*, Excursus iv.

691 τοῦτ' ὀφλῶν ἀπέρχομαι.

As line 689 has just ended with ὀφλῶν ἀπέρχεται, is it too bold to propose ἀπώλεσα here in the place of ἀπέρχομαι, which may very well be an erroneous repetition? The ἀπολέσθαι in another sense of 692 does not seem to me against this, at any rate in comparison.

KNIGHTS.

712 ἀλλ', ὦ πονηρέ, σοὶ μὲν οὐδὲν πείθεται.

As Demos is at present quite unacquainted with the sausage-seller, there is no point in saying that he does not heed him. How can you heed someone you never heard

of? Read the future πείσεται, corresponding to the futures in the two preceding lines. The mistake is a common one. It occurs again, I think, in *Clouds* 1422

οὐκ οὐκ ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸν νόμον θεὸς τοῦτον ἦν τὸ πρῶτον,

ὥσπερ σὺ καγὼ, καὶ λέγων ἔπειθε τοὺς παλαιούς;

ἔπειθε is certainly possible, meaning that he had habitually to persuade; but ἔπεισε, matching θεὸς, seems more likely.

783 ἐπὶ ταῖσι πέτραις οὐ φροντίζει σκληρῶς
σε καθήμενον οὕτως.

The parallels quoted for the accusative, being practically all poetical (*Ar. Rhet.* 2. 9. 4?), are not very satisfactory. Should we read εἰδῶς for οὕτως? On confusion of εἰ and οὐ see *Bast Comm.* p. 760.

CLOUDS.

75 νῦν οὖν ὅλην τὴν νύκτα φροντίζων ὁδοῦ
μίαν ἤτρον ἀτραπὸν δαιμονίως ὑπερφνῶ,
ἦν ἦν ἀναπέσω τουτονὶ σωθήσομαι.

The greatest objection to ὁδοῦ (for which Blaydes suggests and Van Leeuwen reads μόλις) is to my mind that there is nothing in the lines preceding to lead up to it. They suggest no difficulty, no need of a ὁδός. It would be a very slight change and yet would make the passage materially smoother, if we read ὁδὸν μίαν ἤτρον, ἀτραπὸν δαιμονίως ὑπερφνῶ.

520 οὕτω νυκίσαιμι τ' ἐγὼ καὶ νομιζομένην
σοφός,
ὥς ὑμᾶς ἡγοούμενος εἶναι θεατὰς δεξιούς
καὶ ταύτην σοφώτατ' ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν
κωμωδιῶν,
πρώτους ἡξίωσ' ἀναγεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἢ παρέσχε
μοι
ἔργον πλείστον· εἰτ' ἀνεχώρουν ὑπ' ἀν-
δρῶν φορτικῶν
ἡττηθείς, οὐκ ἄξιός ὢν.

It seems impossible to make sense of πρώτους ἀναγεῖν ὑμᾶς. It is understood (1) of the first edition of the *Clouds* brought out at the Great Dionysia, as if Aristophanes claimed credit for having first produced it there, when he might have produced it at Piræus or even (Teuffel) Aegina. I doubt whether, except a doubtful statement in Aelian and one or two other stories of very

exceptional circumstances, there is any evidence of new plays by Athenian poets being produced anywhere but in Athens. Certainly that was the ordinary practice, and nothing could have been more grotesque than for the poet to draw attention to the fact that he had in this case actually conformed to it. What else was he likely or even able to do? The words are also taken (Blaydes, Kock who reads *πρώτην*) of (2) the second edition, to which our parabasis belongs. This is however entirely inconsistent with *εἰτ' ἀνεχώρουν* κ.τ.λ., which must refer to the same occasion and is admitted to refer to the first performance.

There is a further difficulty in the word *ἀναγείδσαι*. Whether it means 'give a taste' or 'give a second taste,' the editors ignore the fact that the idea of a *taste* is quite out of place. A taste of a play would be given by the performance of one scene or the recital of one *ῥῆσις*. To exhibit a play entire is not to give a taste of it. This objection is fatal to some other theories and proposals that have been broached.

When we read the passage, the sense required seems to be something like 'I thought my cleverest play, the play which cost me so much labour, would be sure to meet with your approval: that you would be the first persons to enjoy it.' But how are we to get this? Pending some better suggestion, I propose very doubtfully *πρώτους ἡξίωσα γανῶσθ' or γάνυσθ' ὑμᾶς*: 'I expected to delight you, or you to be delighted first.' The active *γανῶν* is not found in this sense, though the passive, especially in the participle *γανωμένος*, is well known. No doubt therefore *γανῶσαι* is dubious, though not out of the question. *γάνυσθαι* is unobjectionable, but less near the MSS. As for Aristophanes' use of the words, cf. *Ach.* 7 ταῦθ' ὡς ἐγανώθην and *Wasps* 612 τοῦτοιςιν ἐγὼ γάνυμαι.

528 ἐξ ὅτον γὰρ ἐνθαδ' ἵπ' ἀνδρῶν, οἷς ἡδὺ καὶ λέγειν,
ὁ σῶφρων τε χῶ καταπύγων ἄριστ' ἡκουσ-
άτην, κ.τ.λ.

The very feeble οἷς ἡδὺ καὶ λέγειν has been corrected by Herwerden to οἷς ἡδὺ καὶ ψέγειν, *men who delight in finding fault*, but this is perhaps not quite the expression which a poet would use when seeking to conciliate. The confusion of λέγειν and ψέγειν is however well known; suppose we were to combine it here with the further slight alteration of οἷς to οὗς (cf. on *Ach.* 641 above) *men with whom it is a pleasure even to find fault*. A poet might fairly say this of

an intelligent audience. He prefers them, even when they make a mistake, to the slow-witted people of other places.

1129 ὅσοι μὲν τὴν νύκτα πᾶσαν' ὥστ' ἴσως
βουλήσεται
καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τυχεῖν ὦν μᾶλλον ἢ
κρίναι κακῶς.

The text is right enough here, as far as I can see. But there seems to be a confusion of thought, which the editors do not clearly point out. The Clouds are threatening the judges with the consequences of an adverse verdict. In various ways and on various occasions they will visit them with bad weather, ὥστε κ.τ.λ. Now here the poet might logically say either of two things: (1) you will have such bad weather that for the future (τυχεῖν and κρίναι must of course be future) you will wish to undergo anything and live anywhere rather than give a wrong verdict: (2) you will have such bad weather that you will wish yourselves removed from Athens, much as you love it, and transplanted to the rainless skies of Egypt. In (1) the climate of Egypt, in (2) ἢ κρίναι κακῶς has no proper place. What Aristophanes actually says is, if my analysis is right, a quite illogical mixture and confusion of the two things. But I shall be very glad if he can be vindicated by better interpretation.

It is not irrelevant here to point out that the analogy drawn in lines 534-6 of this play between his comedy and Electra is somewhat faulty. In the first place Electra does not 'come seeking' for her brother, as the comedy does: it is the brother that comes to her. Secondly the comedy is to recognise its spiritual brethren, a capable and congenial audience, by something or other, as Electra recognised Orestes by the hair. The only thing on the part of the audience that could lead to such recognition under the circumstances would be their applause and favourable reception of the comedy. But anyone can see how very lamely this answers to its intended analogue, the lock of hair. What would really answer to that would be some quality or action of the audience as unconnected with the comedy as the lock of hair with the person of Electra. This criticism is not pressing a logical point too far. It is just in the finish of details that perfection of classical work consists, and any good judge must feel that the confusion here and in 1130 is a serious blemish.

I add two trifling suggestions on the text.

320 καὶ περὶ καπνοῦ στενολεσχέιν.

Perhaps περὶ τοῦ τε καπνοῦ στενολεσχέιν. The quantity of the α in καπνοῦ is a real difficulty.

933 κλαύσει, τὴν χεῖρ' ἣν ἐπιβάλλης.

So apparently the MSS., but it is rather the aorist tense we want. The Aldine text has τὴν χεῖρ' ἐπιβάλλεις. Should we read κλαύσει, τὴν σὴν χεῖρ' εἰ 'πιβαλεις?

WASPS.

65 ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν λογίδιον γνώμην ἔχον,
ἡμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν οὐχὶ δευτέρων,
κωμωδίας δὲ φορτικῆς σοφώτερον.

Perhaps δεξιωτέρων and σοφωτέρων, agreeing with γνώμην.

318 ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐχ' οἶός τ' εἰμ' ᾄδεν.

For ᾄδεν, which has been seen to be nonsense here, read εὔδεν. In Plut. Mor. 515 F εὔδεν is now always read for the MS. ᾄδεν (οἶκοι μὲν εὔδεν τυφλήν).

564 οἱ μὲν γ' ἀποκλάνονται πενίαν αὐτῶν καὶ
προστιθέασιν
κακά πρὸς τοῖς οὖσιν, ὥς ἀνιῶν ἀνίσωσθαι
τοῖσιν ἐμῶσιν.

So V: the other MSS. omit ἀνιῶν. Editors sometimes ἀνιῶν, but most of them give the passage up, or materially alter it. It presents three difficulties: (1) ἀνιῶν or ἀνιῶν: (2) the position of ἀν, or, if we read ἀνίσωσθαι, its omission: (3) the strangeness of making Philocleon speak of his evils (κακά) or miseries, when he is dwelling on the proud, almost royal (549-551), position that, as a dicast, he occupies. No real explanation of this last point is forthcoming.

After much puzzling over the passage I am inclined to make the bold suggestion, which will get rid of (1) and (3) together, that for ἀνιῶν we should read ἀγαθοῖς, imagining ἀνιῶν to have arisen perhaps out of ἀν, as Van Leeuwen says, after ἀγαθοῖς was lost. ἀγαθοῖς gives excellent sense ('makes himself out as wretched as I am enviable') and is at any rate in perfect keeping with 577 καὶ τὰ γὰρ ἅ μοι μέμνησ' ἄχων φάσκεας τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄρχην and 601 σκέψαι δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἶων (!) ἀποκλήεις καὶ κατερύκεις. For the antithesis of the sentence cf. Thuc. 6. 78. 3 τοῖς αὐτοῦ κακοῖς ὀλοφύρβεις τάχ' ἂν ἴσως καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποτε βουλευθείη αὖθις φθονῆσαι.

There remains the question of ἀν. Some might prefer to write ἔως...ἀνίσωσθαι (or ἀνισωθῆναι, as is needlessly suggested), but the omission of ἀν is very improbable, though

perhaps in anapaests we ought not to call it quite impossible. Of the two alternatives I would rather choose the other, that ἀν is out of its proper place. There is at least one other example of this in Aristophanes, namely *Frogs* 259 ὁπόσον ἢ φάρνγξ ἂν ἡμῶν χανδάνῃ δι' ἡμέρας, not to mention the Doric οὐχ' ἄς πόδας κα' ἔχοντι ταὶ τριήρεις which seems a very probable restoration of *Lysistr.* 173. A few examples may also be found elsewhere e.g. Plato *Lysis* 647 E ὁπόσω πλέων ἂν ἔλῃ, 739 C, 848 A, 955 D: Xen. *Cyn.* 6. 20 ὁποσαχῇ οἶόν τ' ἂν ᾖ: *Hiero* 1. 38 ἢ μάλιστ' ἂν δύνωνται: Eur. fragm. 1029. 4 ὅσω περ μᾶλλον ἂν χρῆσθαι θέλῃς. It may be observed however that, even if the MSS. are correct, these examples all occur, except *Lysistr.* 173, in relative clauses.

LYSISTRATA.

97 πρὶν λέγειν δ', ὑμᾶς τοδὶ | ἐπερήσομαί τι μικρόν.

τοδὶ—τὸ μικρόν would be much more usual, and the confusion sometimes occurs.

553 κατ' ἐντήξῃ τέτανον τερπνὸν τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ ῥοπαλισμοῦς.

'ἐντήξῃ B: ἐντέξῃ RBC: ἐνστάξῃ Hirschig' Hall and Geldart. But ἐντέξῃ seems an illegitimate form. ἐντήξῃ very questionable as to use, and ἐνστάξῃ scarcely appropriate. Perhaps ἐμπήξῃ may be conjectured. Pind. *Pyth.* 2. 91 ἐνέπαξαν ἔλκος ὀδοναρὸν ἐὰν πρόσθε καρδίᾳ and Isocr. 1. 46 αἱ λύται ταῖς ἡδοναῖς παραπετήγασιν are enough to vindicate the metaphorical use.

634 I shall be (says the chorus) another Aristogiton:

αὐτὸς γὰρ μοι γίγνεται
τῆς θεοῦς ἐχθρᾶς πατάξει τῆσδε γραῶς τὴν γνάθον.

αὐτὸ for αὐτός seems unmeaning, and ταῦτό is not much improvement on it. I would suggest πάντα...γίγνεται in the sense of 'is everything needed,' 'carries the day,' &c. πάντα and αὐτά, πάντων and αὐτῶν, &c. are sometimes confused. In line 486 of this play, καὶ μὴν αὐτῶν τοῦτ' ἐπιθυμῶ νῆ τὸν Δία πρῶτα πυθέσθαι, αὐτῶν, which has nothing to refer to, has been very plausibly altered to πάντων.

1150 οἱ Λάκωνες...
πολλοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας Θετταλῶν ἀπό-
λεσαν,
πολλοὺς δ' ἐταίρους Ἰππίου καὶ ξυμ-
μάχους,
ἐννεκμαχοῦντες τῇ τόθ' ἡμέρᾳ μόνοι.

ἐννεκμαχεῖν is not found elsewhere, nor

does it seem a probable form. Even if it were open to no other objection, it is not likely that Aristophanes would have used it immediately after *ξυμμάχους* in the preceding line. I take it that under the influence of *ξυμμάχους* it has been erroneously written for another word, probably *συνεκπονούντες*. This source of error has often been pointed out. Of course some other word, e.g. *συνεκδραμόντες*, is possible.

THESMOPHORIAZUSAE.

103 *πρατίδι* for *πατρίδι*? *πρατίς* seems admissible in an Agathonian lyric, since we find it in Euripides.

217 ἢ μὴ 'πιδιδόναί 'μαντὸν ὠφελόν ποτε.
ἢ should, I think, be ἦ. Cf. *Ecc.* 145 ἦ μοι μὴ γενεῶν κρείττον ἦν.

802 πρὸς ἕκαστον. ? καθ' ἕκαστον, as in *Birds* 564.

870 μὴ ψεύσον, ὦ Ζεῦ, τῆς ἐπιούσης ἐλπίδος.

As ἐπιούσης has been questioned, it may be worth while to point out that ἡ μέλλονσα ἐλπίς occurs once or twice in Demosthenes (18. 89 : [26. 21]) and elsewhere.

1061 Should καὶ τὴ be καὶ τῶ? There does not seem much point in the former.

1181 φέρε θοιμάτιον ἄνωθεν, ὦ τέκνον, τοδί.
ἄνωθεν being unmeaning and a verb required, we naturally think of ἀναθῶμεν, but it would have to bear some meaning that the dictionaries do not exactly specify. 1189 λαβὲ θοιμάτιον gives the reverse.

FROGS.

689 κεί τις ἤμαρτε σφαλεῖς τι Φρυγίχου παλαίσμασιν,
ἐγγενέσθαι φημί χρήναι τοῖς ὀλισθοῦσιν τότε
αἰτίαν ἐκθεῖσι λῦσαι τὰς πρότερον ἁμαρτίας.

αἰτίαν ἐκθεῖσι is unexplained. 'Setting forth a reason why' gives no good sense. That would be justifying or at least explaining their offence, whereas λῦσαι τὰς πρότερον ἁμαρτίας (note πρότερον) clearly contrasts subsequent conduct with earlier. They are somehow to redeem, not to extenuate, their error. We want something roughly like the words of Thuc. 2. 42. 4 καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τὰλλα χεῖροσι δίκαιον τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνδραγαθίαν προτιθεσθαι, or *ib.* 3. 56. 6 δίκαιον ἡμῶν τῆς νῦν ἁμαρτίας, εἰ ἄρα ἡμάρτηται, ἀντιθεῖναι τὴν

τότε προθυμίαν. This being so, Herwerden's αἰτίαν ἐκδοῖσι, adopted by Van Leeuwen, is no improvement. Proceeding on the occasional confusion of αἰτίος and ἄξιος (cf. this *Review*, 14 pp. 101A and 447A), I think it possible that ἄξι' ἀντεκθεῖσι may be what Aristophanes wrote, though I would not say more. Cf. the ἀντιθεῖναι in Thuc. 3. 56. 6. ἀντεκθεῖσι would mean of course, not that they had performed worthy deeds, but that they had produced or set them forth as arguments in their favour. ἐκτιθέναι in this sense is familiar in Aristotle, though it is not cited from any other author, and we have the testimony of all the MSS. to it here. If Aristophanes could say ἐκθεῖσι, he could say ἀντεκθεῖσι. That Aristotle happens to have the phrase αἰτίας ἐκτιθεσθαι is not very important, if the phrase is shown to be unsuitable in this place. The poet is arguing that the offenders should be allowed a chance of retrieving their former fault, not of showing how they came to fall into it. But I confess we should have expected a word expressing *performance* rather than a somewhat scholastic term for *statement*. It is of course natural to suggest the simple ἀντιθεῖσι, but then how would the *εκ* get in?

835 ὦ δαμόνι' ἀνδρῶν, μὴ μεγάλα λίαν λέγε.

λέγειν μεγάλα should mean *use boastful, arrogant language*. But the words to which it is applied here are nothing of the kind. Euripides has said of Aeschylus

ἀποσεμνυνεῖται πρῶτον, ὅπερ ἐκάστοτε
ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαισιν ἑτεραπεύετο,

and to these words μεγάλα λέγειν seems quite inapposite. A few lines previously, however, Euripides has said something which might well call forth the rebuke :

κρείττων γὰρ εἶναι φημι τούτου τὴν τέχνην.

Should 835 follow on this?

1180 οὐ γὰρ μοῦσιν ἄλλ' ἀκουστέα
τῶν σῶν προλόγων τῆς ὀρθότητος τῶν
ἐπῶν.

ἀκουστέα does not seem quite the right word to use. Perhaps γευστέα.

ECCLESIAZUSAE.

In the opening speech of Praxagora γάρ in l. 3 is not easy to understand, and in line 6 ὅρμα κ.τ.λ. occupies an impossible place in the middle of descriptive lines. The imperative cannot have been meant to stand between the statement ἔχεις and the statement δηλοῦμεν. It would be best placed after line 1. But any change is open to the

objection that it leaves three consecutive sentences (3, 4, 7) with a γάρ.

44-5 ἡμῶν is very awkwardly placed. Should it change places with οἰνόν? (Meineke ἡ μὴν for ἡμῶν).

171 τοῖς θεοῖς μὲν εὐχομαι
τυχεῖν κατορθώσασα τὰ βεβουλευμένα.

This must be the beginning of Praxagora's speech in character as a man. The sense and the antithesis of μὲν...δέ show this. But then the feminine κατορθώσασα is wrong. The error is, I think, one that occurs elsewhere, a confusion of nominative singular feminine with dative plural masculine, there being only the difference of a vowel. Read κατορθώσασι. The action is much better ascribed to the gods than to the speaker; indeed it could hardly be claimed by the latter without some arrogance. On the other hand τυχεῖν, as applied to the gods, seems to me very questionable, and I should be glad to find some parallel, or some alternative.

253 Praxagora will say of Cephalus first παραφροντεῖν, then μελαγχολᾶν, then

τὰ τρύβλια
κακῶς κεραμεύειν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν εὖ καὶ καλῶς.

But this last would be complimentary and out of keeping with the other statements, so that it can hardly be right. Our doubts are strengthened by the fact that εὖ καὶ does not appear at all in the Ravenna MS. I suggest τὰ τρύβλια καλῶς κεραμεύειν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν κακὸν κακῶς, in which the reason for the loss of κακόν is obvious. κακὸς κακῶς, καλὸς καλῶς are familiar Aristophanic phrases.

280 Perhaps we should read οὕτως or εὐθύς for αὐτῶν, which is very obscure.

282 ὥς εἶωθ' ἐκεῖ
τοῖς μὴ παροῦσιν ὀρθροῖς εἰς τὴν πύκνα
ὑπαποτρέχειν ἔχουσι μηδὲ πάτταλον.

This use of εἶωθε, 'it is a usual thing,' is unknown. Also ἐκεῖ is entirely superfluous, the Phnyx being mentioned by name in the next line. Did Aristophanes write ὥς εἶωθός ὄν? Cf. Eur. *Hec.* 358 οὐκ εἶωθός ὄν.

286-7 ἡμᾶς is much too emphatic as it comes. Read perhaps ἡμᾶς αἰὲ μεμνημένας... λέγειν.

469 σὺ δέ γε νῆ Δία
δρᾷ ταῦθ', ἢν' ἀριστῆς τε καὶ κινῆς ἅμα.

I do not think the context supplies any meaning for δρᾷ ταῦθ', and—what is more—νῆ Δία cannot be used with an imperative. δρᾷς ταῦτα may be suggested, ταῦτα being τὰ τῆς πόλεως, attending assemblies, &c. The point is his contingent reluctance to do something which it is at present his very object to enable himself to do. Cf. perhaps for the corruption *Eq.* 1019 (δρᾷ for δρᾷς) and for the sentiment *Soph. fragm.* 669.

581 ἀλλ' οὐ μέλλειν ἀλλ' ἄπτεσθαι καὶ δὴ
χρῆν ταῖς διανοαῖς,
ὥς τὸ ταχύνειν χαρίτων μετέχει πλείστον
παρὰ τοῖσι θεαταῖς.

In 581 ἀλλὰ πέτεσθαι and τῆς διανοίας have been suggested, Bentley who made the former suggestion afterwards acquiescing in the latter (Blaydes). Perhaps ἀλλ' ἐπιθέσθαι may deserve consideration. Cf. such passages as Plato *Gorg.* 527 D ἐπιθρομέμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς.

596 It is hard to see how κοινωνοῦμεν can be right with regard to future time. Perhaps the deliberative κοινωνῶμεν, but ἡρὴ κοινωνεῖν would be much more natural.

622 Fighting περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐνγκαταδαρθεῖν is surely not a possible expression: the negative has no business there. Is μὴ a mistake for δῆ?

628-9 Instead of inserting some words like καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις in 628 to make up for the necessary removal of οἱ φανώτεροι, I suggest that 628 should end with ταῖσι γυναιξίν, and that in 629 between πρὶν <ἂν> and τοῖς αἰσχροῖς three or four syllables have been lost. Such a halting line as ταῖσι γυναιξί, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς χαρίσωνται, though it has Elmsley's authority, is not one we can ascribe to Aristophanes: the position of πρὶν ἂν is intolerable.

1070 τοῦτο and τοῦτον cannot be right together. Read perhaps τοῦτ' αὖ, πολλὸ τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐξωλέστερον, the second τοῦτο emphasising the first.

1091 Possibly ἀμφοτέρας for ἀμφοτέρας, but I think it is hardly necessary, though a difficulty has been felt.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

VINDOBONENSIS F AND THE TEXT OF PLATO.

AFTER Mr. Adam's review of my edition of the Republic in *C.R.* xvi. 215 ff. and Mr. Stuart Jones's article in *C.R.* xvi. 388 ff., Vind. 55 (suppl. phil. gr. 39) can no longer be called 'a neglected MS. of Plato.' Mr. Adam admits that in future, as the oldest representative of the class to which it belongs, F should be quoted instead of Laur. plut. 85. 7 (= Stallbaum's Flor. x., Schneider's Flor. R) and Ang. C. l. 7 (= Bekker's v, Schneider's Ang. B). There is no doubt of the seniority of F: it is written in a fourteenth century hand, and was, as appears from the *scriptio*, in possession of Franciscus Barbarus in 1420, the very year in which Flor. x was written, while Ang. v is not earlier than the sixteenth century. In my opinion, Schanz has proved that x is derived from F (*Platonis opera* IX., pp. x, xi). Mr. Adam doubts this, and refers them to a common original. Similarly, I believe that Schanz has shown v to be derived from x (*Platocodex* pp. 73, 79 ff. 106 ff.). Here again Mr. Adam has doubts, and he might have appealed to the authority of Jordan, (*Hermes* xiii. 470 ff.), who derives F with xv from Laur. plut. 59, 1 (Schneider's Flor. A). I have not been able to accept this, because, though there is an undeniable relationship between the two MSS. in certain passages, it does not extend to the greater part of the Republic, and because there are many things which point to the independence of F. I cannot see my way, on the other hand, to believe that xv are independent of F, because they are full of readings that can be explained only as misunderstandings of the corrections made in F by a later hand. We are, I think, forced to conclude, either that xv are derived from F, or that by some strange coincidence, after F had been written, the same corrections were made in the supposed common original of F x v as were made in F itself by the later hand f. This is not an easy hypothesis, and therefore I do not adopt it. The main point is, however, that even if Mr. Adam were shown to be right, that would only strengthen my case. I am trying to prove the existence of a tradition independent of ADM in the Republic; but I only feel justified at present in calling a single witness to that tradition. Mr. Adam's argument, if it were conclusive, would show that there are at least three.

Mr. Stuart Jones also admits all that is vital to my case, namely that F 'follows a

tradition not derivable from ADM,' thus as he says, 'to a considerable extent rendering an appeal to the MSS. of the Renaissance (esp. Ξ q) superfluous.' This is the point for which I am contending. The Renaissance MSS. (and especially Mon. q) are full of readings which no one would dream of ascribing to anything but conjecture. When, therefore, we are driven to rely on their authority, we cannot be sure in a single case that we are relying on genuine tradition. Such readings have precisely as much or as little authority as the printed emendations of Renaissance scholars. Mr. Jones points out, it is true, that F too contains conjectures. That is the case, but they are of the harmless mediaeval type which is comparatively easy to deal with. F very often inserts words with the intention of making the grammatical structure of a sentence clear, and thereby it often, as in Rep. 330, c 6- (a case referred to by Mr. Jones) completely destroys the real meaning of a passage. But Byzantine interpolations of that class are a very different thing from the more plausible emendations of the Italian Renaissance. I hold, therefore, that I was quite entitled to say of F that in many places it alone 'preserves' the true reading, even if that reading happens to occur also in one or more Renaissance MSS. The burden of proof must always lie with those who hold that, in any given case, the true reading has been 'preserved' by MSS. like Ξ and q.

Mr. Jones's main argument, however, is not directed against this position, which is substantially his own, but against the hypothesis of the 'ancient vulgate.' With regard to that hypothesis, I wish to say that it was not invented by me and that my case for F does not stand or fall with it. The problem is an interesting one in itself, especially for the light which may be thrown by its solution on the text of the papyrus fragments. I do not think Mr. Jones has succeeded yet in overthrowing the theory, though perhaps I went too far in using the words *vel ex mea adnotatione satis apparebit*, if that is to be construed strictly as referring to the Republic alone. The fact is, as Mr. Jones allows, that, for a final solution of the question, it will be necessary to examine the text of the other dialogues as well, and I am at present engaged upon that task. When it is completed I shall be happy to discuss the

point again; for the present I prefer to say no more about it.¹ I will only observe that, even if the result of further inquiry were to confirm Mr. Jones's negative conclusion as to the 'ancient vulgate,' that would only strengthen my case for F. If F represents an 'ancient vulgate,' then its readings and those of the *testimonia* taken together only amount to the evidence of a single and not very trustworthy witness; but, if there was no such 'vulgate,' the very numerous agreements² between F and the quotations in ancient writers become more striking still. In any given case of agreement, we shall then have two witnesses instead of one, and F must be placed on a higher pedestal than I have ventured to claim for it. The working hypothesis—for it is nothing more at present—of a *vetus vulgata* is chiefly useful in enabling me to state the case for F in the most moderate form possible.

To return to the question immediately in hand, the relation of F to the leading MSS., I am now in a position to strengthen the case very considerably. I owe this to the great kindness of Prof. J. Král of Prag, who has collated a considerable portion of the MS. for me, there being no published collation except in the Republic. None of the dialogues which come before the Gorgias in the traditional order are con-

tained in F, but from that point onwards we have its help. I am now able to state that, just as in the Republic F is independent of ADM, so in the Gorgias and Meno it is independent of BTW. In Tetralogy VII, which is not contained in the Clarkianus, it is similarly independent of TW, though in the Hippias minor, Io, and Menexenus, it is very closely related to Bekker's Σ (Ven. 189), a fact already noted by Schanz (Platonis Opera IX, pp. xiv, xv). Schanz made considerable use of Σ (which he names S) in these dialogues, and he called attention to the agreement of that MS. with Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Stobaeus in the Menexenus. If any one cares to compare the readings of S in that dialogue³ with those of the two writers named, he will find that they raise the same sort of problem as the passage of Eusebius which I adduced. The readings of F are practically the same; but the precise relation between F and S (which is of earlier date than F) must be left for future inquiry.⁴

In order to prove the independence of F, I begin as in my former article (*C.R.* xvi. 98ff.) by showing that, from the nature of the errors which it makes, it must have been derived from an uncial codex. The following examples will make this clear.

GORGIAS.

BTW	F
448b ἡρόδικος	πρόδικος
467b σχέτλια	ἔχεται ᾧ
505d ἀτελῇ	ἄτε δῇ
522e λέξει	δέξαι
525c ἐν αἰδου	ἐδίδου

MENO.

BTW	F
70b εἴθικεν	ῥοικεν
80d εἴσει	ἴσθι
93b παραληπτὸν	γὰρ ἀληπτὸν

HIPPIAS MAIOR.

TW	F
286b φειδοστράτου	φιλοστράτου
287d μῆλλα	με δᾶι
291a πᾶσι τοῖς	πλείστοις
292b δέξει	λέξειν
293a αἰ	δῇ

³ A selection from them is given in the Appendix to Schanz's Plato, vol. IX.

⁴ The agreement of F with S does not appear in any dialogue before the Hippias minor for reasons given by Schanz (*loc. cit.*). Nothing, therefore, can be inferred from it with regard to the text of S in dialogues not contained in F.

¹ I must, however, at once correct an inadvertence on the part of Mr. Jones, which has led him to misrepresent my view. He attributes to me the statement that the recension represented by our best MSS. of Plato, was made 'possibly about the ninth century A.D.' Such a view has been, and is, held; but I have never been able to believe that anyone in the ninth century could have made a 'recension' of Plato. What I said was 'the fifth century A.D.,' not 'the ninth,' and I mentioned that date because I think it is the latest possible one. I should have no objection, so far as this argument is concerned, to putting the date of the recension earlier still. If, for instance, we were to adopt Usener's theory of the history of Plato's text, we should obviously have to do so. I may be allowed also to say that, in the *Praefatio* to vol. ii. of my Plato, in dealing with the views of A. Schaeffer, I expressly rejected the theory of a ninth century recension, so far as the Clarkianus is concerned.

² The number of these agreements is far greater than any one would be led to infer from what Mr. Jones says; but it is not so much their number as the peculiar way in which they occur that constitutes the real problem. It is not a question of making 'lists' of agreements. These would prove nothing. Mr. Jones himself has adopted the only sound method, namely that of taking passages of considerable extent and studying every variant in them. That is what I did also in my article (*C.R.* xvi. 98 ff.). I took a long passage which is quoted by Eusebius, and I noted almost every variant of importance. If that passage stood alone (and it certainly does not) it would of itself raise the problem.

TW	F
„ d εὐήθη	εὐνοῇ
„ d γὰρ ἔχω	παρέχω
294d ἀγνοεῖσθαι	διαλέγεσθαι
298a θράσει	ὀράσει
299d εἰ τις αὐτῷ	ἐπὶ αὐτῷ
„ εἰς ὃ	οὐσθ'
300b αἱ ἡδοναὶ	δῆλον αἱ
302b ἐλεγχθῇ	ἐδίχθη

HIPPIAS MINOR.

TW	F
368b οἶαι αἱ περσικαὶ	οἶμαί περ εἰ καὶ
371c κλισίη	καισίη
„ e εὐηθείας	εὐνοίας
„ e ἡ οἱ	μοι
376a διὰ δύνανιν	αιαδυναμια

MENEXENUS.

239d δεῖ δὴ	δῆλῃ
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Occasionally F alone has read the uncials correctly, while the leading MSS. have gone wrong, e.g.—

GORG. 492b. ἐπεὶ ὅσους F: ἐπεὶ θεοῖς BT: ἐπεὶ δὲ οἷς W. The reading of F is new and obviously right, as it alone will account for the corruptions. The generally accepted reading, ἐπεὶ γε οἷς is based by Schanz on the authority of 'recens b,' and is clearly an attempt to repair the damage after it had been done. The ἐπεὶ τοῖς of the corrector of T is a less happy attempt of the same kind.

ib. 492d. ἀμώθεν γέ ποθεν (sic) F: ἀλλοθεν γέ ποθεν BTW. In Schanz's edition the true reading figures as Bekker's emendation.

ib. 514a. φῶμεν F: θῶμεν BTW. In Schanz's edition φῶμεν is adopted as a conjecture of Madvig's.

526d. ἀσκῶν F Eusebius: σκοπῶν BTW. Schanz does not adopt ἀσκῶν, but it is doubtless the true reading. It is noteworthy that two lines above T has γρ. ἀσκῶ as a note on σκοπῶ.

MENO 89e. ἀντρος (bis) F: αὐρὸς (bis) BTW. The true reading has hitherto rested on the authority of 'Flor. x.'

HIPP. MA. 291d. ἐπαίειν F: ἐπαινεῖν TW. Schanz can only quote for ἐπαίειν 'γρ. apogr. E, Muretus.' (By 'apogr. E', he means Ξ).

In conclusion, I wish to call attention to one or two correct readings of F which bear the mark of the highest antiquity.

GORG. 472b. ἐν πυθίον F: ἐν πυθοῖ BTW. The reference is to the ἀνάθημα of Aristokrates, son of Skellios, and the reading of F is confirmed, if confirmation were needed, by C.I.A. i. 422, 'Ἀριστοκράτης Σκελίου ἀνέθηκεν νικήσας Κεκροπίδ[ι] ἐν ἑορτῇ . . . Πυθίου. The right reading is already found in Stephanus, who no doubt got it from the second Basel edition, but it has up to the present had no authority but Par. 1815 (Bekker's I), a 16th century MS., which, in this part of the Gorgias, follows the text of F very closely indeed.

ib. 487c. τείσανδρον F: τίσανδρον BTW. No other MS. has succeeded in preserving the true spelling of the name.

ib. 493b. ἀδῆς F: ἀειδῆς BTW. Here F alone has preserved the true form, to which attention was first called by the Petrie papyrus fragments of the Phaedo. Cf. my critical note on Phd. 79, a 4, from which it will be seen that T preserves the correct form in the Phaedo, though it has not done so here.

I think I may claim that a MS., which preserves such readings as these, is not to be lightly set aside. Whether it represents an 'ancient vulgate' or not, it certainly represents, though in a mutilated form, an older tradition in some respects than the leading MSS, and thus enables us to find a more solid basis for the text of Plato.

JOHN BURNET.

PLATONICA.—V.

(Continued from Vol. XVI. p. 16.)

THEAETETUS.

143 A ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην.
ὃ μὴ μεμνήμην seems much more likely, and these perfect optatives are very liable to corruption.

148 C εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπανῶν μηδενὶ οὕτω δρομικῷ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἴτα διαθέντος τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡγνίθης, κ.τ.λ.

τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου seems an impossible expression. 'The swiftest runner' is

right enough, because in any given set of people one will probably be the swiftest. But 'the grown man' is not right, because any number of them may be grown men. We cannot take the words as generic, 'a grown man and very fast runner': Plato could never use the article so in such an expression, and it must not be defended by *ἄν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον κτείνῃ* (Dem. 23, 41, etc.), *ἄν τις τὸν ἐλεύθερον κακῶς λέγῃ* ('Ath. Πολ. 59. 5), and similar technical forms.

We might patch the words up by reading <ὕπό> *τὸν ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου* (or *ἀκμάζοντός του* as has been proposed), but to me *καὶ ταχίστου* seems awkward. Superlative does not go well with positive. I cannot but suspect that Plato wrote *εἴτα διαθεὶν ἀκμάζοντος καὶ τούτου ταχίστου ἡγήθης. τούτου* was perhaps by an easy error changed to *τοῦ* (cf. next note) and *τοῦ* then transferred from an impossible place. For *ἀκμάζων* as a semisubstantive cf. *Rep.* 459 B ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων.

ιβ. Ε οὐ μὲν δὴ αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλαγῆναι (δύναμαι) τοῦ μέλειν.

For *τοῦ* the Vienna MS. has *τούτου*: Burnet writes *τοῦ τούτου*.

In this sentence *μέλειν* could not represent *μέλει μοι*, but only *μέλω*. Such a use of *μέλω* however is not found, as far as I know, in prose, which always employs the other form. A unique use of *μέλω* on Plato's part is surely less likely than that some copyist wrote *μέλειν* by error for *μελεῖν*. Cf. 174 C οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι.

149 D καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ (ποιεῖν) δύνανται τὰς δυστοκοῦσας, καὶ ἐν νέον ὃν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν ἀμβλίσκουσιν.

νέον ὃν has given rise to many conjectures, none in itself quite satisfactory (δείον Heindorf, ἀναγκαῖον Stallbaum, ἄμεινον Madvig, νόμμον Schanz, and others). But I think that by combining two of them we may not improbably arrive at the right reading. Naber has proposed *καὶ νᾶνον ἂν δόξῃ*, which though infelicitous as to *νᾶνον* has the merit of suggesting *ἂν* for *ὃν*. If with this we unite Madvig's *ἄμεινον*, which is a most suitable word, we get *καὶ, ἄμεινον ἂν δόξῃ ἀμβλίσκειν*, the position of *ἂν* (ἐάν) being quite unobjectionable. When we put side by side *KAMEINONAN*, and *KANNEONON*, we see that one would have no difficulty in passing into the other.

152 Ε καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδον συμφύρεσθον, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιη-

τῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμωδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, <ὅς> εἰπὼν κ.τ.λ.

'*συμφέρεσθον* B (ut videtur): *συμφέρεσθον* T.W.: *συμφέρονται* Stobaeus' Burnet, who with Campbell adopts the imperative. But surely in such a context the imperative, *let us say, let us assume, that they all agree*, is singularly out of place. Why should it be assumed, if it is not the fact? The very point of the whole is the weight of actual authority on that side: hence the names of philosophers and poets that follow. Heindorf was content to adopt *συμφέρονται*; but this leaves the other form or forms quite unexplained, while it is itself easily explained as an obvious correction or inadvertence. I quite agree that the philosophers cannot be here spoken of in the dual: that is impossible, especially as the actual subject of the verb is not *Πρωταγόρας κ.τ.λ.* but *πάντες*. Nor, I think, can the dual be due to the dual idea of philosophers and poets side by side. But in the next clause we have the dual division of poetry into comedy and tragedy with two poets mentioned. Surely this suggests that the verb belongs there and has only got out of its proper place. As *οἱ ἄκροι* means two men, *συμφέρεσθον* would be admissible, I think, after *ἑκατέρας*, even if *ἑκατέρας* itself did not give a dual notion. After *Ὅμηρος* it would be awkward, if we were sure that *ὅς*, there added by Heindorf, was right. No doubt the last letters of *Ὅμηρος* would account for the omission of *ὅς*, but, if it were thought probable that *συμφέρεσθον* stood there, we could find some other word or words of connection to insert instead of *ὅς*. The fact that *something* is certainly lost after *Ὅμηρος* may be thought in favour of this. (For transference of word cf. the notes on 155 B and 201 C and the all but certain case of *ὑποκορίζομαι* in Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 26).

155 B ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὐν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ὕστερον ἀλλὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνεν τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον; ΘΕΑΙ. δοκεῖ γε δῆ.

No sense can be made of *ἀλλά* where it stands. I incline to think that, like *συμφέρεσθον* in 152 Ε it has got into the wrong line. Read Theaetetus' answer as *ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ γε δῆ*, which is perfectly good. See Ast's *Loc. Plat.* 1. 101 *ἀλλά*. . γε, and in 153 D, 157 D, etc., see answers beginning with *ἀλλά* in a very similar way. Badham has shown us, I think, how *γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι* should be treated (*εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἄνεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον*).

ιβ. Ε χάριν οὐν μοι εἶση ἐάν σοι ἀνδρός,

μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνέξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν (αὐτὴν has slight authority).

These words have given the critics some trouble. The remedy is not really far to seek, and the appearance of αὐτὴν in a Vienna MS. might have suggested it. We have here the not very uncommon occurrence of two words having exchanged their terminations. Instead of ἀποκεκρυμμένην . . . αὐτῶν read ἀποκεκρυμμένων . . . αὐτῇ. Cf. 180c παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς.

157 A τό τέ τιμι συνελθὼν καὶ ποιῶν ἄλλω αὐ προσπεσὼν πάσχον ἀνεφαίνη.

καί should be omitted, as συνελθὼν is subordinate like προσπεσὼν; 'what acts when it meets one thing is acted upon when it comes across another.' Cf. 160 A οὐτ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιῶν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλω συνελθὼν ταῦτόν γενήσων τοιοῦτον γένηται. This insertion of καί with a participle, the relation of which has been misunderstood, is found in other places.

157 B τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὐτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τὸδε οὐτ' ἐκεῖνον οὐτ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὅτι ἂν ἴσῃ.

We must not allow (he says) any word that imports any sort of fixity and permanence as contrasted with constant flux and change. The difficulty in the words quoted is in οὔτε τοῦ οὐτ' ἐμοῦ, for which οὔτε σοῦ οὐτ' ἐμοῦ, οὔτε τοῦτο, οὔτε τοῦτ' εἶναι have been proposed by good critics. του adds nothing to τι, just as the proposed τοῦτο would add nothing to τὸδε. The genitives do not seem suitable (I suppose *in* or *belonging to*) nor the mention of persons (ἐμοῦ or σοῦ and ἐμοῦ) at all called for or even in keeping with the general course of the argument, in which *you* and *I* play another part. We want then probably two words suggestive of fixity in things, external things. Though τοῦτο, meaning the same as τὸδε, will not do, ταῦτό(ν) is appropriate, distinct, and likely enough. What to do with ἐμοῦ I hardly know, but perhaps ἐν may serve and the *ou* be taken to come from the οὔτε following. ἐν is clearly suggested by the words just before, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό (cf. 152 D) which also suggest the possibility of αὐτό (not ταῦτό) for του. Without much confidence therefore I suggest that we might read οὔτε τι οὔτε ταῦτο οὐθ' ἐν οὔτε τὸδε οὐτ' ἐκεῖνο: 'we must not admit such expressions as *some thing, same thing, one thing, this thing, that thing.*'

ιδ. E λείπεται δὲ ἐνπνίων τε πέρι . . . καὶ

μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακοῦεν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.

The τε after ὅσα is awkward: so is it to find *μανία* as the subject of these verbs. Should we read ὅσα τις?

A little further on in 158 B there is another odd τε: ὡς οἱ μανόμενοι ἢ ὀνειρώτοντες οὐ ψευδῇ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανοῶνται. Here it is explained that after πτηνοὶ τε we supply οἴωνται εἶναι. Did Plato write οἱ δὲ ὡς πτηνοὶ τε καὶ πετόμενοι . . . διανοῶνται?

161 E τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὁρθὰς ἐκάστου οὔσας.

ἐκάστω?

ibid. εἰ ἀληθὴς ἢ Ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζοντα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγγετο.

Is τῆς βίβλου an adscript?

162 E ἀξίος οὐδ' ἐνός (or οὐδενός) μόνου ἂν εἴη.

μόνου seems very weak. Perhaps μέντοι. If μέντοι lost its τ, the change would be easy. So μέν and μόνον get interchanged.

170 A σωτήρας σφῶν προσδοκῶντας <ἔσεσθαι>? Without the infinitive, the words should mean 'expecting saviours,' not 'expecting them to prove saviours.'

172 B καὶ ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγωσιν, ὁδὲ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι.

τὴν σοφίαν (*this is the philosophy of many* Jowett: cf. Stallbaum and Campbell) does not mean philosophy, or the philosophy of ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. The question has been in what sense or in what applications one man can be called σοφώτερος than another, what in fact real σοφία is; and it is quite clear here that the general meaning must be *this is what they make, this is their view*, of σοφία. Whether ἄγουσι can bear this sense or Badham's λέγουσι should be substituted, may be uncertain. I incline to think ἄγουσι may be right, and λέγουσι after λέγωσιν is certainly undesirable. But I have written these lines only to insist on the true sense of σοφίαν.

173 C ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες.

Both the use of χορεύοντες and that of ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε, which wants a substantive, are very questionable. Badham suggested ἐν τῷδε τῷ χορῷ ὄντες (not mentioned by Mr. Burnet, though he records very many of Badham's acute conjectures). I think χορῷ ὄντες certainly right; but as to τῷδε, what would 'this chorus' mean? The few people there

present cannot take themselves as constituting the entire company of philosophers. It would seem better to retain ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε. (I have sometimes thought of ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ δὴ χορῶ ὄντες).

173 D σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ σίνοδοι καὶ δέπνα καὶ σὺν ἀλλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδ' ὅναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

We could reconcile ourselves to the anacoluthon, if it were somewhat differently worded, e.g. τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν. But πράττειν seems unsuitable as referring straight to the substantives preceding. σπουδᾶς πράττειν, κῶμους πράττειν, &c. are not Greek: we should want ποιεῖσθαι. I do not know whether anyone has suggested that a whole line has got lost after κῶμοι, e.g. <οὐδ' εἰ γίνονται ἴσασι, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα>.

174 A Perhaps ἀρκεῖ should be ἀρκέσει. I see no need for ἦκει.

175 B τὰ μὲν ἐπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν.

Badham was again right, I think, in reading τὰ μὲν ἐπερηφάνα ἔχων. But I would urge it on a different ground from his, namely that τὰ ἐν ποσὶν requires a corresponding expression, as in Diog. L. 1. 34: τὰ μὲν and τὰ ἐν ποσὶν are not a pair. We might possibly keep ἐπερηφάνως ἔχων, if something were added to τὰ μὲν. Cf. Ar. Eth. 6. 7. 1141b 6.

175 C ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας . . . ἢ ἐκ τοῦ εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων κεκτημένος τ' αὖ χρυσίον βασιλείας περὶ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλης εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν.

The εἰ before βασιλεὺς is wanting in a few MSS. (though found in B and T) and often omitted by editors. Burnet after Campbell reads ἦ. I would myself retain εἰ here and also substitute it for τί before ἐγώ. The two things are naturally thrown into the same form. In the first question εἰ is distinctly more proper than τί. The issue in a court is likely to be not *what* wrong one party has done, but *whether* he has done any. In the second case it is objected that only a philosopher would ask with doubt εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων, and that popular ideas assume it. Strictly speaking, this is no doubt true. But we may take εἰ as not more than equivalent to one of those questions which hardly expect an answer, or which at any rate make sure of an answer in the affirmative, 'Isn't he happy?' And we must bear in mind that the bare affirmation 'He is happy,' especially if supported

by a reason, 'with all that money,' is itself argumentative and consciously presents a theory which might be combated. The omission of εἰ therefore does not altogether remove a difficulty, the existence of which I quite admit; namely that the words in any form seem to suggest, however faintly, the same question about human life that is then put in contrast with them (βασιλείας περὶ κ.τ.λ.). One thing I feel, and that is that by analogy to the previous question and indeed on general grounds we should expect this question too (εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων) to be of a more personal, individual kind. All the books I have looked at take βασιλεὺς as a king, which does not merely imply a general theory, but openly and at once propounds it. I should have thought βασιλεὺς might well be *the Great King*, introducing something of that personal element which popular talk loves and philosophical discussion excludes. Cf. Gorg. 470 E ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δὲ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γινώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα. ΣΩ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οὐδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης: Euthyd. 274 A: Apol. 40 D: with the curiously close parallel in Horace C. 2. 2. 17 redditum Cyri solio Phraaten | dissidens plebi numero beatorum | eximit virtus and *ib.* 3. 9. 4. Whatever difficulty remains seems due not to any error in the text but to inadvertence on the part of Plato.

As to the very uncertain κεκτημένος τ' αὖ χρυσίον, in which Madvig and Schanz read ταῦ from a gloss in Hesychius, ταῖς μέγας, πολὺς: ταύσας' μεγαλύνας, πλεονάσας, I make with very great hesitation the following suggestion. In inscriptions τ often stands for τάλαντον (ττ two talents and so on). Is it possible that τ here stands for τάλαντα, the letters αν giving or rather concealing a number? What number of gold talents popular imagination held the Great King to be master of, I would not attempt to say. I need hardly remind anyone that α stands for a thousand. With τάλαντα we should of course need to read χρυσίον. In spite of the very strong case established by Hesychius' gloss I feel the use of such an out-of-the-way word as ταῦ to be questionable.

177 B ὅταν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέῃ διδόναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι.

The last word may be right. Bad men have a sort of theory of life and criticise the foolish virtue of the good. But this is so far from obvious and the occasional confusion of ψέγω with λέγω is so well known, that perhaps περὶ ὧν λέγονσι should be read.

Those precise words occur three lines below, which tells at once for and against my suggestion, as the repetition would be a trifle weak.

182 B ἄλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντα τὰ μὲν ποί' ἅττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

'The text is not grammatical, but neither is it really open to suspicion, and Madvig's conjecture, ἀποτεχθέντα, makes nonsense' Campbell. I do not defend ἀποτεχθέντα, but I feel pretty sure that Plato wrote ἀποτικτόντων. The termination has got accommodated to those near it. The other participle, συγγιγνομένων, is subordinate to ἀποτικτόντων and therefore no καὶ is needed: cf. on 157 A above.

184 E καὶ ἔξεις κ.τ.λ.

As this is an alternative course and as ἦ and καὶ are often confused, we might read ἦ ἔξεις here, keeping τοῖδε at the beginning of the sentence. This is better than omitting καὶ with Madvig and Schanz.

190 C ἄλλον δὲ τίνα οἶε ὑγαιίνοντα ἢ μαινομένον τολμῆσαι κ.τ.λ.

It is of course impossible that τολμῆσαι can = τολμήσειν, though the words seem to have been sometimes taken so (perhaps even by Heindorf). But, if they refer to the past, we want a ποτέ, as we can hardly carry on to this sentence the ποτέ of the previous question, an answer to which has intervened. I conclude therefore that ἂν is to be inserted after τινά or elsewhere.

201 C οὐκ ἂν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὁρθά ποτ' ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνεν ἐπιστήμης.

The transference of καὶ δικαστήρια to follow δικαστὴς ἄκρος seems the best method of dealing with those words that has been proposed. Cf. on 152 E above. But is ἐδόξαζεν right? 'If true opinion and knowledge were the same thing, no judge could ever have held a right opinion without knowledge.' This is insipid, being indeed an identical proposition. Socrates had just said that dicasts ἄνεν ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὁρθά πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν. Surely then he said here not ἐδόξαζεν but ἐδίκαζεν (or ἐδίκασεν): 'if they are identical, no judge ever gave right judgment without knowledge.' This is much more pointed. Of course on analysis it comes to the same thing as ἐδόξαζεν, but it by no means follows that ἐδόξαζεν was as likely to be used by a writer of discrimination. The imperfect ἐδίκαζεν

seems admissible, but the aorist may be preferred.

ibid. ὃ γε ἐγώ—ἐπελελήσμεν, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ. Read ὃ γάρ...νῦν ἐννοῶ. The other gives quite a wrong turn to the words.

SOPHIST.

216 C καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς δ' ἄξιοι τοῦ παντός.

Madvig omits τίμιοι; Cobet, doing the same, transfers ἄξιοι to its place. I should much prefer to read τιμητέοι. Abbreviated terminations account for many mistakes.

ib. D τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἂν πυνθανοίμην κ.τ.λ.

Surely ἡμῖν. He is *their* ξένος; or, if we connect the dative closely with the verb, ἡμῖν is *with your leave*. Cf. Theaet. 143 E καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν ἄξιον οἷα ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μερικίῳ ἐντετύχηκα.

The two pronouns are, I think, again confused in 217 B, where I would read πρὶν ὑμᾶς (Socrates and his party) δεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν.

217 A καθ' ἐν ὄνομα γένος ἐκάστω προσῆπτον.

For ἐν read ἕκαστον or ἐν ἕκαστον.

218 A Theaetetus ought hardly to strike in with such words (δρᾷ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ.). He waits to be spoken to by the stranger. Give them to Theodorus.

219 C τέχνη τις κτητικὴ λεχθεῖσα ἂν διαπρέψειεν. ΘΕΑΙ. ναί, πρόποι γὰρ ἂν.

διαπρέπω is not used anywhere else by Plato; nor is any writer at all cited as using it in the sense of *be becoming, suitable*: it means *be conspicuous*. Coupling this with the fact that Stobaeus gives the words ἂν διαπρέψειεν in the form ἀντρέψειεν, may we not read ἂν πρέψειεν? δια, perhaps corrupted from δῆ, may be a dittograph for ἂν. In 223 E πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται it would not be surprising if διὰ were an error for δῆ.

ib. D ἐν κτητικῇ που ὄλον <ὅτι>.

ὄλον cannot stand alone in this sense.

221 A ὅπερ ἄρτι προῦθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν.

Perhaps δῆ for δεῖν, with which or δεῖ it is apt to get confused. But cf. Ar. Eth. 6. 9. 1142 b 19, where Γ seems to have had ὁ προτίθεται δεῖν with no other infinitive, and the MSS. give ἰδεῖν.

221 E τὰ νευστικά τῶν ἐνύδρων.

This has been written by a common blunder for τὰ ἐνύδρα τῶν νευστικῶν or τῶν νευστικῶν τὰ ἐνύδρα. Cf. 220 B νευστικοῦ...τὸ

μὲν πτηνὸν...τὸ δὲ ἔνυδρον. Very similar is the blunder in 228 A διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν for διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν and that pointed out above in *Theaet.* 155 E.

223 B Are the forms in -ία right alongside of those in -ική? The latter seem more suitable (cf. 221 B, 224 D E, 226 A, etc.) and the mixture is strange. So in 265 A ἐν θηρευτική καὶ ἀγωνία καὶ ἐμπορικῇ. Cf. on 216 C.

224 B οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα συνωνοῦμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταῦτον προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

There is no construction for νομίσματος. (Campbell governs it by ἀμείβοντα, leaving πόλιν without construction; for γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἐλαίνομαι is quite different. Besides, compare *Apol.* 37 D ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένη: *Polit.* 289 E πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλὰ τούτων). I suspect a subordinate participle has dropped out and we should read νομίσματος <πωλοῦντα> ἀμείβοντα. Cf. 228 C, where B has θέμενα, T with Galen and Stobaeus θέμενα πειρώμενα, which is no doubt right.

224 C Read τῷ γε with the Vienna MS. for τὸ γε and in the next line τῷ δέ. Compare e.g. 262 D τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξίμεθα λόγον.

226 C Theaetetus, asked if he can see how to divide a certain genus into two species, says ταχίαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττει. It is unsatisfactory either to take this ironically (Jowett) or to make it mean 'that is rather a rapid enquiry for my small powers.' I suspect the loss of a negative, οὐ ταχίαν or possibly οὐ βραχίαν, ταχύς and βραχύς being liable to interchange. Cf. below (226 E) ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τό γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὐτὸ διπλοῦν ὃν πᾶς ἂν ἴδοι. ΘΕΑΙ. ναι, κατὰ σχολὴν γέ ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔγωγε καθορῶ νῦν, which perhaps favours (οὐ) ταχίαν as against (οὐ) βραχίαν. But the use of ταχύς seems strange.

228 C For αὐτὰ πάσχειν read τοῦτο, or possibly ταῦτα, πάσχειν.

ιβ. D Ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ (the soul) γένῃ.

Rather κακιῶν. Cf. κακίαν and δύο εἶναι γένῃ κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ immediately following: also 227 E δύο εἶδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον.

231 B It is difficult to get any meaning out of ὅποτ' ἰκανῶς φυλάττωσιν, nor does Heindorf's φυλαχθῶσιν or Schanz' φυλάττωμεν satisfy one. Madvig probably saw the real sense when he wrote φωραθῶσιν (i.e. οἱ

σοφισταί), but I would suggest that φανῶσιν is what Plato wrote. This or some kindred word appears over and over again throughout the dialogue in the sense that the nature of the sophist is ascertained by the discussion: e.g. 224 D: 231 D (ὅποσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται), etc. φυλάττωσιν, which is not very much like φανῶσιν, may be due to the influence of φυλακὴν two lines before and be a 'false echo' of it not quite in the sense Campbell intends.

232 E Read ὑπολείπειν for ὑπολιπεῖν. Since Heindorf editors always adopts λείπειν for λιπεῖν in 227 D.

234 A ΘΕΑΙ. παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά. ΞΕ. τί δέ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε κ.τ.λ. μὴν οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον;

I do not see how Campbell can be right in supplying τέχνην with τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος, as the word has not occurred recently enough (233 D). We certainly must not supply παιδιὰν from what precedes, but it is just possible that the gender (τὴν for τὸ: Schanz alters τὴν to τὸ) is due to the predicate παιδιὰν which is coming. This is probably what Stallbaum meant, but he fails to make it clear. Such an attraction however, though common in relative and demonstrative pronouns, is not known to me in the article, and some parallels would be welcome. Pending their discovery, we might consider whether a substantive such as ὑπόσχεσιν has not been omitted. The verb ὑπισχνούμαι occurs just below and twice in 232 D. It might be put in either after λέγοντος or after χρόνῳ.

234 E παραγενομένων, Probably παραγινομένων.

235 A τῶν τῆς παιδείας μετεχόντων ἐστὶ τις μερῶν εἰς.

μερῶν is bracketed by Schanz, marked as corrupt by Burnet. Should we not read γενῶν? Cf. a few lines below τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θανματοποιῶν τις εἰς. In *Thuc.* 2. 37, 2 Herwerden's οὐκ ἀπὸ γένους for οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους is certainly attractive.

235 E It is a pity that Schanz has adopted Badham's τῶν κώλων for τῶν καλῶν. Not only is καλῶν shown to be right by the occurrence of the word more than once in the context, but κῶλα could hardly be made to cover head and trunk as the sense requires.

236 E εἰπόντα should perhaps be εἰπεῖν. Cf. on 216 C; 223 B.

237 A οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα.

So Simplicius gives the verse of Parmenides, though the MSS. of Plato (here and in 258 D) and Aristotle (*Met.* 13, 2, 1089 a 4) agree in τοῦτ' οὐδαμῇ. δαμῇ is at first sight strange and has provoked many doubts and suggestions. But when we recall the similar use of αἰρεῖν for *prove*, and compare Pindar's ἀγῶνα δαμάσας, we may very well acquiesce in it. Of course to Parmenides it meant rather *won*, *gained* than *proved*, or the point is spoken of as a difficulty *overcome*. Cf. also *Polit.* 284 B καθάπερ ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ προσσηναγκαζόμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν and *Theaet.* 196 B, perhaps 153 C.

239 C ὥς ἂν τινι δυναμένῳ δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐντυγχάνωμεν.

If right, this can only mean 'until we find ourselves talking with.' If it were 'until we meet,' the verb would have to be in the aorist:

241 E αὐτῶν. Perhaps ὄντων.

242 C εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διελθεῖν . . . μῦθον . . . φαίνεται διηγείσθαι παυσιν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν.

Εὐκόλως, *good-humouredly*, is hardly the right word. Badham οὐχ ὁλως, *did not even argue*. Is it not plain that Plato wrote εὐχερῶς? *Theaet.* 154 B θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν: *Dem.* 18, 70 ὡς λέγων εὐχερῶς ὅτι ἂν βουληθῆς. In *Phaedo* 117 C εὐχερῶς and εὐκόλως are joined together, but that is far from showing that the latter can stand here.

244 A ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα.

μὲν seems in a very questionable place. Perhaps μανθάνειν μὲν δοξάζωμεν or δοξάζωμεν μὲν μανθάνειν. There is no objection to μὲν after -μεν. Cf. *Polit.* 281 D λέγομεν μὲν: *Rep.* 353 A θήσομεν μὲν: even Isocrates 6. 85 ἀνορθώσομεν μὲν: 15. 311 ἐπαυνοῦμεν μὲν.

247 A Read δικαιοσύνης <καὶ φρονήσεως> ἔξει καὶ παρουσία. Campbell suggests φρονήσεως instead of παρουσία.

ιβ. Ε λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὅποιαν οὖν κερτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὅτι οὖν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φανλοτάτου . . . τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

τι seems needed either before or after ποιεῖν. It would fall out easily before π, which is often almost indistinguishable from it.

ὀρίζειν and ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα have been bracketed. Böckh wrote ὀρίζων.

It does not seem likely that Plato said τὰ ὄντα themselves were δύναμις, nor does 248 C

support it. It is οὐσία which is δύναμις, and I cannot but think οὐσία (with ὡς ἔστιν) or οὐσίας (with ὅρον) has been lost. But what to do with ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, unless it should be simply omitted, I do not know.

251 A καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἰδεῖν δυνάμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὅπερ ἂν οἰοί τε ὤμεν εὐπερίστατα διωσόμεθα οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα.

Campbell and Badham defend διωσόμεθα in different ways. Others have proposed emendations, but nobody what seems to me a certain correction, namely διαδυσόμεθα. If they cannot satisfy themselves (says the stranger) about either being or not-being, at any rate they will with the utmost credit *escape, make their way through*, the difficulties of both. The very same expression occurs in this dialogue 231 C ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον. διαδύσθαι τὸν λόγον can be contrasted with what is called in *Phil.* 43 A ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον. Cf. also *Polit.* 284 B κατὰ τοῦτο διέφυγεν ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος. In *Rep.* 612 A I have suggested that ἀπεωσόμεθα should be read for the ἀπεδυσόμεθα and ἀπελυσόμεθα of the MSS., neither being at all suitable.

253 E τὸ γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλω δόσεις.

This use of the neuter does not seem like Plato. Perhaps διαλεκτικὸν <εἶναι>.

259 C ταῦτα εἰσάγοντα ὡς δυνατό.

ἀνήντα for δυνατό Badham, and that gives very good sense. But we might also think of ἀνόνητα, which seems to me to suit the context better, as he goes on to say that these things are not an ἔλεγχος ἀληθινός and that they argue a novice.

267 A ὅταν οἶμαι τὸ σὸν σχῆμα τις τῷ ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνῇ φωνῇ φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληται πον.

The difficulty of this has perhaps not been sufficiently noticed. The sense required is 'makes his body or voice like yours,' while the words actually mean 'makes your figure or voice like his,' an impossible inversion. Who ever wrote or deliberately spoke like this? Perhaps the same accident has occurred that we seemed to find in 224 B and another participle governing τὸ σὸν σχῆμα has been lost. 'Representing your figure,' 'having your figure in his mind,' &c., would make good enough sense. Τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σώμα is the object of ποιῇ, put in the dative after the participle according to the ordinary rule. I suggest then the insertion of (say) ἀπεικάζων, or even μιμούμενος itself, which would perhaps be more likely to fall out near χρώμενος. Cf. *Crat.* 432 B εἰ τίς . . . τὸ σὸν χρώμα καὶ

σχῆμα ἀπεικάζειν. We might also think of <κατὰ>τὸ σὸν σχῆμα, or I daresay of other insertions which would afford a construction and a sense.

POLITICUS.

258 D Some τέχνηαι have nothing to do with action and give knowledge only: αἱ δὲ γὰρ περὶ τεκτονικὴν αὐτὰ καὶ σύμπασαν χειρουργίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνοῦσαν σύμφυτον τὴν ἐπιστήμην κέκτηνται καὶ συναποτελοῦσι τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν σώματα πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα.

The last clause as it stands would seem to mean that these arts help to produce the things which are produced by them. Campbell only makes better sense of it by straining the meaning of ἀποτελῶ ('perfect') and making αὐτῶν refer to πράξεις when it would naturally refer to the subject of συναποτελοῦσι. Reflection will lead us, I think, to substitute συναποτελοῦσαν. This practical ἐπιστήμη is described as ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνοῦσα and συναποτελοῦσα τὰ γιγνόμενα σώματα, and αὐτῶν are the arts in question.

264 E τὸ πολιτικὸν οὐ...ζητητέον; would give the best sense, if we might substitute οὐ περὶ (not Heindorf's ἢ περὶ) for ὥσπερ (B and T), εἰ περὶ, and one or two other MS. readings. In the next line perhaps αὐ should be added.

266 E παραδοῦναι τὰς τῆς πόλεως ἡγίας ὡς οἰκείας καὶ αὐτῷ ταύτης οὔσης τῆς ἐπιστήμης.

It would seem as though we ought either to omit καί, as Stephanus after one MS. did, or to insert after it something like ἰδίας.

268 E ἀλλὰ δὴ τῷ μύθῳ μὲν πάνν πρόσχε τὸν νοῦν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες· πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκφεύγεις παιδίας (sic B T) ἔτη.

Editors have usually been divided between παιδίας a game, play and παιδίας childhood, either of which would be a genitive following on ἔτη, for ἐκφεύγειν requires an accusative. Campbell rightly points out that, to make sense with this, πολλά would have to be πολύ; and it may be added that <τὰ τῆς> would be needed before the genitive, at any rate in the case of παιδίας. He himself reads by his own slight alteration παιδίας games, and Burnet follows him. But after παῖδες surely παιδία, not παιδιά, is the word we want, and therefore I should suggest παιδιάν: it is only a few years since you emerged from childhood. Cf. Campbell's correction of πολεμίας in 307 c to πολεμίαν, also adopted by Burnet.

ibid. ἦν τοίνυν καὶ ἔτι ἔσται τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων πολλά τε ἄλλα καὶ κ.τ.λ.

I think we should read ἔστι for ἔσται, and

understand the words somewhat differently. They are usually taken to mean that various other things in ancient story and the great portent of the sun's changing its course did occur and will yet occur again. But at this point it does not seem proper to bring in the statement that this and other things will occur again. The speaker comes to that presently. At starting he has only got to refer to this as an old legend. Also ἔτι ἔσται means rather will still exist than will occur or exist again. Reading ἔστι, I understand him to say that among other things belonging to old legend there used to be and still is the story of this portent, and he goes on ἀκήκοας γάρ τον κ.τ.λ. This certainly seems the sense in which his interlocutor understands him. The confusion of ἔστι and ἔσται is not uncommon, but it usually works the opposite way.

270 A διὰ δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἐν καὶ ἰσορροπώτατον ἐπὶ μικροτάτων βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι.

For ἰέναι read εἶναι. βαῖνον εἶναι is very pleonastic, while the resolution of verbs into participles with εἶναι is a marked feature of Plato's later style. Cf. in this dialogue 273 B πολλὰς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας, 289 A, 296 c, etc.

273 A ὁ δὲ (κόσμος) μεταστρεφόμενος καὶ συμβάλλων ἀρχῆς τε καὶ τελευτῆς ἐναντίαν ὁρμὴν ὁρμηθεὶς κ.τ.λ.

Both συμβάλλων and the genitives are obscure. Read συμβάλλων ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτήν, bringing together beginning and end. The end of one system is the beginning of another. Cf. note on 268 E above, where παιδιάν is proposed for παιδίας. (After writing this I observe Badham's συμβάλλων ἀρχάς τε καὶ τελευτάς, but the singular seems better.)

ibid. θορύβων τε καὶ ταραχῆς ἤδη πανόμενος καὶ τῶν σεισμῶν γαλήνης ἐπιλαβόμενος.

It will be an improvement in every way to read καὶ τῶν σεισμῶν, just as in 292 B we have καὶ τῆς ἐπιστατικῆς. In Aristotle *Hist. An.* 5. 5. 13 αἱ δὲ πέρδικες, ἀν κατ' ἀνεμον στῶσιν αἱ θηλείαι τῶν ἀρρένων, ἔγκνοι γίγνονται· πολλὰς δὲ καὶ τῆς φωνῆς, ἀν ὀργῶσαι τύχῳσι, καὶ ὑπερπετομένων ἐκ τοῦ καταπνεῖσθαι τὸν ἀρρεναῖς it is plain that καὶ τῆς φωνῆς should be read, and in *Eum.* 280 I suspect Aeschylus wrote

βρίζει γὰρ αἶμα κάκμαραίνεται χερός,

for the genitive χερός seems almost to require it. The substitution of καὶ for καὶ or κἀν is very common.

274 D ὁλος ὁ κόσμος, ὃ συμμιμούμενοι καὶ συνεπόμενοι . . ζῶμεν.

ὃ συνεπόμενοι καὶ συμμιμούμενοι?

277 E ἐν <μὲν> ταῖς βραχυτάταις.

278 D ἡ ψυχὴ . . τότε μὲν ὑπ' ἀληθείας περὶ ἐν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τισὶ συνίσταται, τότε δὲ . . φέρεται.

The compound *συνίσταται* does not seem right. In contrast with *φέρεται* we want *ίσταται*. *συν* is perhaps a repetition of the last letters of *τισί(τισίν)*.

He goes on καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμῇ γέ πη τῶν συγκράσεων ὁρθῶς δοξάζει, where the genitive is odd. Should not τὰ μὲν be τὰς μὲν, αὐτῶν agreeing with τῶν συγκράσεων and contrasting them with the στοιχεῖα?

281 C δοκεῖν χρὴ . . προσποιήσασθαι.

The future *προσποιήσεσθαι* is necessary, like *ἀμφισβητήσουσιν* a few lines before.

284 B καθάπερ ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ προσηναγκάσαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τοῦτο διέφυγεν ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος.

Surely διέφυγεν. ὁ λόγος διέφυγεν ἂν, if they had failed to vindicate not-being.

293 D εἰάν τε . . καθαίρων . . εἴτε καί . . ποιῶσιν ἢ . . αἰξῶσιν.

Εἰάν can hardly carry on its force over the εἴτε, so as to make subjunctives possible. Must we not read ποιῶσιν and αἰξῶσιν?

296 E τοῦτον δεῖ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τὸν γε ἀληθινώτατον ὁρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως, ὃν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ διοικῆσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων; ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης τὸ τῆς νεῶς καὶ ναυτῶν αἰεὶ συμφέρον παραφυλάττων κ.τ.λ.

So this passage is written in all the editions I have consulted. Stallbaum translates τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων *res civium*, Campbell

the condition of his subjects, Jowett the affairs of his subjects. But in reality τὸ goes with the συμφέρον which is coming in the next clause, governed by παραφυλάττων. τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων συμφέρον is compared to τὸ τῆς νεῶς καὶ ναυτῶν συμφέρον. The mark of interrogation should therefore be deferred and put after σφίξει τοὺς συνναίτας at the end of the ὥσπερ clause, though the sentence is really anomalous, Plato forgetting that he began with a question and after the ὥσπερ clause rambling into another which takes it up with a οὕτως.

299 A. οὐκοῦν ὃ γ' ἐθέλων καὶ ἐκὼν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἄρχην δικαιοτάτ' ἂν ὅτιον πάσχοι καὶ ἀποτίνοι.

The distinction, if any, between ὃ ἐθέλων ἄρχην and ὃ ἐθέλων ἐκὼν ἄρχην is very fine and hardly to the purpose. Read ὃ γ' ἐθέλων καὶ ἐκὼν . . ἄρχων, in which the two words become, what they really are, synonyms.

302 C τὴν αὐτὴν τοίνυν (i.e. ἀρχὴν) φάθι τριῶν οὐσῶν χαλεπὴν διαφερόντως γίγνεσθαι καὶ ῥάστην.

ῥάστην I take to be a mere blunder for ἀρίστην, encouraged no doubt by the opposition of χαλεπὴν. See further on in E μοναρχία (which is what he means here) ξευχθεῖσα μὲν ἐν γράμμασιν ἀγαθοῖς, οὓς νόμους λέγομεν, ἀρίστη πᾶσιν τῶν ἐξ ἀνομοῦ δέχαλεπὴ καὶ βαρυντάτη συννοικῆσαι: and again 303 B ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ (ζῆν) πρώτον τε καὶ ἄριστον. The question all through is about goodness and badness: see especially 303 A.

303 C With εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι there must have gone some word now lost like λεκτέον or νομιστέον.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

NOTE ON ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS*, 1338, A 24.

THE unmetrical verse quoted here by Aristotle as Homeric, ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλεῖν, is still assigned to ρ 382 f. in spite of Peppmüller's objections in the *Jahrbücher*, 1891, page 375. So the Provost of Oriel and van Leeuwen in their editions of the *Odyssey*, and Susemihl-Hicks and Newman in their editions of the *Politics*, have not hesitated to accept the line as in Aristotle's text of ρ. Mr. Newman (*Politics*, iii. 516) takes this text to have been:

ρ 382

τίς γάρ δὴ ξείνονα καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν, ἀλλ' οἷον μόνον ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλεῖν, μάντιν ἢ ἱγῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, οἱ καλέουσιν ἀοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἅπαντας.

To assume the absence from Aristotle's text of οἱ δημοεργοὶ ἔασι, which is found not only in the Homeric MSS. of 383 but also in Plato (*Republic*, 389 D), would seem unscientific, but that may pass. The text as formed, however, is obscure. What is the

antecedent of οἷ in line 4? Can it be the seer and carpenter of the preceding verse? Are they the bidders to an Homeric feast? Or, if this seems unreasonable, are they the most distinguished guests, to receive the first invitation? With all Homeric appreciation of the dignity of labour, neither of these alternatives is possible. The most serious objection to this construction of the text, however, lies in the fact that the poet is not speaking of invitations to a feast, but of bringing to the community (πόλινδε ἡγάγες) men who would be useful to it (δημοεργοί). Thus in the early settlements of New England and in the western parts of the United States, nothing was more common than to offer special inducements to a teacher, a physician, a preacher, or a skilled artisan to join the community;—a *fama* might be offered to such a one, or freedom from rates, or other privileges. So Eumaeus disclaims all responsibility for bringing the disguised Odysseus to Ithaca, and says at 387 *πτοχὸν δ' οὐκ ἂν τις καλέοι*, in which he cannot refer to an invitation to a feast but must refer to an invitation to come to the settlement to live. The fact that καλέει is used often of bidding to a feast seems to have led Spengel to connect the Aristotelian verse with ρ 382.

But are we obliged to accept this connexion with ρ 385, ὃ κεν τέρπῃσιν αἰεῖδων? Aristotle

says ἦν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ (i.e. σχολῇ) τάττουσιν (sc. μουσικῇ). διόπερ Ὅμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' οἷον κ.τ.λ. καὶ οὕτω προειπὼν ἑτέρους τινάς, οἱ καλέονσιν, αἰδοῖον, φησὶν, ὃ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἅπαντας. In my opinion, Aristotle is making two entirely independent quotations. The οὕτω would be then a repetition of οὕτως with ἐποίησεν, and προειπὼν ἑτέρους τινάς κ.τ.λ. would be simply 'after mentioning several other kinds of men, he names a bard *who cheers all*.' The last three words are the sole reason for this second quotation: the carpenter and seer are of no importance in this connexion, since the author is speaking of the place of music in education and in life.

The words οἱ καλέονσιν have not been explained. Spengel's οἱ καλοῦνται gives a satisfactory sense; that these men are called to live in a town and not to take part in a feast does not disturb Aristotle's neat quotation. However the faulty verse is to be emended, οἷον must be masculine, as Mr. Newman interprets it, rather than neuter as Mr. Jowett translated it, 'how good it is to invite men to the pleasant feast,' which has no connexion with the rest of the passage.

T. D. S.

MUSONIUS AND SIMPLICIUS.

A NEW edition of the remains of Musonius is advertised; and indeed Peerlkamp's edition has long been out of date, and is little known. In two interesting fragments *περὶ τροφῆς* (Stob. flor. 17 n. 43 Meineke, n. 42 Hense, and 18 n. 38 M, 37 H, 10. Stob. anthol. iii. 503, 523, Weidmann 1894), Hense illustrates some details from other authors, but has missed the most comprehensive parallel, the commentary of Simplicius on Epictet. *encheirid.* c. 46 (of Schweighäuser's ed. c. 33 s. 7, S's Epict. iv. 427-8). Thus Stob. p. 503 19 H ὡς χρὴ καθάπερ τὴν εὐτελεῆ τῆς πολυτελοῦς τροφῆν προτιμᾶν καὶ τὴν εὐπόριστον τῆς δυσπορίστου. p. 505. 4 ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁμοιοτάτην ταύτῃ προσφέρεισθαι τροφὴν ἂν εἴπῃ τὴν κοινωτάτην καὶ καθαρώτατην. Simplic. p. 269b Heins ἐν μὲν τροφαῖς καὶ πόμασι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τρεφόντων τὸ ἀνθρωπείον σῶμα τὰ εὐπόριστα καὶ φυσικώτερα ἐκλεγομένους. ταῦτα γὰρ εὐθὺς καὶ καθάρωτερα εὐρίσκεται καὶ λιτότερα καὶ ὑγιεινότερα.

Muson. p. 505 14 ἡμεῖς δὲ τέχνας καὶ μηχανὰς ποικίλας ἐπινοοῦμεν, ὥστε τὴν ἐδωδὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐφθύνειν καὶ τὴν κατάποσιν κολακεύειν μεζόνως. εἰς τοῦτο δὲ προελθύνταμεν λιχνείας καὶ ὕσφαγίας, ὥστε καθάπερ μουσικά καὶ ἱατρικά οὕτω καὶ μαγειρικά πεποιήνται τινὲς συγγράμματα, ἃ τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν καὶ πάνν αὔξει τὴν ἐν τῷ φάρμακῳ, τὴν δ' ὑγίειαν διαφθείρει. πολὺ γοῦν κάκιον διακειμένους ὄραν ἐστὶ τὰ σῶματα τοὺς περὶ τὰ βρώματα τρυφῶντας. Simplic. *ib.* τραφῆναι γὰρ δεῖται τὸ ζῷον, οὐ μέντοι τοιαῖσδε καὶ τοιαῖσδε ποικίλαις τροφαῖς. οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς Θεωρίαν καὶ Παξάμονας ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις ὥκειωσε καὶ τὴν μαγειρικὴν κακοτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τροφὴν τὸ ἀπορρέον ἀνυφαίνονσαν. Sen. cons. ad Helv. 12 § 5 o miserabiles quorum palatum nisi ad pretiosos cibos non excitatur! pretiosos autem non eximius sapor aut aliqua *faucium* dulcedo sed raritas et difficultas parandi facit. alioqui, si ad sanam illis mentem placeat reverti, quid opus est tot artibus ventri servientibus? quid mercaturis? quid vasta-

tione silvarum? quid profundi perscrutatione? passim iacent alimenta, quae rerum natura omnibus locis disposuit, sed haec velut caeci transeunt et omnes regiones pervagantur, maria traiciunt et, cum famem exiguo possint sedare, magno invitant. (cf. Stob. 18 38 M. 37 H p. 527 17 ἀλλ' ὁμως χάριν ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐλαχίστου χρόνου, ὃν ἡδόμεθα, παρασκευὴ μὲν ὅψων γίγνεται μυρίων· πλείται δ' ἡ θάλαττα μέχρι περάτων.)

Muson. *ibid.* (p. 527 14) εἶδε δέ γε, εἴπερ ὁ θεὸς ἡδονῆς χάριν τὴν τροφὴν ἐμνηχανίστατο ἡμῖν, τὸν πλείω τούτων χρόνον (the period of digestion) ἡδεσθαι ἡμᾶς ὑπ' αὐτῆς, καὶ οὐ τὸν ἐλάχιστον ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ καταπίνομεν, Democrit. *ib.* 18 35 H, 36 M: ὅσοι ἀπὸ γαστρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖνται ὑπερβεβληκότες τὸν καιρὸν ἐπὶ βρώσεσιν ἢ πόσεσιν..., τούτοις πᾶσιν αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ βραχεαὶ τε καὶ δι' ὀλίγου γίνονται, ὅσοον ἂν χρόνον ἐσθίωσιν ἢ πίνωσιν, αἱ δὲ λῦπαι πολλαὶ κ.τ.λ.

Muson. *ibid.* p. 528 3: δεῖπνα δὲ παρατίθενται τινες ἀγρῶν ἀναλίσκοντες τιμὰς, καὶ ταῦτ' οὐδαμῶς ὠφελουμένων τῶν σωμάτων ἐκ τῆς πολυτελείας τῶν βρωμάτων. πᾶν γὰρ τοῦναντίον οἱ ταῖς εὐτελεστάταις χρώμενοι τροφαῖς ἰσχυρότατοί εἰσιν. τοὺς γοῦν οἰκέτας τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ τοὺς χωρίτας τῶν ἀστικῶν καὶ τοὺς πένητας τῶν πλουσίων ἴδοις ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ῥωμαλεστέρους ὄντας καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ποιεῖν δυναμένους, ἦττον δὲ κάμνοντας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις, νοσοῦντας δὲ σπανιότερον, ἀνεχομένους δὲ εὐκολώτερον κρύος, θάλπος, ἀγρυπνίας, πᾶν ὅ τι τοιούτων, cf. the story of Zeno (17 42, p. 506 16). Simplic. p. 269c Heins: καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, δηλοῦσιν οἱ δι' ἀπορίαν ἀναγκαζόμενοι φυσικώτερον τρέφεσθαι, πολλῶν τῶν τρυφῶντων ὄντες ὑγιεινότεροι· ὥσπερ ἄγροικοὶ μὲν τῶν

πολιτικῶν, δοῦλοι δὲ τῶν δεσποτῶν, καὶ τῶν πλουτούντων οἱ πένητες. See the story in Xen. mem. iii 13 § 6. Io. Chrys. hom. 1 in Col. 5 (xi 329^{bed}): ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐδεσμάτων τὴν φύσιν ἐξετάσωμεν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καὶ μὴ βουλομένῳ διαβρῆγγυσθαι τῷ πολλῷ οἴνῳ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐκ ἐνὶ μὴ βουλομένον ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν, ὥστε ἐκεῖ μὲν τὴν ἐκ τῆς τῶν σιτίων ποιότητος ἡδονὴν ἢ τε προλαβοῦσα ἀτιμία ἀφαιρεῖται καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς πλησμονῆς ἀηδία. οὐ γὰρ ἦττον λιμοῦ τὰ σώματα ἡμῖν ἢ πλησμονῇ διαφθεῖρει καὶ ὀδυνᾷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλῶν χαλεπώτερον· καὶ ἂν ἂν θέλγῃ μοι δοῦναι, εὐκολώτερον αὐτὸν διαβρῆγγνῶν τῇ πλησμονῇ τοῦ λιμοῦ. ὄντως γὰρ τοῦτο ἐκείνου φορητότερον· ὅτι λιμὸν μὲν ἂν τις καὶ εἰκοσιν ἡμέρας ἐνέγκῃ, πλησμονὴν δὲ οὐδὲ δύο μόναν· καὶ τούτῳ μὲν προσπαλαίοντες διηλεκῶς οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ἐν ὕμειρ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ δέονται ἰατρῶν· ταύτην δὲ, τὴν πλησμονὴν λέγω, οὐκ ἂν ἐνέγκοιεν μὴ συνεχῶς καλοῦντες ἰατροῦς· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων βοήθειαν ἤλεγξε πολλάκις ἡ ταύτης τυραννίς. καὶ ἡδονῆς μὲν οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ ἡ τιμὴ τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι ἡδίων, καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ εἶναι τοῦ ὑποτάσσεσθαι, καὶ τὸ θαρρῆναι τοῦ τρέμειν καὶ δεδοικέναι, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρκούντων ἀπολαύειν τοῦ πάρα τοῦ μέτρου εἰς τὸ τῆς τροφῆς καταποντίζεσθαι κλυδωνίων, βελτίων ἄρα ἐκείνης αὕτη ἢ τράπεζα καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν. καὶ τὰ τῆς δαπάνης δὲ ἐνταῦθα βελτίονα· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ δαπανηρὰ, αὕτη δὲ οὐκέτι. He goes on to speak of the anxious preparation for a luxurious feast, which keeps the host restless at night, etc. Dr. Parkes, in his valuable little tract, *The Personal Care of Health* (S.P.C.K.), holds that sensible working men are better fed than any other class.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

AN ILL-USED PASSAGE IN IGNATIUS (*AD PHILAD.* 8, 2).

In an often quoted passage occurring in Ignatius' epistle to the Philadelphians (8, 2), that Church Father states that some people refused to believe certain things which they did not find expressly recorded in the Gospel. The text runs thus according to all editors (Zahn, Funk, Lightfoot, Hilgenfeld): 'παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς, μηδὲν κατ' ἐρίθειαν πράσσετε (πράσσειν, Hilg.) ἀλλὰ κατὰ χριστομάθειαν. εἴπει ἡκουσά τινων λεγόντων ὅτι· Ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις (ἢ ἀρχαίοις) εὔρω, ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ (εὔρω τοῦ εὐαγγελίου g*, Hilg.), οὐ πιστεύειν. καὶ λέγοντός μου αὐτοῖς ὅτι Γέγραπται, ἀπεκρίθησάν μοι ὅτι Πρύκειται. ἐμοὶ

δὲ ἀρχαῖα (ἀρχαῖα g*, Hilg.) ἐστὶν Ἰησοῦ κτλ. Here the words in spaced type ὅτι and πρύκειται represent editorial misreadings of great consequence. But before discussing them, I think that classical students may be interested to know that this passage constitutes one of the *loci classici* in early Christian doctrine, and that it has been the subject of keen controversy among leading Biblical critics of our times.

In the oldest Latin version L (apparently of the 13th century) the passage reads thus: 'Quia audiui quosdam dicentes quoniam "si non in veteribus invenio in evangelio

non credo"; et dicente me ipsis quoniam "scriptum est," responderunt mihi quoniam "praeiacet." mihi autem principium est Jesus Christus' etc. Still more fanciful is Chevalier's translation (as quoted by Scrivener, Introduction, ii, 527): 'unless I find it [what?] in the ancient writings [ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις], I will not believe in the Gospel. And when I said to them 'It is written (in the Gospel), they answered, 'It is found written before' (in the law).' But we cannot ignore the weight of the authority of such critics as Zahn, Funk, Bishop Lightfoot, and Hilgenfeld (the latest editor) who reprint the passage though widely disagreeing, or rather altercationing, as to its true meaning.¹

Now all their learned polemic loses its

¹ Both Lightfoot in his *Apostolic Fathers* (London, 1885) vol. ii, i, 270—3, then in his *The Apostolic Fathers* (1891) p. 126,—and Th. Zahn in his *Patres Apostolici*, ii, 78, then in his *Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons*, vol. i. (Erlangen, 1888) p. 846, and vol. ii (1892) p. 945, agree in the reading of the passage: ἐπεὶ ἡκουσά τινων λεγόντων ὅτι "Εὐὰν μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις εὕρω, ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ (Zahn εὐαγγελίῳ,) οὐ πιστεύω." καὶ λέγοντός μου αὐτοῖς ὅτι "Γέγραπται," ἀπεκρίθησάν μοι ὅτι "Πρόκειται." ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρχαία ἔστιν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός κτλ.,—but they disagree in its interpretation, Zahn translating: "Denn ich hörte gewisse Leute sagen: Wenn ich es [but what?] nicht in den Urkunden finde, nämlich im Evangelium, so glaube ich es nicht. Und da ich ihnen sagte: Es [What?] steht geschrieben, antworteten sie: Das ist die Frage. Mir aber ist Urkunde Jesus Christus" u.s.w.—while Lightfoot still less correctly renders the passage thus: 'For I heard certain persons saying: "If I find it [what?] not in the charters, I believe it not in the Gospel." And when I said to them, "It is written" they answered, "That is the question." But as for me, my charter is Jesus Christ' etc.—Zahn, then, in order to refute Lightfoot, reverts to the subject and discusses it in a special chapter of four pages (*Geschichte des neut. Kanons* (ii, 945—8), defending his own interpretation as given above. Involved in this controversy, A. Hilgenfeld in his recent edition *Ignatii Antiocheni et Polycarpi Smyrnaci epistolae et martyria* (Berlin, 1902), says in a very long comment (pp. 298—300) on the passage: 'Ignatius audiverat aliquos dicentes: "Nisi in veteribus [reading ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, as indicated above] (in Veteris Testamenti libris) invenero, in evangelio non credo." Ignatius dixit: "Scriptum est" (vel. scripta sunt), sc. in ipso evangelio, cuius divinae scripturae auctoritatem vindicavit. illi responderunt: "Quaeritur," sc. verene scriptum sit vel in divina scriptura doceatur (aliter Ign. II. οὐ γὰρ προκρίνεται τὰ ἀρχαία τοῦ πνεύματος). Ignatius asseruit: "Mihi vetera Iesus Christus," etc. . . . interpretationem meam deridens Zahn, quem Lightfoot non secutus est, post ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ comma posuit, ut hic sensus efficeretur: Quoniam audivi quosdam dicentes: "Nisi in monumentis litteris conscriptis [pro: in tabulariis] invenero, i.e. in evangelio libro, non credo," etc.

raison d' être as soon as we remove the editorial misreading ὅτι 'Εὐὰν 'that if,' by restoring the author's words ὅ, τι ἐὰν *whatsoever*:² 'whatsoever I find not in the records (namely) in the Gospel, I believe not.'

The other editorial error underlies the word πρόκειται. As Greek students know πρόκειται does not bear the meaning foisted into it by Zahn: *das ist die Frage*, and adopted by Lightfoot who translates: *that is the question*. For taken impersonally πρόκειται, means not: 'that is the question' (= it is questioned, ἀμφισβητεῖται), *quaeritur*, but *the question is*, and moreover requires a complement: περὶ τούτου, or an infinitive, or at least a definite subject (τοῦτο πρόκειται μοι, 'I am concerned with this). In other terms πρόκειται means *it forms the subject under consideration*, just like the French *il s'agit* and the German *es handelt sich*.—As a matter of fact, πρόκειται here is a scribal or editorial misreading; it should be read πρὸς κεῖται (= προστίθεται), seeing that in old MSS both *προ* and *προς* are represented by the same graphic contraction or ligature, namely by a Π with a tiny ρ planted upon it: πρ, so that ῥκεῖται = πρόκειται or πρόσκειται. Accordingly the answer given to Ignatius by certain persons (τινὲς) was: 'that which you allege as being written (ὅτι γέγραπται) is spurious: πρόσκειται, it has been added, it is superadded.' Cp. Pl. Crat. 393 D οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς σκεῖται τι γράμμα οὐδ' εἰ ἀφήρηται. Victor Antioch. in Mark 16, 1 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τισι τῶν ἀντιγράφων πρὸς σκεῖται . . . ἀναστὰς δὲ κτλ, ἐροῦμεν ὡς δυνατόν ἦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι νεόθενται τὸ παρὰ Μάρκω τελευταῖον ἐν τισι φερόμενον. Cramer's Catena 102 (Eph. 1, 1) Ὁριγένης δὲ φησὶ 'Ἐπὶ μόνων Ἐφεσίων εὐρομεν κείμενον τὸ 'τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὐσιν.' καὶ ζητοῦμεν, εἰ μὴ παρέλκει προσσκέιμενον τὸ 'τοῖς ἁγίοις τοῖς οὐσιν,' τί δύναται σημαίνειν.

There is no doubt then that the above passage of Ignatius alludes to such critical or protestant Christians as refused to believe anything not found in the genuine or canonical text of the Gospel. Accordingly the passage should read in English: 'For I heard certain persons saying, 'Whatever I find not in the Records, in the Gospel, I believe not. And when I said to them, 'It is written,' they answered, 'It is added.'

A. N. JANNARIS.

² It is well known that ὅς ἐάν for ὅς ἂν is very common in post-classical and Biblical texts.

98⁴³² απλακαν ες μολιβην απο ψυχοφορου τοπον ενχαραξον ο βουλει K. Quidnam istud απλακαν sibi vult? Recordemur alium huius libri locum: λα(βων) ράκος λινούν καθα[ρὸν] γρα(άφε) εἰς αὐτό κτλ. 96³⁵⁹, ubi λα(βών) compendio est scriptum hoc modo Λ. Archetypi scriptura cum in ΑΠΛΑΚΑΝ esset corrupta vocula ες a librario est addita, ne deesset, quo ἐνχαράξον spectaret. Restituendum autem meo quidem iudicio λαβών¹ πλάκαν μολιβήν ἀπὸ ψυχοφόρου τόπου κτλ., cf. etiam λαβ(ων) μόλιβ(ον) ἀπὸ ψυχοφόρου σωλῆνος ποιήσον(ν) λάμναν καὶ ἐπίγραφε χαλκ(ῶ) γραφ(είω) ὡς ὑπόκειται 97³⁹⁷.

98⁴⁵⁰ εἰν δὲ καταρυκτικὸν ποι(ῆς) ἢ ποταμὸν ἢ γῆν ἢ θάλασ(σαν) ἢ γουν ἢ θήκην ἢ εἰς φρέαρ γρα(άφε) τὸν λόγον. Et primum quidem ΗΓΟΥΝ in ΗΡΟΥΝ (ἢ ρούν) corrigendum esse nemo opinor non videt, multo vero difficilius de voce καταρυκτικόν iudicium, pro qua Wessely καταρυκτικόν ediderat (ΚΑΤ//ΑΡΥΚΤΙΚΟΝ pap., sed inter A et T duae lineolae apparent, quae quid sibi velint nescio). Vocem librarii incuria corruptam in *κατορυκτικόν corrigendam esse arbitror, cf. κατορύξεις δὲ ἐπὶ ἁώρου θήκη(ν) τὴν λεπίδα pap. mag. Parisina vs. 2215 (Wessely, Wien. Denkschr. 1888, 76). Incantamentum condendum esse dicit auctor sive flumine sive terra sive mari sive aquae ductu sive sepulcro sive puteo. Quae si recte sum commentatus, superest ut praepositio εἰς toti ordini praefigatur: εἰν δὲ κατορυκτικὸν ποι(ῆς) ἢ <εἰς> ποταμὸν ἢ γῆς κτλ., cf. ἢ εἰς φρέαρ.

100⁴⁸⁸ φορεῖ περὶ τὸν τραχὴλον μετ' ἐπικαλέσας εἰσελθε παρα σταντω K. Rursus vitiosam intulit librarius distinctionem, qui scribere debuit *μετεπικαλέσας 'simul precatus domum abi'.

100⁵¹⁷ τη ἱεραλμῃ K., sed rectius τῇ ἱερὰ λίμ(ν)η Wessely, cf. 'Αχερουσία τε λίμνη 'Αἰδου Wien. Denkschr. 1888, 57.

103⁵⁹³ λαβων νξον ἀμλτωτον ποιησον ἐλλυχνιο[ν] πλοιο² νεναναγηκotos K., λαβων [λυχνο]ν ε[. . .] νξον ἀμλτωτον ποιησον ἐλλυχνία ζ απ[ο] πλοιο² νεναναγηκotos Wessely. Sunt enim septem candelae fila, quae deinceps singillatim memorantur. Eiusmodi filum etiam μύξα appellatum est, cf. e.g. τὴν μύξαν τοῦ λύχνου Hes. s. μύκητες. Unde nomina δίμυξος et πολύμυξος formata, siquidem saepius in eadem candela plura extabant ellychnia, cf. etiam εἰκοσι μύξαις πλοῖσιν λύχνον Callim. epigr. 59. Cum illis

vocalibus coniungendum ἐπτάμυξος papyro Londinensi sine dubio servatum.² Tota vero periodus sic legitur: λαβὼν λ[ύχνο]ν ἐπ[τά]μυξον ἀμλτωτον ποιήσον ἐλλυχνιον [ἀπ]ὸ πλοῖον νεναναγηκotos. Quominus enim ἐλλυχνία ζ legatur impedit papyrus, neque haerendum in voce ἐλλυχνιον sensu colectivo posita, quamquam postea scribitur: καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ [α] ἐλλυχνίου γρα(άφε) ΖΡ/ΙΑΩ: ἐπὶ τοῦ β ΑΔΩΝΑΙ etc.

106⁶⁹⁴ πακιδαι αβουλοδαμεια K., leg. πακιδάμεια βουλοδάμεια; πακιδάμεια idem est ac *παγιδάμεια 'quae rumpit retes' (invocatur enim Urso stella caelestis). Tenuem interdum in mediam converti iam e LXX versionis codicibus notum, cf. πακίδες Ps. XVII 6 Sinait. man. prim. πακίδος XXIV 15 Sin. πακίδας LVI 7 et LXIII 6 Sin. man. prim. etc.

111⁸⁴⁴ σχεδον δε [σ]υ ποιειση το παν αγνος K., leg. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐ (sic iam Wessely) ποιείς ἢ τὸ πᾶν (τὸ πᾶν adv.) ἀγνός. Quae sequuntur hunc in modum sunt legenda: τὸ δὲ φυλακτῆριον ὅπου τὸ πρ(ᾶγμα)³ ἐγ<γέ>-γραφας θές πρό<ς> κεφ(αλήν) σου.

112⁸⁸⁰ ἐπικαλοῦμαι σε δέσποινα (Iuna est) τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου καθηγούμενος (sic) θεᾷ μεγαλοδύναμει . . . (894) προσκαθηγούμενον τῆς νυκτός κτλ. Deleatur vox προσκαθηγούμενον, quae nihili est, scribaturque προκαθηγούμενη. Voculas πρό et πρὸς invicem permutat librarius in transcribendis archetypi compendiis parum diligens.

118⁷⁰ λίβανον ἄδμητον id est ἄτμητον.

120¹⁰⁴ leg. ἔχων πρό<ς> κεφαλῇ⁴ σου πλάνθον ὥμην⁵ ἔστιν δὲ ὦ (=ὅ) γράφεις κτλ. Paulo post ἔχων . . ἐν . . τῇ δεξιᾷ χερὶ ξίφος καμπη ἐπὶ τὸν τράχηλον κειμένης itidem corrupte traditur. Medelae viam imago appicta demonstrat, in qua virum cernimus dextra manu gladium tenentem, quod in collum est conversum, unde legendum duco ξίφο<ς> κ<υ>ς κώπη<ς>⁵ ἐπὶ τὸν τράχηλον κειμένην.⁶

GUILELMUS CRÖNERT.

SCRIPTI BONNAE.

² λυχνία ἐπτάμυξος Epiphani. I 909^b al. (Thesaur. III 1941^b.)

³ Scilicet id quod a numine petis, cf. εἰσάκουσον μου καὶ ποιήσον τὸ δ(ε)ῖ(να) πρᾶγμα pap. mag. Paris. Wien. Denkschr. 1888, 27, ἐλθέ ἐπ' ἐμαῖς θυσίαις καὶ μοι τῷδε πρᾶγμα ποιήσον 93 al. Vocem πρᾶγμα in compendio illo inesse Kenyon quoque est sententia (cf. pg. 254).

⁴ cf. θε[ς] πρὸς κεφαλῇν 105⁸⁸⁵.

⁵ Forsan quispiam vocem καμῆ 'curvam gladii aciem' significare suspicetur. Sed haec notio cum omnino sit nova neque similem vocum (καμπτήρ καμπόλος al.) exemplis firmata, librarii vitium quam mirum auctoris usum sumere praestat.

⁶ An potius legendum κειμένην?

¹ Sic iam Wessely olim correxerat (Wien. Denkschr. 1893, 35).

TWO LEXICOGRAPHICAL NOTES.

I.

IN the well-known Locrian inscription (I.G.A. 321 = Roberts, *Introduc. to Grk. Epig.* i. No. 231, lines 38 ff.) the following words occur: ὅσστις καὶ τὰ ξεῖδηκότα διαφθείρη τέχνη καὶ μαχῆ καὶ μῆ, ὅτι καὶ μὴ ἀνφοτέροις δοκέη, Ὀποντίων τε χιλίων πλήθη καὶ Ναφπακτίων τῶν ἐπιβοῶν πλήθη, ἄτιμον εἶμεν καὶ χρήματα παματοφαγείσται. The meaning is of course clear enough: if any one seeks to circumvent the provisions of the document, such an one shall be ἄτιμος, and his property shall be confiscated, for παματοφαγείσται can mean nothing else than δημοσιεύεσθαι. Van Herwerden in his new *Lexicon Graec. supplementarium et dialecticum* says of the word 'Mirus usus; originem enim vocabuli spectans crederes significare κατεσθίεν τὰ πατρώα. Sed enim contextus illud valere non sinit dubitari. Patria igitur dicitur damnatorum possessiones devorare.' But how does παματοφαγείσται come to get this notion of confiscation? πᾶμα = κτήμα is plain, but the attempt has been made to associate √φαγ in the φαγείσται with the more general notion of the Sanscrit bhaj, that is to get into the word the idea of distribution, and meanings allied to this notion. In Vaniček's *Lexicon*, for example, we find under BHAG, Skr. bhaḡ (1) austheilen, zutheilen, (2) verleihen, bringen, (3) begeben, ausrüsten, (4) erhalten, theilhaftig werden, sich betheiligen; zu geniessen haben. The definition of the Petersburg *Lexicon* is essentially the same. See also Prellwitz, *Etymol. Wbch. d. gr. Spr.*, p. 337. It is in connection with these definitions that the late Professor F. D. Allen (*Curtius' Studien* iii., 1870, p. 276) sought to interpret the meaning of the second part of the compound in παματοφαγείσται, and according to this explanation the notion of eating in √φαγ does not enter into the word. A few years ago I chanced to talk with Professor Allen on this subject, and I afterwards had from him a letter in which he made some very characteristic remarks on the compound. He intended to print a note on the word. Professor Allen wrote as follows: 'As to παματοφαγείσται, I think I know what that is now, though what I wrote about it twenty-five years ago is rot. At a time when πάματα and κτήματα consisted of flocks and herds, confiscation of property consisted in seizing on and eating up, in a general

public feast, the victim's sheep and oxen. This is παματοφαγεῖν (= κτήματο-φαγεῖν). Doubtless the δωροφάγοι βασιλῆες in Hesiod are similar; the bribes were fat lambs and the like, and the wicked kings roasted and ate them. Doesn't this seem probable?'

It may be noted that L. Meyer, *Hdbch. d. griech. Etymol.* iii., p. 366, has doubted the correctness of the common explanation of √φαγ; 'Die gewöhnliche Zusammenstellung mit altind. bhaḡ, 'erlangen, erreichen' und causal 'theilhaft werden lassen, austheilen, zutheilen' wird zu wenig der Bedeutung von φαγ- gerecht, um richtig sein zu können.

About the time that I received this letter from Professor Allen the same idea of the word was suggested to me by line 429 of *Odyssey* 16. Penelope is upbraiding Antinous for his faithlessness and ingratitude to Odysseus, seeing that his father had as a fugitive won the protection of Odysseus when the Thesprotians sought to kill him and to appropriate his ample substance:

ἦδὲ κατὰ ζῶνιν φαγέειν μενοεικέα πολλήν.

Here in ζῶνιν καταφαγεῖν we seem to get near to the origin of παματοφαγείσται. The context points distinctly to the thought of the confiscation of an individual's property by the public, and not simply to a metaphorical use of 'eat up,' common enough, I suppose, in all languages and found certainly in both Ancient and Modern Greek.

II.

Inscription No. 8 of the Thera Appendix to the last edition of Roehl's *Imagines* is as follows:

ΑΖ ΜΑΔΑΣΔΛΟΛ

Δοκ(h)αία Δαμία.

In *I.G.I.M.A.* the inscription is No. 361, where there is the following comment: 'Enucleavit P. Wolters. Photii glossam λοχαῖος σῖτος ὁ βαθύς· ἢ ὁ δι' ἐπομβρίαν κεκλημένος (where it is possible, I believe probable, we ought to read κεκλημένος) attulit Wilamowitz. Est igitur eadem quae Aiginae cum Damia colebatur Auxesia.' The Hesychian gloss s.v. λοχαῖος· κλ[ε]νόμενος εὔσιτος· ἀπὸ τοῦ.....εὐτροφεῖν may also be cited as making a similar suggestion. λοχαῖος, then, apparently re-

ferred to the thick rich growth of corn, whether etymologically it suggests corn which could not stand upright (cf. *κεκλιμένος*, 'lodged' grain, as one hears in New England) and we connect it with the root *legh-lie*, including the Greek derivatives *λεχ*, *λοχ*, or not.

It thus seems likely that the inscription designated a statue of or an offering to two goddesses of fertility called Damia and Lochaia and that these suggest the Aeginetan cult of Damia and Auxesia described by Herodotus and recently confirmed by an inscription which turned up in Thiersch's excavations (see *C.R.*, xv. pp. 474 and 477).

Now in L. Meyer's *Grammatik*, p. 935, under the root *lagh* the word *λάχεια* is cited with the remark, 'dunkles Beiwort einer Insel (Odys. 9, 116) und des Meeresufers (Odys. 10, 509) statt dessen Bekker und Nauck aber *ἐλαχεία* "klein" lesen.' See also L. Meyer's *Hdbch. d. griech. Etymol.* iv. p. 564.

The first passage referred to (9, 116) describes the island which lay just off the land of the Cyclopes, where Odysseus and his companions disembark to engage in the chase. *Νῆσος ἔπειτα λάχεια παρέκ λιμένος τετάνυσται* are the words. The second passage (10, 509) is in Circe's description of the shore upon which Odysseus must land when he makes his descent into Hades.

ἐνθ' ἀκτή τε λάχεια καὶ ἄλσος Περσεφονείης.

It should be said that in Hom. Hym. in Apol., 197, the word *λάχεια* appears in some MSS., but there is little doubt that *ἐλαχεία* should be read in this place.

In these passages from the Odyssey, as has already been said, some editors read *ἐλαχεία*. This was the reading of Zenodotus.

Aristarchus probably gave *λάχεια*, and this has been retained by most editors. The scholiasts interpret the word by *εὐγειος*, *εὐσκαφος*, and seek to connect it with *λαχαίνω*. Whatever their idea of the etymology may have been, it is clear that they thought it referred to the fertility of the soil. Many modern editors, however, have not shared this view. For example, Nitzsch tried to connect the word with *λάχρη*, *λάχανον*, understanding it to mean 'overgrown', and 'rough' (see Lobeck, *Puth. Proleg.* p. 177 note, who accepts this view); Döderlein on the other hand associated it with *λεχ*, and interpreted 'low-lying.' See also Prellwitz *Etymol. Wbch.* p. 177, where 'flach' is used to explain the *λάχεια νῆσος*. In Hesychius we get again the scholiasts' interpretation: *λάχεια εὐσκαφος, εὐγειος παρὰ τὸ λαχαίνεισθαι, ὃ ἐστι σκάπτεισθαι πυκνῶς*.

Now this notion of fertility is distinctly the meaning the context calls for in the first passage from the Odyssey. The second passage is too brief a description of the locality referred to to make it of much help, but here too *λάχεια* may well mean 'with rich soil,' since the trees in the grove of Persephone are abundant. But of the island off the country of the Cyclopes it is said at line 134,

*ἐν δ' ἄροσις λείη μάλα κεν βαθὺ λήιον αἰεὶ,
εἰς ὥρας ἀμῶνεν, ἐπεὶ μάλα πῖαρ ὑπ' οὐδας.*

The poet thus certainly thought of the island as being of wonderful fertility for the raising of crops, had there been any inhabitants to till it.

May we not then connect *λάχεια* with the divinity *Λοκ(η)αία* or *Αἰζηγία*? It is for the etymologists to say.

J. R. WHEELER.

THE GORTYNIAN INFINITIVE IN -μην.

The infinitive ending -μην, which appears in inscriptions of Gortyn¹ in Crete, has been explained in two ways. Brugmann, *Gr. Gram.*² 228, would derive -μην from an Idg. locative -mēn. On the other hand G. Meyer, *Gr. Gram.*³ 665, is inclined to regard -μην as an analogical transformation of -μεν. That the latter view is the correct one, is shewn by the distribution of the forms in the inscriptions of Gortyn.

¹ -μην is a purely Gortynian ending. In *ἡμην*, Cauer² 121, η seems to denote *ei*.

In the collection of old Cretan inscriptions published by Comparetti, *Monumenti Antichi* vol. iii., the oldest inscriptions of Gortyn shew the ending -μεν:—*διαπορθήμεν* 12-13, *ἤμεν* 18, 19, *ἀποδόμεν* 18. Later inscriptions have -μην:—*ἡμην* 152, 153, 154, 171, *κατισσταμην* 152, *θεμην* 152, *δομην* 152, *καταδομην* 175. Such a distribution is obviously incompatible with the derivation of -μην from an Idg. -mēn.

The distribution of the endings -μεν and -μην has a curious parallel in the distribution

of the endings *-εν* and *-ην* from verbs in *-εω*. Doric dialects, in which verbs of the type *φέρω* have the infinitive in *-εν*, have likewise infinitives in *-εν* from verbs of the type *φιλέω*; contraction had taken place before the ¹ analogical development of *-εν*. Examples are Delph. *ἐνοικεν*, *ἀπογραψεν*, Arg. *πῶλεν*, Ther. *διοικεν*, *τελεν*, *λειτουργεν*. The early inscriptions of Gortyn have *-εν*:—*μῶλεν* 2, *ἐνφοικεν* 18, like *ἐκεν*, *λειπεν*. In the later inscriptions verbs in *-ω* have still *-εν*, but verbs in *-εω* have now *-ην*:—*καλῆν*, *μωλῆν* 152. As Professor Thurneysen has pointed out to me, this is doubtless a secondary distinction analogous to the distinction between verbs in *-ω* and verbs in *-εω* in other parts, e.g.

¹ As to *-εν*, Brugmann, *Gr. Gram.* ³ 361, suggests that *δόμην* by *δόμην* may have led to *ἐχεν* by *ἐχην*. But as *-μην* has turned out to be simply a late Gortynian form, that explanation is impossible. The Rhodian ending *-μην* is a contamination of *-μην* with *-εν*. Is *-εν* a similar contamination of *-ην* with *-μην*? Such an explanation would be possible in the Doric dialects. The difficulty lies in Arcadian, which has *-εν* but not *-μην*. But our knowledge of the Arcadian verbal system is very imperfect; it is possible that *-εν* originated here otherwise than in the Doric dialects.

φέρετε and *καλῆτε*. We may compare Delph. *καταγορεῖν*, *ἀδικησεῖν*, *ἐπιτρεψέιν*, *οἰσεῖν*.

The parallelism between *-μην* *-εν* and *-μην* *-ην* in the earlier and later inscriptions of Gortyn can hardly be accidental. The only reasonable explanation is that one of the two forms has been influenced by the other. Now *-ην*, as we have seen, admits of a very simple explanation. Hence the inference can scarcely be avoided that *-μην* became *-μην* under the influence of *-ην*. Why the verbs in *-εω* should have exerted this influence is not very apparent. In the Cretan forms which I have before me the only coincidence is in the subjunctive, e.g. *θῆ* and *καλῆ*. Perhaps further discoveries in Crete will make this clear too.

Many of the infinitival forms quoted above have been left unaccented, because the true accentuation is to a great extent very uncertain. However, there can hardly be any doubt that *μωλῆν*, *καλῆν* should be accented *μωλῆν*, *καλῆν*. This suggests that *ἡμην*, *δομην*, *θεμην*, *ἰσταμην* should be written *ἡμῆν*, *δομῆν*, *θεμῆν* *ἰσταμῆν*.

J. STRACHAN.

EPILEGOMENA ON LUCRETII.

When the observations, with which the writers in the *Jahresberichte über die Fortschritte der Class. Altertumswissenschaft* garnish their reports, proceed from a critic of Professor A. Brieger's candour and competence, they command a consideration which might not otherwise be theirs. So when the Lucretian scholar complains (*op. cit.* 109, p. 156) that he does 'not understand' what I mean by certain emendations propounded in the *Cambridge University Reporter*, and subsequently mentioned in the *Classical Review* (vol. xiv. p. 353), I am impelled to take an early opportunity of enlightening him.

I will deal with the longest passage first, which, to avoid prejudice to the argument, must be set out in its context:

V. 380 *sqq.*

Denique tantopere inter se cum maxima
mundi 380
pugnent membra, pio nequaquam con-
cita bello,
nonne uides aliquam longi certaminis
ollis
posse dari finem, uel cum sol et uapor
omnis

omnibus epotis umoribus exsuperant?
quod facere intendunt, neque adhuc
conata patrantur: 385
tantum suppeditant amnes ultraque
minantur
omnia diluuiare ex alto gurgite ponti,
nequiquam, quoniam uerrentes aequora
uenti
deminuunt radiisque retexens aetherius
sol,
et siccare prius confidunt omnia posse 390
quam liquor incepti possit contingere
finem.
tantum spirantes aequo certamine
bellum
magnis inter se de rebus cernere
certant,
cum semel interea fuerit superantior
ignis,
et semel, ut famast, umor regnarit in
aruis.

To bring out the requirements of the passage and the difficulties of the vulgate rendering I print Munro's translation with certain portions italicised:

'Again since the chiefest members of the world fight so hotly together, fiercely stirred by no hallowed

civil warfare, see you not that some limit may be set to their long struggle; either when the sun and all heat have drunk up all the waters and gotten the mastery: this they are ever striving to do, but as yet are unable to accomplish their endeavours: such abundant supplies the rivers furnish, and threaten to turn aggressors and flood all things with a deluge from the deep gulfs of the ocean; all in vain, since the winds sweeping over the seas and the ethereal sun decomposing them with his rays do lessen them, and trust to be able to dry all things up before water can attain the end of its endeavour. Such a war do they breathe out with undecided issue, and strive with each other to determine it for mighty ends; though once by the way fire got the upper hand and once, as the story goes, water reigned paramount in the fields.'

That the thought requires the sense of Goebel's *patravunt* in 385 'as yet they have not accomplished their endeavour' and of the Italian MSS.'s *ultra* in 386, any one can see. Whether the words of the tradition will furnish it, I need not stop to consider here.

To pass to what is more vital. Munro's 'the sun and all heat' is dark to me and I get no light from subsequent editors. 'sol et vapor' appear to be two causes of evaporation—the sun's rays and diffused heat—distinguished here as the *aetheris aestus* and the *radii solis* are in 483 *sq.* To whom are they opposed in the unhallowed warfare? To *umor* or *umores* to be understood from *umoribus*, I suppose, to be the reply. In itself this is conceivable. But it does not seem to be in Lucretius' thought which here takes a different turn. Here the adversaries of the *sol* and *vapor* are the rivers, mentioned also in 415 'constiterunt imbres et flumina uim minuerunt' which far from yielding in the strife, continually pour water into the sea to replace the *umores epoti* and threaten in their turn a universal deluge. An *a* for an *o* will restore them to their place; *amnis*, the object of 'exsuperarint.' I have never claimed this correction as my own though Prof. Brieger apparently ascribes it to me. All my part in it is recognising the acc. plur. in *-is*. Some unknown has pencilled 'amnes' in the margin of my Munro. Who was its author I have not the least idea.

For 387 again Munro's version shows us the sense demanded and its absence from the vulgate. *ex* is in fact senseless; an ablative of the instrument is required 'with the ocean waters.' *alto* too may be impugned: the 'ponti gurgis' is always deep. My *exalto* meets both objections. The flood comes when the sea is over-deep. This word is said by Georges (Lex.) to occur in Apuleius (Met. 6. 14), where it is only a

plausible conjecture of Hildebrandt's, the MSS. having 'exarto' and the last editor, van der Vliet, emending 'extrito.' It is to this place I presume Prof. Brieger refers when he calls the word 'nachklassisch.' I lay no stress upon the Apuleius place, and 'nachklassisch' begs the question. There are plenty of classical adjectives compounded with *ex*. *praealtus* (which Lucretius does not use) and *exaltus* are just as good a pair as *praeceus* and *excelsus*. And I claim for *exalto* that it has quite as much support in the tradition as *ex alto*. For we need pay no attention to the ignoramuses who divided the words in the archetype of the Leyden MSS. and produced within a hundred lines of the present passage such results as *omnigenus* (428, 440), *alte uolans* (433) and *salsos offudit* (482).

VI. 80 *sqq.*

quam quidem ut a nobis ratio uerissima
longe
reiciat quamquam sunt a me longa pro-
fecta
multa tamen restant et sunt ornanda
politis
uersibus est ratio *caelique tenenda
sunt tempestates et fulmina clara canenda, 85
quid faciant et qua de causa cumque
ferantur
ne trepides caeli diuisis partibus amens
unde uolans ignis peruenerit aut in
utram se
uerterit hinc partem.

For *qui faciant* (86) which I have proposed I referred to Munro on IV 1112 (not 1113 as it is printed in the *Reporter*) and Aetna 208; but I should have said that I took *faciant* in the sense of 'act' 'do something' 'produce an effect,' which is not quite the same as Munro's 'hoc facere.' As my nearest parallel, the Aetna passage, is doubtful, I will throw over *qui faciant* to Prof. Brieger, provided I am not expected to accept *qui fiant*, Bockemueller's improbable conjecture. Let us then keep *faciant* and read *quae* (neuter nom.). The sense is the same as with *qui fiant*, Lucretius mentions more than one cause of storms, &c. in the sequel, and the postponement of the first word of the subordinate clause, Lucretian as this is (*e.g.* v. 37, 77, 183), was enough to mislead a copyist.

On the same passage Prof. Brieger criticises my *notanda* for *tenenda* (*C.R. l.c.*), for slight reasons as I think. I will however suggest an alteration in the hope that he will reconsider his preference for *docenda* which again is destitute of palaeographical proba-

bility. Suppose we interchange the two similar verse-endings *tenenda* and *canenda*, and putting a longer pause at the end of 83 take the *tenenda*, now in v. 84, in closer connexion with *ne trepidus*. The reason, Lucretius will then say, why you must grasp the things that make storms and lightnings and the various causes that set them in motion, is that you may no longer lose your wits with fear when they do occur. This seems fairly coherent.

To V. 1009 sq. (see *C.R. l.c.*) I should not again refer but for Prof. Brieger's serious misconception of the force of my proposal. I had argued that the lines should be thus written

illi imprudentes ipsi sibi saepe uenenum
uergebant, medicis nunc dant sollertius
ipsis

nunc dant being the accepted correction for the *nudant* of OQ, *ipsis* that of Bergk and others for *ipsi* and *medicis* my own supplement. On this Prof. Brieger comments 'als ob die Aerzte in jener Zeit für eine Giftmischerzunft gegolten hätten!' *suum! sibi habeat*. The printed Latin means 'In early days men often poured draughts of poison down their own throats but nowadays they administer it more expertly than physicians themselves.' Where in all this is there anything about a 'poisoners' guild'? The words do not even necessarily mean that physicians did poison in Lucretius' time: 'do administer' and 'can administer' are both legitimate expansions of the thought. The point is not here at all. It is that the increase of knowledge has done harm and that a non-professional can poison as expertly as one whose business it is to be acquainted with the properties of drugs. That *dant* has here a technical reference,

Palmer (who mistakenly conjectured *medici —usi*) saw; and Duff following Palmer points out the same in his note. It forms a suitable contrast to that rather strange word *uergebant* which implies a certain recklessness of action, as when the contents of a patera are upset on a victim or a tomb; compare Servius *ad Aen.* 6. 244, Heinsius on Ovid *ex Pont.* 1. 9. 52. *sollertius* is also most suitable as *sollers* (*sollus* and *ars* 'all skill') is frequently applied to those who are masters in any craft or profession.

The words may very well after all carry a sidelong imputation. The faculty which wields the pharmacopoeia has in all ages been liable to the suspicion of abusing its powers. To prove this for Roman times one quotation from the celebrated invective of Pliny is enough: *N.H.* 29. 20 'non deseram Catonem tam ambitiosae artis inuidiae a me obiectum aut senatum illum qui ita censebat idque non criminibus artis adeptis ut aliquis expectauerit. quid enim uenenorum fertilis aut unde plures testamentorum insidiae?' May be the expression was suggested to the poet by some scandal of the day—some ancient Palmer or Lamson case. At all events it is quite in that saturnine vein of his to which I have recently adverted in this *Review* (*C.R.* xvi. 113b, 114b). To those who would accept my supplement if they could attribute the omission of the word to haplography, I would point out that, as *e* and *i* are confused perpetually in the MSS. of Lucretius, *med* and *nud* are convertible groups of letters, and thus in '*medicis nudant*' a scribe might easily write '*nudant*' when he should have been writing '*medicis*.' But, as I have said before, words are omitted in our tradition without any such contributory cause.

J. P. POSTGATE.

A NOTE ON SALLUST'S JUGURTHA.

In ch. 3 of the *Jugurtha* Sallust says he thinks the pursuit of a political career at the present time undesirable:

quoniam neque uirtuti honos datur neque illi, quibus per fraudem fuit, tuti aut eo magis honesti sunt. nam ui quidem regere patriam aut parentis, quamquam et possis et delicta corrigas, tamen inopportunitas est..., frustra autem niti neque aliud se fatigando nisi odium quaerere extremae dementiae est.

nisi forte quem inhonesta et perniciosa libido tenet potentiae paucorum decus atque libertatem suam gratificari.

Jacobs explained the first seven lines of this passage as follows: '*nam ui quidem* &c. explains the preceding thought. In carrying out the duties of office one has only two courses between which to choose: either one must use force or one can do nothing. The former course, at the best is

dangerous and objectionable; the latter could only suit a fool.'

This explanation appears to me undoubtedly correct. But in the later editions (at all events in the last, 1894, revised by Wirz), a different one is given, which is in the main the same as that given by Fabri and, I think, almost certainly wrong.

Fabri says '*uis* is opposed to *virtus* and *fraus*, and denotes a third way of obtaining influence in public life. For the elliptic *nam* cp. Cat. 58. 20.' So far, Fabri and Jacobs-Wirz agree exactly: the latter adds Cat. 13. 1 as a parallel for the use of *nam*. They vary however as regards the explanation of the words *frustra...dementiae est*. Fabri says they mean 'when one can do nothing [even] with the aid of force,' Jacobs-Wirz take them to refer to the case of a man who, after usurpation (*uis*), makes no attempt to use his power. But both agree in making the clause the alternative to the clause *quamquam...corrigas*.

That Sallust uses the elliptic *nam* is undeniable. As certain exx. I would take the two cited above from the Catiline, and Jug. 19. 2. In all these cases *nam* has no direct reference to the preceding clause, and the words 'I say nothing of.....' have to be supplied before we can translate it by the English 'for.'

The conjunction of *nam* and *quidem* is also not uncommon in the Jugurtha—it does not seem to appear in the Catiline. In none of the cases, I think, is the *nam* elliptic. I will take them in order.

24. 9 quid est reliquum, nisi *uis* uestra, quo moueri possit? *nam* ego quidem uellem... haec uana forent potius quam miseria mea fidem uerbis faceret. sed quoniam eo natus sum ut Iugurthae scelerum ostentui essem, non iam mortem neque aerumnas, tantummodo inimici imperium et cruciatus corporis deprecor.

The first clause is a rhetorical question, equivalent to 'no one is left but you,' and the *nam* clause explains why this is so: 'for I can do nothing.' The editions of Jacobs (including Jacobs-Wirz) give practically the same explanation.

31. 2 multa me dehortantur a uobis, Quirites... : opes factionis, uestra patientia, ius nullum, ac maxime quod innocentiae plus periculi quam honoris est. *nam* illa quidem piget dicere his annis xv quam ludibrio fueritis superbiae paucorum, quam foede quamque inulti perierint uostri defensores...sed quamquam haec talia sunt, tamen obuiam ire animus subigit.

The *nam* clause simply explains the

words that precede, especially those that follow *ac maxime*. It is certainly not elliptic here, and none of the three editions suggests that it is.

31. 20 (the times when the oligarchy had everything) uos autem...satis habebatis animam retinere. *nam* seruitutem quidem quis uestrum recusare audebat?

Here Fabri says *nam* is elliptic, and adds 'so below, § 23.' Jacobs-Wirz agrees, referring to the note on 3. 2. But there is no ellipse at all: *nam* simply introduces the justification for the strong words *satis*—*retinere*.

31. 23 uobis aeterna sollicitudo remanebit, cum intellegitis aut seruandum esse aut per manus libertatem retinendam. *nam* fidei quidem aut concordiae quae spes est?

I do not deny that *nam* may be elliptic here (as Fabri and J-W say), and that the words 'these are the only courses open to you' may be supplied before it. But it is certainly open to us to take the *nam* clause as explaining why they will suffer *aeterna sollicitudo* or why they will understand they have got to choose between two courses.

85. 27 (I know my adversaries can beat me at speechmaking, but the office I hold is a gift from you, they keep abusing not only me, but also you, and so I did not see fit to hold my tongue lest people should think I admitted my unworthiness). *nam* me quidem nulla oratio laedere potest...; sed, quoniam uestra consilia accusantur..., etiam atque etiam reputate.

Here *nam* explains the theme of the previous clause: 'this abuse affects you, not me.' No ed. explains it, either as elliptic or otherwise.

Thus in all five cases *nam* followed by *quidem* can (in four of them must) be taken in its usual sense: it introduces a clause justifying a definite and emphatic statement just made. So far, then, as usage goes, we are more likely to be right in taking it so in chap. 3. The definite and emphatic statement here is that those who get office are not *tuti aut eo magis honesti*.

And, usage apart, this seems to suit the context better. The aforesaid statement needs explanation. Caesar might serve as an example of those who, getting office, used *uis* and yet he was not *tutus*. And his colleague Bibulus, avoiding *uis*, might be said *frustra niti neque aliud se fatigando nisi odium quaerere*, and so to incur the charge of *extrema dementia*. This last corresponds to the (non) *eo magis honesti* above. For the confusion of the idea of *folly* and

dishonour ep. Sallust himself, Jug. 107. 1 *nec quemquam decere...in maximo metu nudum et caecum corpus ad hostis uortere*, a direct translation from Xenophon, who however writes *μῶρον...τὸ...τὰ τεφλὰ τοῦ σώματος...ἐναντία τάρρειν κ.τ.λ.*

That *S. is*, in this sentence *nam—dementiae est*, bearing in mind the words *tuti aut... honesti* is, I think, made certain by the words which follow—*nisi forte* etc. Here he *does* suggest a third course open to the office-holder, only to stigmatise it as open to each of the objections against the other two: *inhonesta et perniciose libido*.

With the other explanation of *nam*, the clause *frustra—est* is awkward. As shown above, the advocates of that explanation

differ in their interpretation of these words. My difficulty with regard to both explanations is this. If we grant that *S. did* mean to reckon *uis* as a *third* method of getting office, did he not sufficiently stamp it as undesirable (and that is his point here) by saying that, even at its best, it was *importunum*? Why further refine, and carefully subdivide according to the use made of his office by the office-holder? Jacobs-Wirz's view of the clause seems to me in addition to attach an unlikely meaning to *frustra niti* (which must mean then 'take much trouble and yet, when one gets the desired object, not use it').

WALTER C. SUMMERS.

VIRGIL'S AENEAS.

What! did the hand then of the Potter shake!—OMAR.

CHARLES JAMES FOX, writing to his friend Trotter, speaks of the Aeneid thus:—'Though the detached parts of the Aeneid appear to me to be equal to anything, the story and characters appear more faulty every time I read it. My chief objection (I mean that to the character of Aeneas) is of course not so much felt in the three first books; but afterwards he is always either insipid or odious; sometimes excites interest against him, and never for him.' The student of Virgil may turn to Dr. Henry's powerful vindication of the phrase *Sumpius Aeneas* (i. 381), to which Fox takes especial exception, and if Dr. Henry does not satisfy him, he can read Marlowe's *Dido Queen of Carthage*, and from Marlowe's Aeneas, with his bows and compliments to the queen, let him go back to Virgil's hero and consider whether after all he is not at once more natural, more manly, and more attractive.¹

But Fox's criticism is one to which it is probable that a large number of Virgil's readers will subscribe, and we are forced to ask ourselves whether it is just; whether it is possible that Virgil's highest conception of manhood is after all so worthless? Or even, if we suppose Fox to use the words 'insipid' and 'odious' with something of the exaggeration of Jane Austen's beaux, must we confess that Aeneas is still funda-

mentally a failure? By lightly accepting such a judgment we should probably lose something which the poet felt intensely to be vital to himself and to everybody. Virgil has a right to require of us some effort to discover this.

Probably no one has ever read Homer and Virgil without remarking the broad gulf between their two heroes. Everyone recognises at once the intense and true humanity of Achilles. There is no doubt that he is a real man, but about Aeneas we are not so sure. Achilles is 'the natural man,' and, as is usual with the creations of a great poet, we like our kind better because Homer has shewn us Achilles, we are reconciled to life and death and have something of Ben Ezra's feeling—'Thanks that I was a man.' Aeneas is not the natural man. He represents a stage at once beyond and behind that of Achilles. He has seen a great deal more of life, he has felt the lifting of a great purpose, he is part of a larger world, but he does not 'see the whole design.' Hence there is a want of poetic satisfaction about him. Aeneas—that is, the ideal Aeneas of Virgil, uncomplicated by outside considerations, is at once an older man than Achilles and the child of a later age of mankind. In the interval between the fall of Troy and his arrival in Italy he has seen many more cities than Odysseus saw and learnt the minds of many more men, and these many minds have confused him. He is a dreamer, and thinks of many things where Achilles looked straight before

¹ Henry, *Aeneidea* i. 647 ff.

him. He is a pilgrim, a man with a quest, a conscious agent of Heaven, and about such men there is something remote from common humanity.

Again, though Aeneas can explain to others where he is going and why he is going, he does not seem able to explain it to himself. He knows, more or less clearly, that he is to seek Italy, but in spite of his abundance of revelations he is outside the counsel of the gods. He needs from time to time the hand of heaven to push him forward. His quest is not a spiritual necessity to him. Crete, Epirus, Sicily, or even Carthage would have satisfied himself. That he was not to rest till he reached Italy was no part of his conviction. The Pilgrim Fathers knew why the *Mayflower* crossed the Atlantic, and they knew what they meant to find at or near Plymouth Rock,—or some other rock; the place was immaterial, but the impulse which drove them westward, they felt, no doubt, to come from heaven, and they understood it. They might not see all that would follow, but they had that priceless gift which their descendants have never lost for long—a conviction of a future, which would be the necessary spiritual outcome of their principles. This Aeneas had not consciously, and though Virgil plainly means that the Roman Empire is the outcome of character of the type of his hero's, this want of clearness and conviction tends to mar a fine conception.

To sum up, Achilles satisfies us, because at every point we feel that he is a man; he thinks, he feels, he suffers as a man; and his experience, deep and intense as it is, is the common lot of humanity, felt and interpreted by a poet. Aeneas does not satisfy us, for his experience, though not improbable, indeed though highly probable and often enough actually true, is not enough universalized; it is not brought 'into every man's business and bosom'; it lies outside us; the ways of God are here justified to our historical faculty perhaps, but not to our hearts; we do not go with Aeneas; but with the poet we watch him from the throne of Destiny, overawed but hardly convinced.

The character of Aeneas then is a failure, for want of completeness and conviction, but a failure which threw into the shade every poetic success between Sophocles and Dante; a failure, which opened for poetry for all time a door into a new world, which brought under poetry's survey great conceptions, unthought and almost unfelt before—of man the agent of heaven, attempting and achiev-

ing acts small in themselves but of incredible consequence for mankind; of a divine purpose and providence, in the least as in the largest things, working through individual suffering the general good; and of something like a mutual intelligibility of man and God, a community of purpose, perhaps even a spiritual unity. These things are not indeed worked out adequately in the *Aeneid*, but they are suggested, even implied. The poet has caught sight of them and is quickened by the sight, but at times it comes over him that he may be deceived. Hence there is a wavering and an uncertainty about the whole poem, a feeling of pain and suspense—*aut videt aut vidisse putat per nubila*.

Aeneas then is not at all a hero of the type of Achilles, and if we come to the *Aeneid* with preconceived opinions of what the hero of an epic should be, we run the risk of disappointment and also of losing Virgil's interpretation of human life. Virgil obviously did not intend to make a copy of Homer's Achilles or of any of Homer's heroes. That was a feat to be left to Quintus of Smyrna. If, as it is, there is an air of anachronism about Virgil's Aeneas, there would have been a far profounder anachronism about him if in Augustus' age he had been a real Homeric hero. The world had moved far and fast since Homer's day. It had exhausted the spiritual impulses which moved it in Homer's day, as we can see in Plato's repudiation of Homer. A new outlook and new principles were needed in view of new conditions of life and the new thoughts which they waked. In its turn the new impulse, with which we connect the literature of Athens, and such names as Euripides, Plato, and Aristotle, was itself spent, though not before it had made an imperishable contribution to the growth of mankind. The world was awaiting another fresh impulse, and, till this should come, it was occupied in analysing, co-ordinating, and developing its existing stock of ideas, not without some dim consciousness that they were already inadequate. It was at this moment that Virgil wrote, and being a poet, and not an antiquarian, he sought to bring his Aeneas into connection with his own age, while still, if possible, keeping him a Homeric hero. It was hardly to be done. If Aeneas as the ideal hero was to be 'heir of all the ages,' it would be difficult to keep the simplicity of Homer's outlook and philosophy. Aeneas could not stand in Achilles' relation to men. He must have new virtues which had been

discovered since Homer's day, if he was to be a hero near the hearts of Virgil's contemporaries—the new private virtues, which Menander and Cleanthes and many more were finding out, and the new political virtues which Alexander and the Ptolemies, Julius and Augustus, were revealing to the world. Aeneas again could not stand in Achilles' relation to heaven. The gods no longer came among men in bodily form, they were far away; and yet perhaps they were not so very far away after all—*deum namque ire per omnes*. (*Georgics*, iv, 221)

Here then is the reason that Aeneas' appeal to us is not so successful as Achilles'. The fusion of the Homeric and the modern types is not complete. Virgil's Aeneas is two heroes in one, perhaps more, for beside the Homeric hero and the modern hero, one feels sometimes that we have another creature, which is not a hero at all, but an idea, an allegory of a virtue, and a political virtue at that, partially incarnated.

To understand the character and the poem of which it is the centre, it will be necessary to analyse more closely the various elements in Aeneas.

I. First of all, there is Aeneas conceived as a Homeric hero. Aeneas has of course the heroic manner, in measure, but not quite the manner of Homeric heroes, a more magnificent, a more courtly manner. He has the wealth of the Homeric hero and his habit of giving splendid presents and receiving them. At times Virgil would have us think he feels the same wild delight in battle which we find in Homer's heroes. 'Lie there now, terrible one! No mother's love shall lay thee in the sod, or place thy limbs beneath thine heavy ancestral tomb. To birds of prey shalt thou be left or borne down in the eddying water, where hungry fish shall suck thy wounds' (x. 457, Mackail). This is what Aeneas remembers to have read in the *Iliad*; he blends what Odysseus says to Socus (*Il.* xi. 452) with Achilles' words to Lycaon (*Il.* xxi. 122). But the words are still Homer's, they are not Aeneas'. Again the reservation of eight captured youths to be sacrificed to the Manes of Pallas (xi. 81 *vinxerat et post terga manus quos mitteret umbris inferias caeso sparsurus sanguine flammis*; cf. x. 517–520) can be defended by the Homeric parallel of Achilles slaying Trojans over Patroclus' pyre (*Il.* xxiii, 22–3, 175) by more awful contemporary parallels, but still it is not convincing. Augustus may have ordered or performed a human sacrifice, but when Virgil transfers this to Aeneas, the reader

feels the justice of Aristotle's paradox; 'there is no reason why some events that have actually happened should not conform to the law of the probable and possible.' This is an actual event, perhaps, but it is not 'probable' here, as we shall see.

But perhaps the most incongruous Homeric touch in Virgil's story of Aeneas is the beautifying of the hero by his mother to enable him unconsciously to win Dido. That Aeneas is 'like a god in face and shoulders' we can well believe, but the addition of the 'purple light of youth' to a man of years, 'long tost on land and sea,' worn to grandeur by war and travel, is surely a triumph of imitation over imagination. Dido was not Nausicaa.

II. Virgil's Aeneas implies a new relation to heaven. Greek thinkers had moved, and brought mankind with them, beyond the Olympus of Homer. Men no longer might expect to

Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn.

There was a gain however in their loss, for it was a deepening consciousness of the real character of the Divine nature that carried men away from Olympus to look for divinity in a higher region. The divine was more remote, but it was more divine. It had less contact with humanity, but it was freer from the weaknesses and the vices of humanity. It was perhaps less interested in the individual, but it might exercise a wider and a firmer power over the universe. On this point opinions were divided. Virgil in his earlier days probably went with Lucretius, and held (at least provisionally) that 'the nature of gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favours nor moved by anger' (*Lucr.* ii. 646, Munro).

This was not Virgil's ultimate view, but it has left its traces upon his epic. He handles his gods with a caution that excludes warmth. Though Aeneas is favoured with one theophany after another, and though they re-assure him for a while, he is not on such easy terms with the gods as was Achilles. He sees them less frequently and his relations are more formal. In fact, the complete rejection of the Homeric pantheon by educated people in favour of eastern religion or Greek philosophy was too strong

for the poet.¹ He was personally less disposed than many of his day to quarrel outright with the gods of his fathers, but Homer's gods were weaker, because more marked, characters, and by this time were little more than symbols, subjects for the painter and for Ovid. These gods in accordance with epic usage had to watch over the hero of the epic, but it was little they could do.

But Virgil had not remained an Epicurean. If some believed that the gods were unconcerned with the world, others rejected the Homeric pantheon because it did not sufficiently relate the world with the gods. They traced the world's origin back to divine intelligence, they recognised the diviner element in man's nature, his power of remembering and re-discovering the divine 'ideas,' and they leant to a belief in the moral government of the universe. With the gradual direction of philosophy to individual life, men came to believe in a personal concern of heaven with the individual man. If fate is hard and unrelenting, it has recognised the individual, and on the whole the individual may accept it without resentment. Hence Cleanthes bids fate lead him in the destined way and he will be fearless, reminding himself meanwhile that there is no question about his following. Man is thus entirely dependent upon the divine.²

Here is one of the great differences between Homer and Virgil. Destiny, as M. Boissier remarks, has its place in Homer. His heroes often know well that they are doomed to fall, but as a rule they forget it and act as if they had not the knowledge. The action is only now and again darkened by the shadow of Fate, but in general we have the free development of the individual's story, as he carelessly abandons himself to the fever of life and forgets the menaces of the future in the interests of the present.³ Aeneas, on the contrary, is entirely in the hands of heaven, and for guidance keeps his eyes fixed on superior powers. If the individual gods, as named by Homer, have less vitality, the great idea of Providence or Destiny—shaping the world and controlling the individual, has gained in strength, and on the whole it is rational

and moral. Aeneas resigns himself to this Providence as a willing, if not entirely intelligent agent. Wherever his great quest is concerned, he is a man of prayer, anxiously waiting for a sign from heaven, which never fails him.

Aeneas then is the chosen vessel of Destiny from first to last—*fato profugus*, he is guided by fate throughout all his wanderings:—

*quo fata trahunt retrahuntque sequamur ;
quidquid erit superando omnis fortuna
ferento est,*

says one of his captains (v. 709). He so entirely subordinates himself to Fate, and, in spite of Virgil's shewing him to us, 'this way and that dividing the swift mind,' he so frequently flies to prayer rather than to reflection and resolution, that the reader feels that life, if not easy, is at least made clear to him, and that his pilgrimage is tedious rather than dark or perplexing.

It was a Roman conviction that Rome was under the special care of heaven—a belief which great Roman generals extended to cover their own personal fortunes. 'It was not by numbers,' says Cicero, 'that we overcame the Spaniards, nor by our strength the Gauls, the Carthaginians by our cunning, or the Greeks by our arts, nor lastly was it by that sense, which is the peculiar and natural gift of this race and land, that we overcame the Italians themselves and the Latins ; but by piety (*pietas*) and by regard for the divine (*religio*) and by this sole wisdom—our recognition that all things are ruled and directed by the will of the immortal gods—by these things we have overcome all races and peoples.'⁴

As this utterance is from a speech, we may take it to represent the belief rather of Cicero's audience than of himself, and this assumption is confirmed by similar language addressed to the Romans by Horace, *dis te minorem quod geris imperas*. Probably Virgil shared this popular feeling more than either Cicero or Horace could, and consistently with his habit of shewing the future in the past, the spiritual sequence of events from principles, he endows Aeneas with this thoroughly Roman attitude towards the gods. Aeneas, the founder of the race, like all his most eminent descendants, holds the belief that his country—for he calls Italy his *patria*—is beloved and chosen of heaven ; like them,

¹ Cf. Sainte-Beuve, *Étude sur Virgile*, p. 276 : 'Avec lui (Virgil) on est déjà dans la mythologie ; avec Homère on était dans la religion.'

² 'Ἄγουν δὲ μὴ δὲ Ζεὺ καὶ σὺ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη
ὅποι ποθ' ὁμῶν εἰμι διατεταγμένος
ὡς ἐφομαι γ' ἄκοντος ἤν δὲ μὴ θέλω
κακὸς γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἥσσαν ἐφομαι.

³ *La Religion Romaine*, i. p. 244.

⁴ Cicero de *Harusp. Resp.* 9. 19.

he subordinates himself to heaven's purpose for his country, and on every occasion, seeks to learn at once and in the directest possible way what is the will of the gods; and, once more like them, he finds that heaven never fails Rome.

From Polybius to Prudentius the theory ruled the world that Rome was chosen by the supreme God, pagan and Christian giving him different names, and seeing different motives in his great purpose, but agreeing that with the fall of Rome the world must inevitably end. Virgil's poem would not have been so intensely national and Roman, and of such real value to every Roman citizen, if it had lacked this great belief.

But we must go further than this when we are dealing with a great poet. Providence, for its own purposes, watches over Rome, and over Aeneas so far as he is serving Rome, but does Providence care for the man as apart from the agent? Is the foundation of Rome the supreme thing for which Providence should care?

M. Boissier holds that the *Aeneid* is a religious epic, because the chief purpose of Aeneas is the introduction of the gods to Latium—*inferre deos Latio; sacra deosque dabo* and so forth. But Virgil at least links with this another purpose, which elsewhere seems to overshadow it. Take these lines

*multa quoque et bello passus, dum conderet urbem
inferretque deos Latio—genus unde Latinum
etc. (i. 5)*

with the line a little below, in which he sums up his theme again—

*tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem
(i. 33).*

Virgil had not been an Epicurean for nothing. The gods whom Aeneas was bringing to Rome, he might now recognise as symbols of divinity, but he could hardly attach such superlative importance to these particular symbols. They have hardly any significance in the story which is not shared by Mercury or Father Tiber—hardly more, one might even hazard, than the white sow and her thirty white porkers. Aeneas carefully brought them from Troy, but it is clear that they really derive their importance from Rome, and that Rome does not owe her importance to them.

The founding of the city is then the first thing, but is it a satisfactory theme for a religious epic? We may believe that there

is a power that 'providently caters for the sparrow,' and that will at least do as much for an empire, that will use an empire as a means to some end (what end we may or may not discover), but we have within us a feeling that an empire is after all a small thing when we look at Providence, that the main concerns of Providence are greater and of more eternal moment, more vitally bound up with human nature and moral law, more spiritual in a word. The Roman Empire is of course one of the greatest factors of the modern world, one of them. It has been outgrown like Homer's theology, and its interest has long been mainly historical, a temporary interest, and while we may include it in the Providential design for the Universe, we shall prefer to think of Providence furthering something more permanent. And we shall, from another point of view, prefer to see poetry also concerned with something more permanent, meditating

On man, on nature, and on human life.

For we feel that Virgil has not brought the foundation of Rome into any sufficiently vital relation with human nature or with moral law. The fall of Troy is historically of no moment whatever, while the foundation of Rome is of the highest. Yet the *Iliad* touches us more closely than the *Aeneid*. Virgil has not mastered the affairs of Providence, and they will not take their place in his poem. He has not convinced us that Rome is so vital to heaven as his poem requires.

Now, turning to the other point, we may ask the more universal question—How do the relations of Aeneas with heaven bear on the general life of man? Does heaven care for the man as apart from the agent? No one could well be more loyal to the bidding of heaven than Aeneas, but on the whole his loyalty seems to give him little joy. He is a man who has seen affliction, who expects little else for himself, but does not despair of labour done for others. Sorrow has not narrowed, but broadened his nature. He is always ready to wake in his comrades a hope and a cheerfulness, which he can hardly feel himself; always ready to spend himself for the future of his people, but hardly happy and profoundly solitary. Virgil is true here to human experience, for with his story of pain and with a doubt at his heart, Aeneas could hardly be other than he is. He can never forget the story he tells to Dido.¹ The poet has seized the

¹ Aeneas' words to Dido, *Aen. iv. 340*, give the keynote of his character.

meaning of the fall of Troy and interpreted it in this quiet, wounded, self-obliterating man. If Virgil's hand shakes here and there, his picture, as he saw it in his mind, is true. Underneath the trappings of the Homeric hero is the warrior-sage, who has sounded human sorrow, and who, though he cannot solve the riddle, will not believe that all is vanity and a striving after wind.

Virgil is anticipating a later age, and Aeneas resembles more closely the character of Marcus Aurelius than any other in classical history. *Erat enim ipse*, says his biographer of Marcus, *tantæ tranquillitatis ut vultum nunquam mutaverit maerore vel gaudio, philosophiæ deditus Stoicæ*.¹ This face of impassive calm is sufficient index of the mind within, unsatisfied in its deepest longings for an explanation of life, yet resolved to endure without satisfaction. It implies a consciousness of the inadequacy of all conceptions of the divine yet achieved. Virgil, Suetonius says, meant on finishing the *Aeneid* to give himself to philosophy. Of himself as of his hero, the words are true:

per mare magnum
Italiam sequimur fugientem et volvitur
undis. (v. 628).

III. We have now to consider Aeneas as influenced by the long study of man which marks the centuries between Pericles and Augustus. We must begin by setting aside the elements in his character which are mere external imitations of Homer, and the episode of Dido, which has not in the *Aeneid* its proper psychological effect on the mind of Aeneas.

Few epithets have been more misconstrued than the untranslatable *pius*, which Virgil has associated with the name of Aeneas; yet to understand it thoroughly is necessary, if we are to have a clear comprehension of the whole poem. What is *pietas*? It is not merely 'piety' for that is only a part of its connotation, nor is it enough to add 'pity' to 'piety' in accordance with the happy suggestion of a French critic unless one give both the words a large and generous rendering. Let us take a few illustrations of the spirit indicated by the word.

First, the death of Lausus, who in rescuing his father was killed by Aeneas in battle:

At vero ut vultum vidit morientis et ora,
ora modis Anchisiades pallentia miris,

¹ *Hist. Aug. M. Anton.* 16

ingenuit miserans graviter dextramque tetendit
et mentem patriæ subiit pietatis imago.

'quid tibi nunc, miserande puer, pro laudibus
istis,

quid pius Aeneas tanta dabit indole dignum?
arma quibus luctatus habe tua; teque paren-
tum

manibus et cineri, si qua est ea cura, remitto.
hoc tamen infelix miseram solabere mortem:
Aeneas magni dextra cadis.—(x. 821—830).

This is how Aeneas makes war. Sheer necessity compels him to strike down Lausus; but in a moment the dying face, the boyhood, and the filial love of his victim turn Aeneas from foe to friend. Lausus is but a boy—*puer*—but he has done what Aeneas did himself years before, he has saved his father, and now all the honour that a hero can pay to his peer, Aeneas will render to Lausus. *Pietas* covers his feeling for Lausus as well as his feeling for Anchises.

We pass naturally to the scene that rose in Aeneas' mind—the fall of Troy, the rescue of Anchises, carried away by his son, and the rescue of Iulus. Enough has been said of Anchises, but mark the picture of the child—

dextrae se parvus Iulus
implicuit, sequiturque patrem non passibus
aequis.—(ii. 723).

The instinctive act of the child—taking his father's right hand—is his comment on Aeneas' *pietas*, and it is surely significant that at such an hour and in such a place the little footsteps of the child are one of the signal memories of the night.²

Now another picture of Iulus. During the siege of the camp (Book IX) he is galled by the taunts which Remulus Numanus levels at the Trojans, and, with a prayer to Jupiter for success, he shoots an arrow at him and brings him down. The boy is delighted with his shot, and the Trojans cheer him. His father is not there, but his place is for the moment taken by Apollo, and though the action and the words are Apollo's, they are in the spirit of Aeneas, and may illustrate the quality we are considering—*pietas*. The god applauds the boy in an aside, and then in clearer tone adds a word for gentleness:—

atque his ardentem dictis adfatur Iulum:
'sūt satis, Aenide, telis impune Numanum
oppetiisse tuis; primam hanc tibi magnus
Apollo

² J. R. Green, *S'ray Studies*, p. 267, brings this out well.

concedit laudem et paribus non invidet armis, cetera parces puer bello.—(ix. 652).

'C'est à la fois,' says Sainte-Beuve, 'ménagement et respect pour le fils de leur roi et pour l'espérance de la tige; et puis Ascagne est trop jeune pour la guerre; si jeune, on devient trop aisément cruel. J'entrevois ce dernier sentiment sous-entendu.'¹

That we are right to suppose that this is the real sentiment of Aeneas as well as of Apollo, we can see from Aeneas' words of farewell at the bier of Pallas—

nos alias hinc ad lacrimas eadem horrida belli fata vocant: salve aeternum mihi, maxime Palla, aeternumque vale.—(xi. 96).

It is the revolt of *pietas*, in its broadest and finest quality, against a destiny which drags the hero against his will into war.

Let our last illustration of *pietas* be the familiar utterance of Aeneas when he saw the pictures of the Trojan warriors, including himself, on the walls of Dido's temple—

Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalium tangunt.—(i. 462).

Professor Tyrrell holds that *rerum* and *mortalia* mean 'things inanimate' and 'the works of men's hands.' In this case Virgil would mean to suggest the appeal of art to the sympathetic temper. Wordsworth and Sainte-Beuve think rather of the appeal of man's lot to man.

'Tears to human sufferings are due; And mortal hopes defeated and o'erthrown Are mourned by man.'—(*Laodamia*).

The former rendering is not at all impossible or un-Virgilian, but the latter gives a broader and deeper sense. Aeneas recognises that at Carthage too, human creatures have human hearts, and he takes courage, knowing what appeal human sorrow makes to the human heart in himself.

If to Terence's *nil humani a me alienum puto* we might add *nil divini*, the enlarged expression (if a little cumbersome) would very fairly represent that new attitude of the quickened man, with which Virgil endows his hero, giving it the name *pietas*, by which he links a modern and rather Greek habit of mind to an old Roman virtue, enlarging the one, and naturalising the other.

IV. We have not yet considered Aeneas

¹ Sainte-Beuve, *Étude sur Virgile*, p. 178.

as prince. Achilles and Agamemnon may be kings in Homer, but the essential royalty of Virgil's Aeneas dwarfs them at once into tribal chieftains. Mycene may have been rich in gold, and yet had, like Ithaca, a midden at the palace doors; but Virgil was writing under a monarch who could boast of Rome *marmoream se relinquere quam latericium accepisset* (Suetonius, *Augustus* 28). It was a boast that implied imperial resources, imperial power, and an imperial outlook, and all these come between the Homeric chiefs and Aeneas, and make him a prince in manner, in attitude, and in ideal.

To take a telling example of the princely manner of Aeneas, we may turn to the episode of his killing the stags in the first book, which is of course modelled in Virgil's way after Odysseus' story of his stag-killing. It has been well handled by Sainte-Beuve, whose account of it may be paraphrased. 'The difference between the two pictures,' he says, 'one feels instinctively. Aeneas and Odysseus are voyaging at the same time, but there is a distance of some centuries between their manners and methods. Odysseus, the hero of the simple ages, whose only aspiration is toward his poor Ithaca, withdraws alone from his companions and goes to spy out the island; he sees a big stag, one only, and it is quite enough; he kills it without needing to ask his arms of his squire (he has no squire or confidant), and, as it is necessary to bring back the beast at once and this involves difficulty, he tells us in detail how he did it, how he made a cord, and how he lifted the animal on to his neck, and made his way, leaning on his spear; he forgets nothing. All is naive and frank, quite in the style of Robinson Crusoe, a style Virgil is careful not to apply to the founder of the future Roman Empire. How could these two men Aeneas and Achates, have carried their seven big beasts to the ships? It is a question not even asked in so dignified a tale. Imagine the figure of Aeneas, drawn with a stag upon his shoulders and his head appearing among the four feet of the animal! Virgil could not, for a moment, entertain the idea of such a picture. Between his Aeneas and Odysseus had come *cette production fine délicate dédaignée; l'urbanité était née*.²

Yes, *urbanitas* was born, and Aristotle

² Sainte-Beuve, *Étude sur Virgile*, p. 243. The passages of Homer and Virgil are *Odyssey* x. 144-171, and *Aeneid* i. 180-193. The German critic, Rohde, has also called the *Odyssey* 'die älteste Robinsonade.'

had written of the Magnificent Man. It was the mark of a vulgar mind, said the Greek comic poet, to walk 'unrhythmically' in the street. Court etiquette had grown up round Alexander, and probably still more round his less great successors. Some part of this would inevitably find its way to Rome, where it would fit in well with the national affectation of *gravitas*. The world was still a long way from Abraham Lincoln. Let us, however, call the thing dignity in Aeneas, and recognise it as a mark of the great prince, even if we regret now and then a certain stiffness which it involves.

But, if Aeneas has the outward bearing of the prince, he has the higher qualities too, for he is Virgil's picture of an ideal ruler. Morality for princes was probably already becoming a branch of ethics; certainly a little time after Virgil's day, it is well developed. Dio Chrysostom wrote treatises on it for Trajan, and in the fourth century A.D. Julian, Claudian, and Synesius, have a plentiful supply of honourable and ancient maxims for Emperors. But it is unlikely that Virgil troubled the minor philosophers for their commonplaces. With a poet's feeling he read the story of Alexander, and watched the work of Augustus, and rising, in his way, from the particular to the universal, he developed in his own mind the idea of a great prince and drew him in Aeneas.

Aeneas has the statesman's temper. A man of broad outlook and of quick intelligence, he thinks for a nation, and as their ruler subordinates himself to the good of his people. Apart from the affair of Dido, nowhere does he fail to put his people, his people present and future, before himself. Not that he submits to their will or inclination, for he is every inch a King and not a President; he gives orders and they are carried out, he does not take mandates except from the gods. Yet he is not unwilling to listen to advice—from Anchises or Nautes, from the old and the trusted. Like an Alexander he dots the world with his foundations. The Homeric chief had destroyed towns, Aeneas builds them.

He makes war and peace as a prince with full apprehension of what they mean for his people. If as a man, worn with war and travel, he desires peace, he also desires it as a prince for his people and his neighbours. To the Latins, who come to beg the bodies of the slain, he speaks thus:—
*Pacem me exanimis et Martis sorte peremptis,
oratis? equidem et vivis concedere vellem.*
(xi. 110).

This is always his attitude, but, if war is forced upon him, he makes war like a prince. He carries his allies into action with him, and no cost of death or suffering will tempt him to falter. War and real war his enemies have, if they choose it; but he had rather they chose peace.¹ Aeneas is here a thorough Roman, and he hardly needed his father's words to supplement his own instinct—

*Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento,
haec tibi erunt artes, pacisque imponere morem
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.*—
(vi. 851).

Latinus and Turnus are his foils; the one unable or unwilling to make up his mind and act on it, and by this weakness bringing defeat and death on his people; the other heedless of national well-being or divine decree, if, at any cost to anybody and everybody, he can gratify his own wishes. If the reader wearies at times of Aeneas in the pageantry of the prince, still, as prince in council and prince in action, Aeneas is well and strongly drawn. The weariness, which the reader feels, may be his own fault as much as the poet's, for it takes more mental effort to picture and to realize to oneself the hero as king than in some other characters.

Aeneas represents, here as elsewhere, a later age than Homer. No doubt, in Homer the chief leads, and the people follow the chief as 'shepherd of his people.' But the Homeric chief is nearer Remulus Numanus; he has the weakness, too persistent in Greece, for petty war and the pillaging of his neighbours—

*semperque recentes
comportare iuvat praedas et vivere rapto.*—
(ix. 612).

Aeneas' mind is other, and he belongs to a later and more developed society. Witness his admiration of the rising Carthage, its walls, its senate-house, its port, its theatre—even its streets and their noise—

*miratur molem Aeneas, magalia quondam,
miratur portas, strepitumque et strata
viarum.*—(i. 421).

But it is as a prince, that he looks at the great city, with the spirit of an Alexander rather than of a Pericles. Democracy and its factions flourish among the Italian tribes; Drances and Turnus have each his

¹ Cf. Caesar's words after Pharsalia, *hoc voluerunt*.

party; but there are no parties among the Trojans. They have no politics but loyalty to their prince. This means a certain lack of interest. The Trojans generally 'want physiognomy.' Like the Romans under the later Emperors, they lack initiative; they are helpless and almost spiritless when without their prince; and the life of the nation is summed up in the prince. Virgil's political philosophy is not Cicero's. On the whole perhaps the poets are not generally republicans. 'For myself,' Goethe said to Eckermann, 'I have always been royalist.' Aeneas is Virgil's ideal of a princely character, as he is his ideal of manhood.

To conclude, we may sum up the matter perhaps most truly by saying that Aeneas is Virgil's picture of the 'Happy Warrior.' The traditions of epic poetry, involving the Olympian gods, make Aeneas less reliant upon the 'inward light' than Wordsworth's warrior, even if Virgil had been as clear as Wordsworth on the possibility or sufficiency of such a guide in life. Aeneas,

'if he be called upon to face
Some awful moment, to which Heaven has
joined
Great issues, good or bad, for human kind,'

is certainly not 'happy as a lover,' nor 'attired with sudden brightness like a man inspired.' A genuine Roman, he is not *supremely* concerned with the labour 'good on good to fix,' nor, perhaps, to 'make his moral being his prime care.' Yet much of Wordsworth's poem is true of Virgil's Aeneas:—

Who, doomed to go in company with Pain,
And Fear and Bloodshed, miserable train!
Turns his necessity to glorious gain:
In face of these doth exercise a power
Which is our human nature's highest dower;
Controls them and subdues, transmutes,
bereaves
Of their bad influence, and their good
receives;
By objects, which might force the soul to
abate

Her feeling, rendered more compassion-
ate . . .

Who comprehends his trust, and to the
same

Keeps faithful with a singleness of aim; . .

Is yet a Soul whose master-bias leans

To homefelt pleasures and to gentle
scenes . . .

More brave for this, that he hath much to
love.

The differences between the two characters are not so much contradictions as the result of a progression in the ideals of humanity. If Aeneas has sight of virtues unknown to Achilles, the 'Happy Warrior' has in like manner advanced beyond Aeneas. The greatness of Achilles is not lost in Aeneas, but developed by the ripening and enlarging of human experience. Aeneas is morally on a higher plane, in spite of the occasional vagueness in Virgil's drawing of him, and in spite of the uncertainty about the supreme things, which passes from the poet into his creation. The 'Happy Warrior,' in turn, has lost nothing of Aeneas' greatness, but he has regained the clear look of Achilles: he is not distracted by unreconciled views of the universe; he 'finds comfort in himself and in his cause,' and is 'happy as a lover,' because he has, what Aeneas at heart lacked, 'confidence of Heaven's applause.' Aeneas falls short of the 'Happy Warrior,' but he is of the same family.¹

T. R. GLOVER.

¹ I may be allowed to quote Sainte-Beuve once more, *Etude*, p. 112: 'Ce personnage si distinct, si accompli, le *pius Aeneas*; pieux envers les hommes autant qu'envers les dieux, et que (sauf son moment d'erreur et d'oubli à Carthage), considérant toutes ses vertus, ses dévotions et religions, ses preuves d'humanité, de prudence, de courage, je suis tenté de nommer le Godefroy de Bouillon, ou mieux (je l'ai dit déjà) le saint Louis d'antiquité;—le plus parfait idéal de héros que puisse présenter cette religion des Numa, des Xénophon, dont Plutarque est pour nous le dernier prêtre.'

SOME NOTES ON LIVY, BOOK. I.

(1) 1. 8. 7 'consilium deinde viribus parat.'

Consilium is usually translated by 'an advising body' or the like. No doubt Livy

has in mind the 'regium consilium,' but *consilium* here may well be quite abstract in meaning, e.g., 'guidance.' The combination of *consilium* with *vires* is a favourite

one with Livy, cp. 2. 56. 16. 'Tempus . . . consilium viribus additurum,' and 3. 62. 7 'consilio etiam Sabini vires adiuvere.'

(2) 1. 13. 7 'id non traditur, . . . aetate an dignitatibus suis virorumve an sorte lectae sint.'

This use of *ve* to express an alternative within an alternative deserves notice. It performs the same bracketing function as *ac* in such passages as Cic. Off. 3. 1. (magnifica vox) et (magno viro ac sapiente digna) —see Madv. § 433. Compare 1. 29. 2 (effractis portis stratisve ariete muris) aut (arce vi capta), 21. 35. 2 'utrumque aut (locus opportunitatem daret) aut (progressi morative aliquam occasionem fecissent),' 25. 1. 12 ('libros vaticinos precationesve) aut (artem sacrificandi conscriptam),' 34. 35. 4 ('mancipium regium publicumve) aut privatum,' 44. 1. 3 'neu (iuncto vehiculo in urbe oppidove) aut (propius inde mille passus . . .) veheretur,' 45. 25. 2 'qui (consules praetoresve) aut (legati) gesserant . . . bellum.'

In such instances (cp. Madv. § 436) *ve* expresses the minor and less important distinction; *aut*, etc., etc., the major and more essential.

1. 19. 2 'quibus cum inter bella adsuescere videret non posse.'

suesco and its derivatives have not fared well at the hands of Lewis and Short. They cite 31. 35. 3 'genus pugnae quo adsueverant,' without noting that this is the only certain instance of the ablative with *adsuesco* in Livy; they quote but one case of a dative and that with *adsuescitur* impersonal passive; they never mention *adsuesco* or *adsuetus* with the infinitive in Livy; nor in the same writer *adsuetus* meaning (1) 'usual' of persons or things (2) 'familiar to' of things with the dative.

The following citations then may well be added to their article on *adsuesco* :—

(A) Under I (ε) Hor. Sat., 2. 2. 109 'hic qui | Pluribus assuerit mentem.'

I(δ).

Livy 21. 3. 2, 24. 18. 11, 38. 34. 9, 39. 9. 5, and (uncertain whether dative or ablative), 1. 19. 2, 2. 2. 3, 4. 45. 4, 10. 22. 3, 25. 26. 12, 28. 27. 2, 38. 34. 3.

Also *adsuetus* = 'accustomed' of persons with dative 5. 48. 3, 10. 17. 10, 21. 16. 5, 24. 30. 12, 27. 47. 5, 28. 2. 7, 28. 32. 7, 38. 52. 2, and (uncertain whether dative or ablative) 5. 42. 8, 6. 9. 6, 22. 18. 3, 24. 23.

10, 24. 24. 2, 24. 39. 1, 26. 40. 18, 28. 25. 8, 28. 46. 3, 40. 36. 2, 42. 11. 7, 42. 15. 3, 45. 29. 2, [add 10. 19. 16, 'adsueti inter se hostes'].

Under I. (β).

Livy 5. 6. 15, 22. 34. 2, 23. 35. 6, 24. 24. 2, 25. 9. 13, 30. 28. 8, 39. 25. 15, 42. 17. 5, and (with *adsuetus*) 2. 3. 2, 2. 6. 11, 10. 6. 11, 10. 19. 19, 10. 41. 2, 22. 46. 5, 23. 40. 10, 27. 12. 5, 27. 39. 8, 29. 6. 4, 31. 34. 4, 33. 48. 9, 37. 42. 5, 38. 29. 7, 45. 32. 4.

Under II.

Livy 24. 10. 12 'adsuetos collis eius cultores,' 25. 9. 9 'portula,' 36. 18. 4 'praesidio,' and, meaning 'familiar to,' with the dative 5. 54. 3 'adsueta oculis regio,' 25. 17. 5 'motibus suae militiae plurimum adsuetis' and 38. 17. 5 'Romanis Galliei tumultus adsueti' where L and S (I ζ) read 'adsuetis,' and provide a unique instance of 'adsuetus' with the genitive.

Finally the absolute use Cic. *ad Fam.* 9. 22, 'sic enim assuevi' might be inserted.

B. In the article on *insuesco* I (β) the verb is quoted as taking *ad* in Livy 5. 6. 1 'ad disciplinam certe militiae plurimum intererat insuescere militem nostrum non solum parta victoria frui. . .' But *ad disciplinam* goes with *intererat* and the instance should be classed under I (γ).

C. Under *consuetus* meaning 'customary,' no cases are cited from Livy. The following should be inserted: 2. 61. 5 'asperitate,' 3. 20. 8 'remediis,' 5. 23. 4 'modum,' 9. 45. 15 'fremitum,' 36. 7. 5 'imperium.'

D. In the article on *insuetus*, insert under B (β) 'also absolutely of persons Livy 21. 35. 3, 38. 21. 6.' And under II correct Livy 28. 21. 16, to 28. 27. 16. One might also add Livy 2. 64. 11 'equo,' 7. 17. 3 'specie,' 39. 23. 13 'libertatis,' 39. 31. 2 'ignominia.'

E. Under *insolitus* with genitive I (γ), quote the only case in Livy viz., 10. 28. 9 'insolitos eius tumultus equos.'

1. 31. 2 'quod cum credi vix posset.'

Here *credo* is used personally in the passive, as frequently elsewhere with a neuter pronoun as subject. The following citations, however, will show that the construction is by no means confined to neuter pronouns: 1. 7. 8, and 1. 15. 6 'divinitate credita,' 5. 15. 1 'prodigia parum credita,' 10. 10. 3 'nec aspernanda res visa neque incaute credenda,' 28. 24. 15 'mors Scipionis falso credita,' 40. 9. 1 'quoniam non creditur nisi perpetratum facinus,' 45. 5. 4 'creditae sanctitati.'

Cicero even (*Rosc. Amer.* 22. 62) has 'res tam scelestā credi non potest,' but I know no certain instance in him of other nouns than *res* so constructed. With *credo* as with *dissero* he, perhaps, never goes further than *id, hoc, illud, &c.* and *res*. At the same time, but for the analogy of *dissero*, one can hardly see why Cicero, if able to write 'res credi non potest,' could not also have said (*Pro Sulla* 15. 43), 'illud indicium . . . temere creditum.' Certainly Dr. Reid's note on the passage would not lead one to suppose that Cicero had ever been guilty of the construction in *Rosc. Amer.* 22. 62.

Livy has the 'personal construction' or 'nominative with the infinitive' on several occasions—Gildersleeve and Lodge 528 Rem. 2, condemn it as 'poetical and late'—e.g. 2. 7. 2 'Silvani vocem eam creditam,' 22. 51. 4 'mora eius diei satis creditur salutis fuisse urbi, 29. 32. 9 'ipse periisse creditus,' 39. 34. 10 'Casander . . . veneno creditur sublatus.'

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NOTES ON SENECA'S *MEDEA*.

22-24.

The MSS. all give

Me coniugem optet, limen alienum expetat,
iam notus hospes quoque non aliud queam
peius precari, liberos similes patri.

Medea is cursing Jason for his unfaithfulness. Leo transposed *me coniugem optet* and *iam notus hospes*. How he sought to justify this step I do not know. As a matter of fact the MSS. text is thoroughly good. The position of *iam notus hospes* after the curse is particularly effective, since the phrase virtually = *sed frustra* or *et (=et tamen) frustra*. The whole = 'Let him be for ever seeking the portals of others, and since men know the sort of guest he is, let him be for ever turned therefrom.' To put *iam notus hospes* before the curse is to anticipate wrongly, and to rob the sentence of part of its force. Further, the traditional text gives an arrangement of thoughts which can be neatly illustrated from other sources. We have in these verses three clauses, the first and third of which are closely similar in thought; *me coniugem*, 22, and *liberos*, 24, stand for 'home, sweet home.' For such an arrangement cf. Virgil, *Aen.* iii. 317-319, Aeneas's speech to Andromache. Aeneas, like Medea, is labouring under great excitement and strong feeling. His first question is based on his conception of Andromache's fate before he had heard the startling rumour referred to in 294-297; in his second question he has in mind this rumour; in his last question his mind reverts to the thought which prompted his first inquiry.

This arrangement seems entirely natural; the mind dwells most on the thoughts it has habitually entertained. Somewhat similar is *Aen.* iv. 242-244; the passage begins and ends with the thought of Mercury's mighty power over the souls of the dead. So Medea begins and ends her curse with the hope that Jason may for ever lack a home. More than once in the play she gives expression to her own sense of desolation in that she not only has lost her father's home but is now deserted by Jason himself.

301-339.

THE MSS. are a unit with reference to the order of these verses; nay, they offer very few variants in the text of the individual verses themselves. Yet Richter deleted 307, 308,¹ the sole reason for this procedure being, so far as I know, his desire to make this choral passage conform to the theory of metrical responsion in Seneca which he and Peiper held. We may reject Richter's view as arbitrary and unfounded.²

Leo, followed by Kingery,³ rejected 305, 306, asserting that these verses are a ditto-

¹ The line numbering is that of Leo's edition.

² Teuffel (§ 290, 3), Leo (l. 135 ff.), and others have rightly rejected this theory. A single example of the 'violent methods' (Teuffel) by which Peiper and Richter sought to carry their theory into effect will suffice. They transpose 385, 386, and assume that a verse has been lost after 390. Yet on general grounds it is impossible to pick any flaws in the traditional text. In 301-379 they reject six verses, unobjectionable in themselves, and transpose seven others.

³ *The Medea of Seneca*, edited by H. M. Kingery, Crawfordsville, Indiana, 1900.

graphy of 301, 302. This, however, is not the case. Repetition of the thought of 301, 302 there certainly is, but 305, 306, as handed down by the MSS., give a touch not found at all in 301, 302. I refer to the words *dubio...cursu*. At first sight these words are at variance with *audax nimium*, 301, but if we interpret them rightly, as meaning 'with uncharted course,' we shall see, first, that the words are not inharmonious with *audax nimium*, but rather confirm and strengthen that phrase, and, secondly, that these words form the transition to 309 ff., as given in the MSS. In other words 309 ff. are a perfectly natural expansion of 305, 306; *nondum...norat* = *nondum quisquam enim*, etc.¹ 301—317, as delivered to us by the MSS., form but a single sentence, consisting of a statement, 301—308, followed by the justification of that statement in 309—317. These facts can be brought out more clearly if instead of a period, the usual pointing, we put a colon after 308.

With *ausus Tiphys*, 318, the second thought begins. Thus far the poet's attention has been concentrated upon the daring of the man who first sailed the seas. He passes on now to name this man. This second thought runs through *sipara velo*, 328. The poet is not content, however, merely to name this first venturesome sailor, but, even as he names him, takes the opportunity to elaborate yet further the description of his daring. Just as the new touch added in 305, 306 makes these verses appropriate after 301, 302, so the added statements in 318—328 make these verses appropriate in spite of 301—308.

Verses 329—338 belong closely together. The poet has dwelt on the daring of the first voyager; he has also given his name: his thoughts now revert naturally to the good old days before Tiphys ventured to cross the seas (328—334). At 335 the thought is, 'But the Argo changed all this'; note the adversative asyndeton.

It has been made clear, I hope, that the MSS. order of the verses yields an entirely satisfactory series of ideas, and is therefore justifiable. If this is so, then any and all alterations of this order are unnecessary and unscientific.

Let us, however, briefly consider the

arrangements of these verses proposed by others.² Richter, followed by Leo and Kingery, put 329—334 after 308; Peiper wished to set these verses between 317, 318. If any change at all is to be made, Peiper's suggestion seems to me preferable to that of Richter, for I cannot believe that *nondum...norat*, etc., 309, is to be divorced from *dubio...cursu*, 305. With Richter's arrangement the order of thoughts is as follows: (1) the daring of the first voyager; (2) the good old days that preceded his fateful voyage; (3) the name of the first voyager, and (4) the iniquity of the *Thessala pinus*, 335—339. There is here no logical development of ideas, unless 335—339 are to be taken as giving the result of 318—328. There is nothing, however, in the form or the expression of these verses to indicate that they are to be thus taken. Again, one is not pleased by the transition from Tiphys (318—328) to the *Thessala pinus* (335—339). Look now again at the MSS. order. There the contrast between the original state of things, as decreed by the gods or by nature (cf. *foedera*, 335), i.e., the purity of the primitive time, and the wickedness of later days, is finely brought out; the adversative asyndeton is particularly effective.

Leo, in adopting Richter's view, has improved upon it somewhat, for he grouped together 329—334, 309—318, and set a colon after 334; it is evident that he took *nondum quisquam*, etc., as giving the explanation of the preceding verses. This arrangement is in itself not bad, but it has no MSS. authority, and is, in my opinion at least, inferior to the arrangement offered by the MSS.

I pass now to another point. It is interesting to compare Seneca's description of the doings of the first voyager with Horace's (*Carm.* i. 3). Horace had described the first voyager as sailing from Brundisium to Dyrrachium, i.e., as doing what people in Horace's own time were constantly doing. Seneca is similarly up-to-date in his description, for he makes the first sailor as skilful in handling sails as was any of his successors and the equipment of his ship is that of the *naves Alexandreae*; see Seneca, *E.*, lxxvii. Seneca's description is particularly interesting, for whereas

¹ In passing we may note the resemblance between 305, 306, and Juv. xii. 57 ff. 'I nunc et ventis animam committe, dolato Confusus ligno,' &c. For another verbal resemblance between Seneca's *Medea* and Juvenal cf. *aurca pellis*, *Medea* 361, with *furtivae...aurum pelliculae*, Juv. i. 10, 11.

² In his *Latin Literature of the Empire*, ii. pp. 100, 101, Prof. Gudeman prints this chorus after Leo, but in his *Appendix Critica*, p. 490, he writes: 'traditum ordinem rectum esse nunc mihi persuasit M. Maellerus.' Where, when, or how he was thus persuaded he does not say.

Horace's account of the first voyager's exploits was naturally conditioned by his thoughts of Virgil's voyage, which was the occasion of the poem, there was no such special motive to colour and determine Seneca's language. That Seneca had Horace in mind elsewhere in 301-339 is apparent to even the most superficial reader. *freta . . . rupit*, 301, 302, recalls *qui fragilis . . . primus*, Horace, i. 3, 10-12, *audax nimium*, 301, *ausus*, 318, *audax*, 346, duplicate in rather skilful and subtle fashion Horace's double *audax*, 25, 27; *dissaepti . . . mundi*, 335, and *mare sepositum*, 339, together reproduce Horace's *prudens Oceano dissociabili* (and make, be it noted, for Kiessling's interpretation of *dissociabili*); *tangens*, 331, is perhaps a subtle reminiscence of Horace's *non tangenda rates . . . vada*, 24.¹

350-360.

At first sight one is tempted to punctuate *Quid? cum Sicii . . . hiatus, quis . . . malo?* If we consider these five verses (350-354) by themselves, this is certainly a more effective pointing, but *quid cum Ausonium*, etc. (355) militates against this arrangement, for there it is hardly possible to point off *quid* by itself. To do so would be to leave *cum Ausonium . . . sequi* in mid air without a predicate or main clause. The truth seems to be that 353, 354 form the predicate not only to 350-352 but to 355-360 also. These two verses are thus pivotal verses. If we keep the MSS. order at 389-391, as I firmly believe we should,² we shall have in the phrase *omnis specimen affectus capit* an expression similarly pivotal in character, as summing up what has been said concerning Medea's condition and conduct and as forming a starting point for a fresh treatment of the same subject. Latin poetry shows many examples of such pivotal verses; cf. e.g. Horace, *Epp.* i. 1. 32, i. 1. 52, *Juv.* i. 14.

If now we consider 353, 354 as the predicate also to 355-360, we have to notice that Seneca seems to have made here a mistake in art. Since 346 he has been trying to describe the punishment that overtook the Argo (and its crew) for its wickedness. 350-354 are thus in point; the punishment here thought of lies in the agony of waiting. For this idea we may compare *Aen.* vi. 614 *inclusi poenam expectant*. This phrase is inconsistent with *Aen.* vi. 570 ff.,

¹ The foregoing note was part of a paper read at the meeting of the American Philological Association, July, 1902.

² I have discussed this point in the *Proceedings of the American Philological Association* for 1902.

from which we should suppose that the entrance into Tartarus proper marked the beginning of punishment. Virgil's picture, however, is very effective, dwelling as it does on the agony of waiting in full sight of such spectacles as are described in 602 ff. In 357 ff. Seneca begins aright in an attempt to emphasize further this agony of waiting by picturing the sufferings of the crew of the Argo as they awaited the outcome of the struggle between Orpheus and the Sirens. In *paene coegit Sirena sequi*, however, the poet has, I think, allowed a false note to creep in, for this phrase suggests a mitigation of their sufferings, (unless, indeed, Seneca means us to think of the grief that comes when success which seems certain after all slips from one's grasp).

Elsewhere Seneca allows incongruous ideas to slip into his verses. In 114 the chorus exclaims, *tacitis eat illa tenebris*, *Si qua peregrino nubit fugitiva marito*. The taunt can hardly be said to be well-timed, since Jason himself was a *fugitivus*. In 238-241, *Virgini . . . occidet*, Medea makes a striking use of the figure of vision in connection with certain past events; with all this *tuus . . . gener*, 240, which belongs so intensely to the present, is out of keeping. In 454-456 Medea says, *Pontici fauces freti* (me petere iubes), *per quas revexi nobilem regum manum, adulterum secuta per Symplegadas?* Here *adulterum* seems in bad taste; Medea was herself as bad. We may, to be sure, avoid this criticism by saying that *adulterum* refers only to Jason's marriage with Creusa, and so = 'one who was to prove himself an adulterer,' but this seems harsh.

In *Aen.* iv. 42 Virgil has similarly allowed his narrative instinct to play him false. Conington and others long ago pointed out that *regio deserta siti* has no proper place in this catalogue of the difficulties and dangers by which Dido's infant realm is beset. *Soporiferumque papaver*, *Aen.* iv. 486, falls under this same general category.

883 ff.

The MSS. give

NUNT. Et ipse miror vixque iam facto malo potuisse fieri credo. CHOR. Quis cladis modus?

NUNT. Avidus per omnem regiae partem furit, etc.

In 884 Leo (followed by Kingery) gave *Quis cladis modus* to the messenger. For

this change there is no justification, since the traditional text gives an unimpeachable progression of thoughts. The messenger enters to announce the overthrow of the state and the death of father and daughter. The chorus asks (881), 'By what guile o'erthrown?' The messenger replies, 'By the common bane of kings, presents.' The chorus asks, incredulously, 'Why, what guile could there be (this time) in them?' The question really = 'Surely there could have been in this case no guile in them.' The messenger's answer (883, 884) has a two-fold value; on the one hand it expresses sympathy with the incredulity of the chorus, on the other it declares that, incredible as the news may seem, it is none the less true. Then, according to the MSS., the chorus asks *Quis cladis modus?* This is perfectly natural; satisfied by the messenger's strenuous assurances the chorus asks no more about the fact of the calamity but passes on to inquire its extent.

With the simplicity of all this Leo's text compares most unfavourably. The messenger is represented as passing himself from his assurances of the correctness of his tidings to ask, in very rhetorical fashion, concerning the extent of the calamity he is reporting. The question must then be taken as = '(but true it is and) no one knows how far the evil will go, where it will stop.' If we had such a text in the MSS. we might find a parallel to it in Seneca, *Medea* 868, 869

nunc ira amorque causam
iunxere: quid sequetur?

Fortunately, however, it is not necessary to look for such justification, since, as has been shown, the MSS. arrangement is unimpeachable.

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THE MOSCOW MANUSCRIPT OF COLUMELLA.

On page 20 of the 'Wissenschaftliche Beilage von Prof. Dr. Häussner' to the Report of the Grossherzogliches Gymnasium Karlsruhe for 1888-89 (*Die Handschriftliche Ueberlieferung des L. Iun. Mod. Columella (de re rust.) mit einer kritischen Ausgabe des X Buches*) occur the following words (italics are mine).

'der aus dem XIV. J. stammende, jetzt in Moskau in der Bibliothek Demidoff liegende codex (membr. 264 fol.)'

This important codex formed a part of the Demidov collection, which has been incorporated in the Library of Moscow University. In 1779 it was collated, though, unhappily for the tenth book alone, by C. F. Matthaei (*Lectiones Mosquenses* 1779) as Prof. Häussner states (p. 21). But since then have occurred the Napoleonic invasion of Russia and the burning of Moscow; and the Demidov *Columella*, like the Demidov *Propertius*, is not to be found.

I owe this information to the kindness of

Professor Pokrovskij, who at the request of Mr. E. H. Minns, Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge, has recently made search for the MS in the University Library, and I hasten to communicate it to the *Classical Review* lest the statement quoted above should cause trouble to others in the future or perhaps even send some scholar on a fool's errand to Moscow.

J. P. POSTGATE.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the above note was in type, the first fasciculus of Lundström's text of *Columella* has come into my hands. The *Mosquensis* is described in the praefatio, as 'anno 1812 flammis deuoratus.' But I have not suppressed my note as I gather from the reference to the codex in Schanz *Geschichte der röm. Litteratur* II² (1901) p. 392 that its fate is not generally known.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF MARTIAL.

(3 families of MSS. :

- A from archetype A^a = H (with its copy T) and R,
 B from archetype B^a = LPQf,
 C from archetype C^a = EXAV and many others.)

The recent additions to our knowledge of the text-tradition of Martial, in particular the discovery of the Lucca MS. (L), provide some emendations which require no discussion :

IX li. 3 Stygius nam Tullus ad umbras.

Editors have accepted *undas* under the mistaken idea that it was the reading of P.

IX xc. 1 Sic in gramine florido reclinis.

Here too the accepted reading *floreo* has been wrongly attributed to P.

X xix. 2 Sed non rusticulum tamen libellum.

The *nimis* of our editors is a mere conjecture of Renaissance scholars to remedy the patent defect of the MSS. of the C-family which have put a word from a neighbouring line in this place. The B-family MSS. have *tamen*.

IV xxxiv. 1-2

Sordida cum tibi sit, verum tamen, Attale, dicit,

Quisquis te niveam dicit habere togam.

The Perfect Tense *dicit* in both lines was falsely supposed to be the reading of T.

The following title-headings in the Xenia (Book XIII) and the Apophoreta (Book XIV) require recognition :

XIII xli. Porcellus lactans,

XIV lxxxiii. Scalptorium eboreum,¹

and possibly XIII xxvii *Petalium* caryotarium ; for some such word as *petalium*, lit. 'little leaf,' i.e. a leaf-shaped bunch (!), and not *palathium*, seems required by the readings of our manuscripts : PETAVIVVM (sic) T, PETADIVM B^a, PETALIVM C^a.

And we now know that the only readings which have traditional authority in the following passages are :

I lxxxix. 2 garrive, cxvii. 13 nec roges, II

¹ This excellent reading of L (the only representative, except Q, and occasionally F, of the B^a headings in these books) settles the question of the true order of epigrams lxxxiii, lxxxiv. F also has the adjective. Q omits it.

Epist. 1 *parum enim*, 12 *fuieris*, xxix. 10 *quid sit*, lii. 1 *loturos*, lxxiv. 7 *Fuficulenius*, lxxxiv. 4 *ab*, VI lxxiv. 4 *Aefulane*, X lxx. 5 *non*,² xxx. 17 *a*, XI xxxv. 2 *ad te*, XII lvii. 15 *quis*. In I lxxviii. 2 *suos* is a vagary of P. Both B^a and C^a had *ipsos*. In I xlviii. 6 all three archetypes had *caveas*, unless the caveat of T represents something else.

(For other instances see *Class. Rev.* xv. 419 ; xvi. 316).

In VI xxvii. 7 the reading of B^a was, I think, *sit pia, si locuples, et potet filia mustum* and should be accepted. In III xx. 12 whether its *rufus* (*Rufus*) is superior to the *rursus* of C^a is not clear (cf. II xxxiii. 2, where C^a shews *rusa* for *rufa*).

But further the whole conditions of textual emendation have been altered. We now know that our three archetypes, A^a, B^a, C^a, represent three different ancient editions of Martial, and that the B^a-text has come down to us by an Italian channel, the C^a-text by a French. How this new knowledge affects the emendation of the text will be best seen from an example. The 80th epigram of Book XI has caused difficulty to editors :

Litus beatæ Veneris aureum Baias,
 Baias superbae blanda dona Naturæ,
 Vt mille laudem, Flacce, versibus Baias,
 Laudabo digne non satis tamen Baias.
 Sed Martialem, Flacce, malo quam Baias,
 Optare utrumque pariter inprobi votum est.
 Quod si deorum munere hoc tibi detur,
 Quid gaudiorum est Martialis et Baiæ !

The emendation *tamen*, for *tibi*, in the second last line has been supported by the argument that the mediaeval contraction of *tamen*, viz. *tn* with suprascript stroke, might, owing to the bad light of a scriptorium or the illegible state of the page, be mistaken for the mediaeval contraction of *tibi*, viz. *t* with suprascript *i*. But what becomes of this argument now that we know that *tibi* was the reading both of B^a and C^a and therefore presumably (since contact of the Italian and French archetypes is unlikely) of the ancient copies from which B^a and C^a are derived ? The confusion of the mediaeval contractions might account for the reading

² In v. 12 LP agree in *rogent*, Qf in *-et*. The evidence of LP greatly outweighs the other. Martial uses the plural verb after two subjects joined with *et* again in X xxx. 8 *Non blanda Circe Dardanisque Caieta Desiderantur* (cf. *Class. Rev.* xvi. 316).

in one archetype, but not in both, unless (as is here obviously not the case) the confusion were one so inevitable that it would be likely to be made independently by transcribers in different countries. The emendation *tamen* would be perfectly suitable for the traditional text of most Latin authors; for our Latin MSS. are usually all derived from the same archetype, generally of the time of the Revival of Learning under Charlemagne, and the usual problem for the textual critic is to explain the manuscript variants as separate divergences from one and the same Carolingian text. Our MSS., or rather our archetypes, of Martial, are quite of a different order. Their variance gives us a divergence of reading that characterized different ancient editions, in many cases editions of the poet's own time; their agreement gives us the current text of possibly the third century A.D., a period not very far removed from the life-time of Martial himself. Gilbert's emendation *mihi* is therefore more attractive than *tamen*, for we can more easily imagine *tibi* to have been substituted for *mihi* at a very early stage of the text's history and to have been a corruption in that current edition from which the ancient sources of B^A and C^A may be both derived.¹

Most unfortunately the greater part of the emendations of Martial's text are of the same nature as this proposal of *tamen* for *tibi*. They go on the assumption that the traditional text of Martial is of the same kind as the traditional text of other Latin authors. Their method clashes with our new knowledge of the history of the text.

But not merely is the method of these emendations impugned by our new knowledge. The very *raison d'être* of emendation is called in question. Of course ancient MSS. and ancient editions were not infallible; but for all that one feels that there is not the same licence for attacking a reading supported by the consensus of three (or even two) ancient editions and a reading which depends on a single mediaeval MS. or archetype. The real field for textual emendation,

following its usual methods, is, we may almost say, narrowed to the *Spectacula*, a part of Martial's works for which we have the evidence only of one archetype, A^A. It may be worth our while to examine somewhat minutely the nature of this evidence.

The Archetype A^A is known to us only through three excerpt MSS., two of the ninth century, *R* and *H*, and one a little later than these, the famous codex Thuanicus (*T*). *T* is a copy² of *H* and since only a fragment of *H* is preserved, our three MSS. really resolve themselves into two, *T* and *R*. Sometimes *T* and *R* happen to choose the same epigram or part of an epigram, but more often their excerpts are different.

The first question that suggests itself with regard to the *Spectacula* is 'How much of the work has been lost?' To answer it, we must follow the usual method of induction and proceed from the known to the unknown. In the books³ whose whole text has been preserved to us by the other archetypes we find that the average portion of epigrams excerpted (in whole or in part) by one or other of the two MSS. is nearly a half, in the opening books rather more than a half, in the rest rather less. We may therefore guess that rather more than a half of the full number of epigrams in the *Spectacula*⁴ have been excerpted (in whole or in part) and that the actual number of

² And a very careless copy too. Witness I iii. 5, where *rhonchi* (followed by a word beginning with *i*) was written *runci* or perhaps *runc* in A^A. This appears in *H* as *runt*, but in *T* this *runt* has become *fuertunt*. In the Thuanicus the Epithalamium of Catullus follows immediately on the Martial extracts, and is written by the same scribe. We must estimate his value as a witness for the text of Catullus from his testimony to the text of Martial. For example, he seems to have found a difficulty with the unfamiliar abbreviations of *quae* (*que*) and *qui* in his original. The Thuanicus spelling in v. 12 of the Epithalamium, *requirunt*, must not be too strongly vindicated against the spelling of the other MSS. *requierunt* (*-que*).

³ The Xenia and Apophoreta, usually called Books XIII–XIV, were not excerpted in *H*, but transcribed in full, so much of them as remained in the archetype.

⁴ That the book was smaller than Book I I infer from I xlv, which surely contains a reference to the *Spectacula* as 'charta minor' (*i.e.* liber chartaceus minor), contrasted with Book I (cf. vi, xxii), which is called 'charta maior':

Lascivos leporum cursus lusisque leonum
Quod maior nobis charta minorque gerit
Et bis idem facinus, nimium si, Stella, videtur
Hoc tibi, bis leporem tu quoque pone mihi.

The poem on the lion and the hare in the *Spectacula* has not been preserved. I xlv is another reply to the same charge of repetition. Martial 'more suo' is paving the way for a reiteration of the

E

¹ Friedlaender's defence of the traditional text is, however, I fancy, correct. He explains *Martialem* to mean, not the poet himself, but his cousin Julius Martialis, who is often referred to by this single name (V xx; VI i; X xlvii). The epigram seems to me a very cleverly worded discharge of the delicate task of suggesting to Flaccus that he should include Julius Martialis in the invitation to Baiae. In a recently published monograph ('The Ancient Editions of Martial'—Parker, Oxford, 1902) I have tried to glean what information is available regarding the three ancient editions of the poet and the three archetypes of our MSS., and have added collations of *L* and *E*.

lines preserved to us is about a half of the full amount.

Another doubtful point is the proper division of the excerpts. In the other books we find that *R* has a preference for couplets and either selects an epigram which consists of only two lines or else excerpts two lines of an epigram and discards the rest. *T* (*H*) sometimes takes a whole epigram, sometimes a portion. Often it takes two portions of the same epigram and writes them continuously. Thus of I xxxiv we find in *T* vv. 1-5 and 8-10, with no indication of a gap. It would seem that *T* (*H*) must have followed the same practice in the *Spectacula*, although modern editions do not recognize any instance of it. Editors prefer to suppose that the excerpt MSS. have in some cases¹ run two separate epigrams into one and in others² have wrongly divided a single epigram into two with the provision of a 'bogus' title-heading for the spurious 'new epigram.' If we examine the excerpts in the books where the proper division is revealed to us by the other families of MSS., we find that these mistakes of 'conflation' and 'wrong division' are hardly ever committed by the two Anthologies. Since *T*, the only MS. which has xvi and xvi^b, does not exhibit in its usual unmistakable fashion the word *vexerat* of xvi^b as the opening word of a new epigram, one is tempted to follow the Renaissance editors in uniting the couplet and quatrain into one piece:

Raptus abt media quod ad aethera taurus
harena.

Non fuit hoc artis, sed pietatis opus.

Vexerat Europen fraterna per aequora
taurus:

At nunc Alciden taurus in astra tulit.

Caesaris atque Iovis confer nunc, fama,
iuvencos:

Par onus ut tulerint, altius iste tulit;

same offence (cf. xlvi, li, lx and, more remote, civ.)

The content of the page of *A*^a seems to have been some thirty-six lines. At *Spect.* vi. 6 and vii. 7 are two defective lines: *hoc [et] iam femineo* and *denique supplicium*. It is natural to refer them to the same hole in the parchment of *A*^a, and to guess the size of the interval which originally separated them. Both fragments are in the MS. (*T*) represented as the beginnings of lines. This would be possible if the page of *A*^a were written (as seems likely) in two columns. The one defective line would be in the left-hand column of a recto, the other in the left-hand column of a verso. Otherwise we should be forced to regard the *hoc etiam femineo* of *T* as, not the beginning, but the end of a line, e.g. <Quis iaculo abmerit tal> ia femineo?

¹ Thus Schneidewin makes a new epigram at iv. 5, Friedlaender at xii. 7.

² The Renaissance editors print vi and vi^b as one epigram.

for the reference seems to be to some 'bestiarius' (Carpophorus?) who was raised into the air to receive the applause of the spectators, he being attired as Hercules and seated on a bull. But it must be remembered that this book deals with the incidents of the opening festivities of the Colosseum and that the same incident would furnish a number of epigrams, each striking a different note on the same theme (cf. xii, xiii, xiv). The *T*-heading of xvi is DE HERCVLE QVI INSIDENS TAVRO RAPTUS EST and of xvi^b IDEM.

Two epigrams, generally attributed to the *Spectacula*, xxxi and xxxii, are preserved only in another class of Anthology MSS. of a much later age, (*N*, *D*, *Fris.*) Whether the two come also from the archetype *A*^a cannot be determined. But if we look closely at the text of the few epigrams preserved for us by this trio of MSS., we find that it is not of good quality. Very often it offers a reading which is clearly a 'doctored' reading, not traditional, e.g. VIII lix. 4 *piccata* instead of *piperrata*. It would not be safe to regard it as a direct transmission of the text of *A*^a or of any equally good archetype.

Nor can we find any justification for the view that the Italian Renaissance MSS. may have drawn upon *A*^a itself or on lost transcripts of *A*^a, which were superior to the existing transcripts. There is nothing to indicate that any Italian scholar or scribe had at his disposal better manuscript material than we have, except that he may have had access to the archetype *B*^a itself. We possess only transcripts of *B*^a; but there are four of them and they furnish us with a quite satisfactory text of their original.

Besides the text, the arrangement of the epigrams has new light thrown on it by our fuller knowledge of the MSS. There is a natural tendency to acquiesce in the order determined by the earliest printed editions; for, after all, epigrams are isolated compositions and their order cannot be of great importance. Yet we often seem to see evidence of careful arrangement on the part of Martial; and now that we have sufficient manuscript material to elicit the genuine traditional order, it will be well to follow it, especially since no great disturbance of the accepted numbering is required in any part of the volume:

in the *Spectacula* the right order of sequence is xxix, xxvii, xxx, xxviii, and, so far as the evidence goes, xxxii, xxxi, in Book VI, lxi, lx,

in Book VIII, l, li, xlix, lii, lv, liii, lvi, liv,
in Book IX, vi-ix, v,
in Book X, xx, xiii-xix,
in Book XI, l, xlix,
in Book XII, iii-v, ii, xxvii-xxix, xxvi,
xlvi, xlv.

Another thing in which editors have wrongly acquiesced is the stop-gap *Pontice* for the omission in XII xxix. 1:

Hermogenes tantus mapparum * fur est.

Martial does not use Proper Names at hazard. The name *Ponticus* has a definite rôle (or rôles) assigned to it, *Aeschylus* has another, *Zoilus* another. Whatever name Martial actually employed in this line, it seems certain that he could not have employed the name *Ponticus*: it would be unsuitable for this context. The most likely name of the required metrical form appears to be *Castricus*; for we find epigrams couched in narrative form, describing the follies or foibles of other people, addressed to Martial's friend *Castricus*, e.g. VII iv, xxvii. So we had better read:

Hermogenes tantus mapparum, *Castrice*, fur est.

Another possible name would be *Maximus* (cf. V lxx; X lxxvii).

I would keep the traditional reading in II xlv. 7-8

Tu spectas hiemem succincti lentus amici

Pro scelus! et lateris frigora *trita* times,
with the meaning 'you express polite apprehension in case your client should feel the cold with his thread-bare coat,' *times* having the sense of *timorem exhibes* or *dicis te timere*. All three archetypes agree in this reading. Perhaps also in XII xxxviii. 1-2, where the evidence of the best archetype is wanting:

Hunc qui femineis noctesque diesque cathedris

Incedit tota notus in urbe nimis,
making *cathedris* depend on *notus*. In XIV xl (the evidence of A^A is again wanting) *Cicindela*, the traditional reading, is right. It was a term for a kind of lamp. Cf. Corp. Gloss. Lat. II 338, 24, where we have evidence of a glossary with *cicindela* glossed as *kandela*;¹ Anth. Lat. I 185 tit. DE CICINDELO (*sic*); see also Georges s.v.

In XII lxxvi. 1 *uicenis* of T practically supports the *uigesis* (-*geesis*) of B^AC^A, which

¹ The use of *k* (common before *a*, e.g. *karus* for *carus*) made the word look like a Greek word, and may have led to its inclusion in a bilingual glossary.

should be accepted. For the Gen. cf. Stat. *Sile.* IV ix. 9, not to mention Catull. v. 3 and Seneca *Ep.* 123, 11. In XII lxxxviii. 1 it is possible that the two archetypes B^AC^A (A^A *n.l.*) have made the same mistake of writing *ego* for *nego*. On the other hand their reading might be defended by a reference to I xli. 18 Non cuicumque datum est habere nasum, 'to have satirical talents.'

The point of II lxxix. 2 is surely that instead of the usual formula of declining an invitation to dinner, 'I am already engaged,' 'I am dining out,' there is substituted 'I am dining at home':

Invitas tunc me, cum scis, Nasicæ, vocasse.

Excusatum habebas me rogo: ceno domi.

We should read *vocasse* with A^AB^A, not *vocatam* with C^A.

In III xciii. 20 the manuscript tradition point to *sisâtiae*, Gen. Sing., governed by *quid*. Was this a slang word connected with the 'nursery' term *sissiare*?

For VIII lviii:

Cum tibi tam crassae sint, Artemidore,
lacernae,

Possim te Sagarim iure uocare meo,

the only explanation I can offer is that it was a reply to some epigram aimed at the poet, something of this fashion:

Cum tibi tam tenues sint, Marce poeta,
lacernae,

Possim te Tanain iure vocare meo.

Another difficult epigram is IX xcv:

Alphius ante fuit (fui), coepit (-pi) nunc
Olphius esse,

Uxorem postquam duxit Athenagoras.

Was 'ôlpha' a current name for the letter we call 'Omega,' a name coined after 'alpha'? And is the meaning 'He (or I) was once the chief friend of Athenagoras, but now of no account'?

Of X lxxxviii:

Omnes persequeris praetorum, Cotta, libellos
(A^A: locellos B^A)

Accipis et ceras. Officiosus homo es,

Friedlaender remarks 'Ein bei jeder Interpunktion völlig unverständliches Epigramm.' May it not be that Cotta, not content with the published programme at the Games, provided himself with wax-tablets in addition? The *quid faciat* of II lxxiii seems to convey the same pun as the *quid ego ago* of Plaut. *Most.* 368.

In XIII lxxv. 2 the A^A reading is rightly preferred by editors (cf. Isid. *Orig.* XII vii. 63). Here, as in so many other passages,

A^A represents an ancient edition which was drawn from better sources than the other two editions. They may however contain the poet's first setting of the line. It is difficult to decide whether *mandere* and *condere* are mere scribal variants (cf. *Class. Rev.* xv. 417 n.) or divergent readings of ancient editors. Reading *mandere*, we may supply *mensis* after *lautorum*; but *condere* is hard to justify, even if we supposed *saepe* to be not the Preposition but the Ablative of *saepe*. The spelling in the MSS. may represent *inlautorum* equally with

in *lautorum*; but *inlautorum* would go better with *credere* (often confused with *condere*). The *ponere* of Q is a mere scribe's vagary, caused by the opening word of the epigram, *ponitur*.

In XIV xxix. 2 *mandatus*, 'an official order,' (so A^AB^A) is surely satisfactory. The *nam ventus* of C^A is either a genuine 'first thought' of the poet or a conjectural emendation of some corruption like *nam datus*. But for the *nam flatus* of Isaac Pontanus there is no room whatsoever.

W. M. LINDSAY.

NOTES ON PLINY'S LETTERS.

THE MSS. and editions referred to in the following notes are as follows: B, cod. Ashburnham R. 98 (37) of the Medicean library in Florence (once in the chapter library of St. Mary's of Beauvais, and later in the Riccardian library at Florence); F, cod. S. Marci 284, of the same library; M, cod. plut. xlvii. no. 36, of the same library; V, cod. Vat. lat. 3864, of the Vatican library; o, cod. Ottobon. lat. 1965, of the same library; u, cod. Vrbinas lat. 1153, of the same library; a, first ed. of Aldus, Venice, 1508; A, ed. of Avantius (X. 41-121); O, copy in the Bodleian library described by Mr. E. G. Hardy in *Jour. Philol.* v. 17, pp. 95 ff., and in his edition of the correspondence with Trajan. All the readings given are from my own collations, with the exception of those ascribed to O, which are taken from Mr. Hardy's works just referred to.

I. 2. 1 ζῆλος a zelo ou stilo (but marg. 1 h. al ZHAN) B stilo (though sti- app. over slight blot) F libro M libro (but later erased and stillo add. marg. 2 h.) V.—The testimony of the Beauvais codex shows the early prevalence of the gloss *stilo*, but as surely gives, though as an alternative, the original reading. The question of the relative value of the MSS. of the Letters is not here concerned, though it is both interesting and important to find that we no longer need imagine that the restoration of the text in this place may be due only to an acute emendation of the 15th century. Iwan v. Müller pointed out (*Jahresb. über d. Forts. d. Altw.* 1883, p. 170) that ζῆλος came to be in the imperial period a technical synonym for χαρακτήρ, and so for *stilus*. This may well explain how ζῆλος in the text came to

be glossed by *stilo*, and therefore finally displaced by it, but is not convincing for the meaning of ζῆλος in this passage. Here the Greek word probably represents a colloquial usage, which helped *zelus* to supersede *studium* in the Romance languages (cf. French *zèle*). That the Greek word is the original, and the Latin the gloss, may probably be accepted at sight, in view of the reading of B, and the comparison of the blind attempt of the progenitor of M to fathom the meaning. The argument necessary to establish the point would be along familiar and elementary lines.

I. 2. 2 pauci equitius adsequi possunt (possint B) BF pauci quos aequus (equus V) amavit qui possunt MV (a second hand has inserted in the margin of V nam pauci uim tantorum uirorum quos aequas assequi possunt) pauci quos aequos assequi possunt o pauci equos assequi possunt u pauci, quos aequas, assequi possunt a.—I hope to be able to point out elsewhere that Aldus follows in the main the tradition of a line of MSS. to which, of all extant MSS., B is most closely related. In some instances where the readings of Aldus vary slightly from those of B, or of BF, and appear to give the truth, his readings are doubtless due to a remarkably keen discernment of the original underlying a MS. error. In other instances it is unsafe to say that his MS. was not simply better than B. The present instance may be difficult to classify in this regard, but that the reading of Aldus, though apparently emended in a single letter through a misunderstanding of the meaning, is otherwise the writing of Pliny himself appears to me most probable.

Pliny apparently wrote 'pauci quos

aequus' adsequi possunt. Aldus may have had a source like that of the second hand of **V**, but at any rate he shows no confusion in the words that precede those immediately under consideration. And the reading of **o**, with its slight emendation in the direction of supposed sense, as well as that of **u**, which tries to make sense by boldly striking out *quos* altogether, indicate the prevalence in the 15th century of that brief reading which is clearly the one that **B** and **F** sturdily maintain, though in unintelligible form. It was to be expected that early scholars, recognising the familiar quotation from Verg. *Aen.* vi. 129, should be unwilling to let the quoted sentence hang fire at the end. Accordingly a progenitor of **M** added the next word *amavit*, which completed both the Vergilian line and the syntactical form, while the *editio princeps* (possibly following some MS. of not very much earlier date than itself) added to *amavit* the missing subject *Jupiter* from the beginning of the next line of the Aeneid. But that Pliny should remind his correspondent of the familiar quotation by a mere initial tag, syntactically incomplete, need surprise no one. Compare, for example, Cic. *Att.* i. 1. 4 ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἱερῶν οὐδὲ βοείων, — a familiar instance from the writings of a man who was Pliny's constant admiration and model. It may be said, to be sure, that Sidonius Apollinaris, whose echoes of Pliny are very frequent, quotes this Vergilian passage with *amavit* (*Ep.* iv. 3. 10 nam te... 'pauci quos aequus amavit' imitabuntur), but this is not of importance in the face of such evidence as that given by the MSS. For not only are **BFa** in general superior in authority to **MV** and *a fortiori* to all other MSS., but in addition to this fact it is easier to account for the later insertion of *amavit* in such a well-known phrase than for its later omission, had it stood originally in Pliny's text.

I. 12. 9. It may be interesting to note that Keil's conjecture of *Geminum* for *Geminium* (**BFa**), or *Germanium* (**M**), or *Germanum* (**V**), though doubtless wrong, is the actual reading of **o**.

I. 20. 19 *lata et magnifica et excelsa* **BFMVa** *alta magnifica et excelsa o elata magnifica et excelsa u*. — In the face of such a consensus in favour of *lata* it is perhaps too bold a venture to believe that Pliny wrote instead of it *elata*, as **u** happens to read, — though the testimony of **MV** alone would amount to but little on precisely such

a point as this, since so frequently the tradition of **MV** shows traces of an early rhetorical revision, one part of which apparently consisted in the lopping off of prefixes. The only thing to cause a moment's hesitation about *lata* is the fact that Pliny, when using such rhetorical triplets, inclines to select those that approximate pretty closely in meaning, and *lata* does not fit in with the two other epithets quite as well as *elata*, — which, moreover, is the reading in i. 8. 5. *est enim paulo quasi gloriosius et elatius* (though **V** reads *latius*, and **ou** even *clarius*), also on a point of rhetoric. More striking yet is iii. 13. 4, where *elata* and *excelsa* are joined together in a characterization of style (only **ou** read for *elata*, *et lata*). On the other hand *lata* goes better with adjectives like *uber* (cf. iv. 17. 11 *latius et uberius*), and nowhere else in Pliny is joined with adjectives like *magnifica* and *excelsa*.

II. 11. 23 ΑΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΟΝ F ΜΗΟΥΡΤΙΟΝ

MV *om. in blank* (but later *h. λειτούργιον o*) **ou** *λειτούργιον a*. A later hand in the margin of **F** writes *λειτούργιον*, and gives as its Latin synonym *negocium*. The same word occurs also in ii. 12. 1 ΑΙΤΟΥΡΓΙΟΝ F ΜΗΟΥΡΤΙΟΝ **MV** *om. in blank* (but later *h. εἰτούργιον*, and space left for initial Δ o) **ou** *λειτούργιον a*. — The testimony of **B** is lacking, on account of the loss of two leaves of the MS. The general meaning of the word is made clear enough by its context. It must denote a small piece of business, perhaps supplementary to a larger one (cf. the marginal gloss in **F**). But the known meanings of the familiar and classical *λειτούργιον* do not fit the case. Nor does its etymology hold out any hope. On the whole the reading of **F** in ii. 11. 23 is left as the best refuge (and **F** is not a sophisticated MS.). *Λιτούργιον* may be connected with *λῆρός*. If it was a technical, or semi-technical, word, or a colloquial word, its absence from classical Greek writers need occasion no wonder, and would account well enough for the substitution for it in the 15th century of the well-known *λειτούργιον*. Cf. the character of some of the Greek words in Cicero's letters.

II. 11. 23 *sestertia decem milia*. — This, with one or two orthographical variations, is the reading of **FMVoua**. (The leaf of **B** containing this passage is lost, but the consensus of **F** and **a** indicates that the reading of **B** would have been the same). The earliest editions agree upon the same reading, — but in a copy in my possession of the

edition printed at Treviso in 1483, which contains many corrections in the handwriting of Pomponio Leto, and appears to have been used by him in preparation for his own edition issued at Rome in 1490, *sestertia* has been changed by Leto to *sestertium*; and this is the reading given by him in his edition, and by a number of other early editors as well as by later. To the reading *sestertium* Mommsen also commits himself in Keil's critical edition of 1870. The reason must be either that *sestertia decem milia* means ten million sesterces,—too magnificent a *buona mano* to be extorted from Marcianus even by the servant of a Marius Priscus,—or that Pliny at least, if not other writers, cannot use *sestertia decem milia* to mean ten thousand sesterces. To be sure *HS* (= *sestertium*) may easily have been expanded into *sestertia*, but it is manifestly unreasonable to advance even the simplest and most satisfactory hypothesis concerning the origin of an error, unless it can previously be shown that an error certainly exists, despite the consensus of MS. tradition. Neither of the possible contentions mentioned above can be established. To take them up in inverse order, in no other place in Pliny, unless I miscount, does *sestertia* occur. In ten places *sestertium* occurs, but in each instance with the numeral adverb, the MSS. reading unanimously in every instance *sestertium*, as they should, and showing no tendency toward *sestertia*. In one instance only (X. 37. 1) *a*, the only authority, reads *HS*, and here also the following numeral must be taken as the adverb. Evidently then the cases in Pliny are not calculated to show by inter-comparison that he could not use *sestertia* in ii. 11. 23 in any sense of which other writers of a good period considered it patient. And to return to the first point, Hultsch seems to have shown clearly enough (*Griech. u. Röm. Metrol.*,² p. 293 f.) that *sestertia* was not rarely used adjectivally with *milia*, whether standing before or after the numeral. There seems therefore no reason to challenge the reading of the MSS., nor to doubt that *sestertia decem milia* in II. 11. 23 means 'ten thousand sesterces.'

VII. 27. 8 *aduentare etiam ut Mou aduentare etiam, ac iam ut a aduentare, et iam ut edd.*—The reading *et iam ut* would be entirely acceptable, were it not for the testimony of *a*, which in general deserves much more careful attention than it usually receives, especially in that part of the correspondence that follows V. 6, with which

the testimony of *BF* ceases. I hope to be able to show elsewhere the importance of *a*, and the ground for belief that *M* (and *V*) present the results of a (perhaps tolerably early) revision of the text in the interests of a closer conformity to commonplace rhetorical standards. The doublet in *a* suggests the less commonplace *ac iam* as possibly the original reading, which has sometime been glossed by *et iam* (read *lateras etiam*). This has then made its way into the context, and by virtue of its apparent applicability to the preceding *aduentare* has not displaced *ac iam* in the tradition represented by *a*, though the more critical redactor of the progenitor of *Mou*, recognising truly that both readings could not stand, thrust out the rightful occupant of the place.

ac iam seems indeed to be Pliny's most characteristic way of bringing a string of particulars up to a climax; cf. e.g. I. 14. 7 *quaesturam, tribunatum, praeturam honestissime percucurrit, ac iam, etc.*; V. 10. 1 *appellantur cotidie et flagitantur, ac iam periculum est ne, etc.*

X. 79. 2 *edictum diui Augusti quo permisit minores magistratus ab annis duobus et uiginti capere Aa* X. 80 *non minores duo et uiginti annorum A* non minores duorum et uiginti annorum *a*.—Pliny has just remarked that Pompey, in organizing the province of Bithynia under Roman administration, set the age of thirty as that at which admission to the local senate could be gained by *adlectio*, or the lower magistracy held that admitted to the senate. This was entirely in accord with the law in Rome itself at the time, and it is well known that in the organization of its municipalities Rome endeavoured to frame their regulations as closely as possible after those of the capital. (Cf. e.g. the *lex Iulia municipalis*, of the year 45 B.C., in *Bruns Fontes*,⁶ p. 109, which agrees in the age limitation with the specific decree of Pompey, and establishes it as the ordinary law of all municipalities, colonies, and praefectures.) Now Augustus reduced the age at which the quaestorship could be held in Rome, and consequent admission gained to membership in the Roman senate, from thirty to twenty-five years. It might therefore be expected that municipal regulations framed by authority from Rome after that date would follow suit, and fix twenty-five years instead of thirty as the date for the holding of the *minores magistratus* and for admission to the municipal senate. There is no reason in the nature of things why Augustus should have made the

age-limit in Bithynia lower than in Rome, and precedents for such action appear to be lacking. Accordingly I am tempted to believe that Augustus kept up the previous Roman policy, and lowered the age-limit in Bithynia (and doubtless in other provinces) to accord precisely with the reduction made at Rome. We should therefore read in both Pliny's letter and Trajan's reply *quinque et viginti* in place of *duobus et viginti* and *duorum et viginti* respectively. The source of the error in **Aa**, or in their archetype, is of course easy to conjecture, the numeral **XXV** being read as **XXII**. Indeed that the number was indicated by numerals instead of words not very far back of the time of printing may be guessed from the ungrammatical variation of **A** in Trajan's answer (X. 80). I trust I do not need to apologize for not following Keil (and in a sense the earlier editors) in denoting the book of correspondence with Trajan by *Trai.*, instead of calling it Book X. For not only does Aldus bear indubitable witness to the existence of a ten-book MS. of Pliny's Letters (including, to make up the number, the correspondence with Trajan), but since Keil's critical edition was published the title of the rediscovered codex **B** gives as the original contents of the volume in its un mutilated form C. PLINI SECVNDI EPISTVLARVM LIBRI NVMERO DECEM.

X. 121 *nec dubitandum fuisse si expectasset donec A nec dubitandum fuisset si expectasset donec Oa.*—The reading of the Bodleian copy and of Aldus is evidently a desperate attempt to make sense at the end of the book, and to complete the meaning Aldus felt bound to insert after *adiuvandum esset* below—what is a palpable interpolation—*usum eorum intentioni tue non profuisse*. Neither Beroaldus with *nec dubitandum fuisse si expectasset*, nor Catanaeus with *non*

dubitandum fuisse si expectasset, offers any new light. Both are evidently trying small and ineffective emendations of the text of Avantius. Nor have later editors succeeded in clearing up the difficulty. Mommsen indeed tries to cut the Gordian knot after the manner of Aldus by a vigorous interpolation, reading *nec dubitandum fuit tibi facere quae sero fecisses si expectasset donec*, and Keil adopts his emendation. But such desperate deeds of valour are not to be resorted to, even in Book X., if anything else can be done. Mr. Hardy, in his edition of the correspondence with Trajan, conjectures *quae dubitanda fuisset, si expectasset, donec*, interpreting 'Trajan says that Pliny's confidence in him would have appeared doubtful if he had waited.' But the use of the gerundive *dubitanda* with *fuisset*, even by Trajan, in the sense of *dubia* or *incerta visa esset*, or of *suspecta esset* or *fuisset*, arouses doubt. I have wondered whether it could be possible that Trajan wrote *nec fuit tibi expectandum donec*. *Expectandum* might then have been glossed above the line by '*i.* *dubitandum*', suggested in part at least by *dubitavi* in the concluding sentence of Pliny's letter immediately preceding, and *fuit tibi* might not impossibly be corrupted into *fuisset si*, which would surely tend to bring *dubitandum* down into the line before *fuisset*, and to secure the change of *expectandum* into a form grammatically possible after *fuisset si*. I have also imagined at times as an alternative that Trajan wrote *non fuisset tibi expectandum* as an appositive to *fiduciam*, from which clause the evolution into the form of **A** or **a** would be in about the same line as before indicated.

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A NOMINATIVE FOR VICEM.

ALL lexica and grammars agree in the statement that the nominative case singular of *vicem* was not in use. While this is doubtless true of the classical period, I have pleasure in reporting that I discovered an example of the missing nominative some three years ago. This example occurs, not, as might be expected, in some recently published *anecdota*, but in a work which

has been in print for over four hundred years. [Augustinus] *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* (a work written in Italy during the last quarter of the fourth century) *qu. lxxxiii.* reads thus:—*forte non contradiceretur, si pro hac misericordia uices illi aliqua redderetur*. The printed text (Migne *P.L.* xxxv.), based on a late MS. or late MSS., reads *vicis*, but six ninth century

MSS., which I have collated, have *uices*, and this must be preferred. Lest it should be retorted that *uices* is plural and that *aliquae redderentur* should be read, I must point out that *uicem reddere* is a favourite phrase of this author occurring altogether twenty-one times, and that the plural occurs once only.¹ [Ambrosius] in 2. Cor. 8, 14 is the reference: *haec est aequalitas ut quia isti in hoc*

¹ References and quotations will be given in my forthcoming *Study of Ambrosiaster* (Cambridge Texts and Studies), chap. iii.

tempore ministrant sanctis reddantur illis uices in futuro. So the printed text (Migne P.L. xvii. 327 D), but some MSS. give *reddatur illis uices*, while one gives *reddant illis uicem*. Sound criticism will, I believe, agree with those which read *reddatur*, and thus give us a second example of the nominative singular. The nominative singular of *uicem* was, then, neither *uicis*, nor *uix*, but *uices*.

A. SOUTER.

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ETYMOLOGICAL VARIETIES.

I.—The Accent of *μήτηρ*.

THE accent of *μήτηρ* was originally on the same syllable as that of *πατήρ*, as the evidence of their declension and the Sanskrit cognates shows. Why has it shifted? On the analogy of the vocative, I should answer straightway, were I to use analogy as a *deus ex machina* to be invoked whenever a phonetic knot can not be untied. But I am convinced that analogy can override custom only in virtue of superior power, and so I must face the difficulty that *πατήρ* has kept its accent unaltered by the analogy which has affected its correlative. A little reflexion however proves it to be far from a serious one. In the Greek household the vocative of *μήτηρ* would be in far more frequent use than that of *πατήρ*—amongst the girls to the end of their unmarried life, and amongst the boys until they joined the outdoor pursuits of their father. So while *μήτηρ* went a-wandering after *μήτηρ*, *πατήρ* stayed where it was.

II.—The Greek Comparative and Superlative Adverbs.

Why, has asked many a puzzled schoolboy who has heard that these adverbs are neuters of their adjectives, should the Greeks have put the one in the singular and the other in the plural? And no answer has he found. We may darken counsel and confuse the phonetic laws of Greek by accepting Joh. Schmidt's theory that *κάκιστα*, e.g., is the singular nominative of an abstract substantive. But we are no further on. The singular of the comparative adverb presents no difficulty, as the parallel of Latin shows. *λέγεις κάλλιον τούτου* 'you speak better'—that is the one comparison—'than

he.' But in the superlative *λέγεις κάλλιστα τούτων* 'you speak best of (all) these' your speaking is compared more than once, to that of at least an A and a B: the comparisons are several, and so the neuter shifts into the plural. This shift is characteristic of lively Greek and cannot be expected from Latin. Latin forms its superlative adverbs by the light of its positives: pulchre—pulcherrime. This is not surprising. For the intensive sense 'very beautiful' is far more deeply impressed upon the Latin superlative, adjective and adverb, than on the Greek, as is shown not only in their difference of usage, but by the fact that the superlative survived, when it did survive, in the Romance languages in the intensive or 'absolute' sense alone, being replaced in the other sense, 'most beautiful,' by new formations, *il più* etc. This is in harmony with what we have observed above about the superlative adverb.

III.—On arma vetricia and the like.

Prof. Lindsay, *Latin Language*, p. 371, compares the use of the suffix in *-ic* with neuter nouns to the extension to the Neuter of the S-suffix of the Masc. and Fem. [in the Nominative] in Adjectives like *audax*, *diues*. Both are extensions; and that is all. For, as Mr. Lindsay notes, after Neue ii.³ p. 15 (rather § 15) *vetricis* is not used as a neuter in the singular till late Latin. In Augustan Latin, where it first appears, the peculiarity is still further restricted. You will only find it in the form of the heading, Verg. Prop. Ov., and in *vetricia fulmina* Ovid. Later we have '*vetricium armorum*' '*vetricibus armis*' Val. Max. on the one hand, and '*vetricia signa*' Lucan, '*u. spicula*' Silius, '*u. bella*' Statius (also '*u. castra, colla,*

regna, uexilla in later writers) and '*ultricia bella*', Sil., '*ult. tela, Tartara*' Statius (and in later or unknown writers '*ult. uerba, arma*') on the other. It is clear that the usage started with a case-form in *d* and with a word (*arma*) that had no singular, and was gradually extended. Of the extensions we may consider those which confined it to the case-form in which it started as the more legitimate, since it clearly sprang from the feminine associations of the short *-a*. This drift of the *a* of the plural had, as is well known, an important influence in shaping the declension of these neuters in the Romance languages, issuing often in irregularities like that of the Italian: Sing. *il membro* (Masc.), Plur. *le membra*, partially feminine, but also *i membri*, completely masculine, *le membre*, completely feminine.

IV.—On the passive infinitive with *iri*.

The two idioms last discussed show the very characteristic which Prof. Sonnenschein on Rudens 1242 *mihi istaec uidetur praeda praedatum iri* (ed. minor) regards as an argument against Palmer's and my rendering of the infinitive there as active in sense (will go a-plundering) and against Neue's and my explanation of the future passive infinitive in *iri*: 'an active *praedatum iri*—says Prof. Sonnenschein, 'is grammatically inconceivable...the construction is not only contrary to rule, but also incapable of analysis.' The last statements, true as they are, do not frighten a comparative philologist, nor force him to admit the truth of the first.

An adverb in the plural and a neuter noun with a feminine adjective are appearances 'contrary to rule,' 'incapable of analysis'; but if grammatically inconceivable, so much the worse for grammar. The tenour of Prof. Sonnenschein's note assures me that he would interpret the line of Plautus as we wish if he saw his way out of the grammatical difficulty. This is not after all such a serious one. It is recognised on all hands that all the other so-called 'passive' formations are employed in deponent verbs without the passive force. Why should this future infinitive passive be an exception? If '*praedor, praedaris, praedatur*' with a deponent sense are not anomalies, why should *praedatum iri* with the same be one either? These *iri* formations are by no means common; and that only a single instance of the use has been preserved need not surprise us.

The origin of the formation in *iri* is far clearer on Neue's theory than on the current one. This breaks down completely when confronted with the well-known crux '*reus parricidii damnatum iri uidebatur*,' quoted by Quintilian. To make out of an active future 'to go to condemn' a passive future 'to be 'goned' to condemn' is no doubt a rather crude proceeding: but is it cruder than to give *potest, nequit, coepit* the passive inflexions when they have a passive infinitive depending on them and make of them *potestur, nequitur, coeptum est*? I trow not.

J. P. POSTGATE.

NOTES.

ON HERODOTUS I. 207.—*ἐκεῖνο πῶτον μάθε, ὡς κύκλος τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐστὶ πρηγμάτων, περιφερόμενος δὲ οὐκ ἐξ αἰεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐτυχέειν.*

This comparison of human affairs to a revolving wheel (which Herodotus puts in the mouth of Croesus) is common in the East to this day. The Greeks give expression to the idea in two homely proverbs: *ὁ καιρὸς εἶναι τροχός*, and *ἔχ' ὁ τροχὸς γυρίσματα καὶ οἱ μῆρες ἐβδόμαδες*; while the Turks embody it in the following aphorism: *Boo doonid tehurkifellek'dir*; *ask olsoon teheverinuty*, 'This world is a wheel; happy the man who can turn it (*i.e.* control its revolutions).'

G. F. ABBOTT.

DEMETRIUS περὶ ἐρμηνείας AND PLINY THE YOUNGER.

Demetr. § 296 καθόλου δὲ ὥσπερ τὸν αὐτὸν κερδὴν ὁ μὲν τις κύνα ἐπλασεν, ὁ δὲ βοῦν, ὁ δὲ ἵππον, οὕτω καὶ πρᾶγμα ταῦτόν ὁ μὲν τις ἀποφαινόμενος καὶ κατηγορῶν φησιν...ἕτερος δὲ ταῦτ' ἐν ὑποθετικῷ προοίεται.

Plin. ep. vii 9 § 11

ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur
si doctos digitos iussaque fiat opus,
et nunc informet Martem castamve Minervam,
nunc Venerem effingat, nunc Veneris puerum,
sic hominum ingenium flecti ducique per artes
non rigidas docta mobilitate deest.

Other parallels in Casanbon on Pers. iii 23, Jahn *ibid.* v 40, Otto, *Sprichwörter*, s.v. *cera*.¹ p. 80, the *Paroemiographi* of Leutsch ii 74 col. i, Wetstein etc. on Rom. 9 20. Add Quintil. x 5 9 nec aliena tantum transferre, sed etiam nostra pluribus modis tractare proderit: ut ea industria sumamus sententias quasdam, easque versemus quam numerosissime, velut eadem cera aliae atque aliae formae duci solent. Hieron. ep. 52 3 pr. (i 272b Vallarsi) mollis cera et ad formandum facilis, etiam si artificia et plastae cessent manus, tamen τῇ δουλεύει totum est, quidquid esse potest.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.

QUERY: DANTE'S EUNOE AND AN ORPHIC TABLET.
—In the well-known Orphic tablet in the British Museum (Kaibel, *I.G.S.I.* No. 641 and *J.H.S.* vol. iii. p. 112) the soul in Hades is bidden to abstain from a well-spring on the left hand—presumably Lethe—and to drink of another well flowing from the mere of Mnemosyne.

Εὐρύσεις δ' ἐτέραν τῆς Μνημοσύνης ἀπὸ λίμνης
ψυχρὴν ὕδωρ πορέειν.

Mr. F. M. Cornford drew my attention to the fact that the two Orphic well-springs have a close analogy in Dante (*Purg.* xxviii. 130, xxxi. 98, and xxxiii. 127)

Quinci Letè, così dall' altro lato
Eunoè si chiama.

Commentators say nothing as to whence Dante borrowed his Eunoè. Can any reader of the *Classical Review* supply his source? My immediate reason for asking this question is that, in another Orphic tablet (Kaibel, *I.G.S.I.* 642), the words occur:

ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὰμ' ψυχῇ φάες ἡελίοιο
δεξιὸν εἰς . . . οἶας.

Kaibel restores εἰσιθι ὡς δεῖ, Prof. Comparetti *eúnolias*; neither seems to me quite satisfactory, and I would suggest δεξιὸν Ε[ὐν]οίας. Eunoia, consciousness of good, seems analogous to the Platonic ἀνέμνησις and the well may lurk in some obscure Neoplatonic writer. Or is it a local Pythagorean tradition surviving to Dante's time in Lower Italy, the home of the tablets?

JANE E. HARRISON.

REVIEWS.

LUDWICH'S *ILIAD*.

Homeri Carmina recensuit et selecta lectionis varietate instruxit Arthurus Ludwich.
Paris prior. Ilias. Volumen prius. 1902.
16 M.

THE great undertaking which Professor Ludwich, now many years ago, put before himself,—of collecting the documentary evidence for the Homeric poems,—has been materially advanced by the publication of this volume. In 1889 Prof. Ludwich gave us the *Odyssey*, in 1896 the *Batrachomachia*; we owe to him also a specimen of the Hymns, various specimens of Scholia, his Aristarchus, his *Homervulgata* and other books and programmes, leading up to his editions, the bibliography of which runs to pages. The world of 'Ομηρίδαι (if, as we have been told, this word is a synonym of 'Ομηρικοί) must offer its warm congratulations to the unwearied worker—collator and collector—upon the achievement of the greater portion of his task.

The book resembles in arrangement the *Odyssey*. A brief preface (which might have been longer, for the readers' convenience) gives a list of the MSS. used. Beside the papyri, which are complete up to date (and therefore slightly fuller than those used in Dr. Leaf's *Iliad*, vol. i, ed. 2) as many as 81 minuscules are cited. Some of these are taken over from older editions, others supplied by contemporary collators—most of the Paris MSS. from Leaf, the two Escorial MSS. from Bethe—the rest are due to the energy of the editor. Such a host of

codices, especially as their variants are given in full, assures to the edition an independent value in face of the rivals which have of late appeared upon the scene. While I acknowledge the merits of Dr. Leaf, it is not to him, nor to a third edition, but to Ludwich, that I turn for information on a given line.

As in the *Odyssey*, Ludwich has not arranged his MSS. in families: he contents himself with a reference to his *Beiträge zur Homerischen Handschriftenkunde* where his views are given. This system has the advantage that the value of the apparatus does not depend upon the correctness of the distribution into families, but it proportionately lengthens the critical notes. I must be allowed to say that the MS. variants seem needlessly full; e.g. what is the value or significance of 'παμποικίλοι Ω (-πικοίλοι Ο', -ποίκιλλοι Ρ^α)' on Z 289, or of 'ἐλέην Χ' and ἐκάβη Ο' on the same page? The editor has also mixed into his commentary the restitutions of philological critics, with whom as he says in his preface he has little sympathy. Exhaustive, the collection might have been useful, and deterrent; but Payne Knight and Brandreth *détournent* among the quotations and the Alexandrians. The reader may be glad that the editor has not in obedience to the a priori critic printed portions of the text in smaller type. He did so in the *Odyssey*, but such a practice is not more trying to the eye than shocking to the judgment, when it meets one in editions which like those of Professor Ludwich, are permanent and standard.

T. W. ALLEN.

THE FRAGMENTA PHILOSOPHORUM.

1. *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*. Edidit HERMANNUS DIELS (Berlin, Weidmann, 1901). 10 M.
2. *Texts to illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on the History of Greek Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle*. By HENRY JACKSON, Litt.D. (London, Macmillan, 1901). 4s. 6d. net.

PROFESSOR DIELS'S edition of the *Poetae Philosophi* is in some respects a tantalising work. No doubt the series of *Poetarum Graecorum Fragmenta* which owes its inception to Wilamowitz-Moellendorf would have been incomplete without the fragments of the philosophers who wrote in verse. No doubt, too, the only possible editor for these fragments was Professor Diels. And yet the appearance of this volume will be a great misfortune if it stands in the way of another which we have almost a right to expect from the editor, namely a new *Philosophorum Graecorum Fragmenta* with a new recension of Diogenes Laertius. Of such a work this volume is indeed an instalment, and an instalment of such value that it seems ungracious to express dissatisfaction with it. But the very nature of the collection to which it belongs makes unity and continuity impossible for it. The *Poetae Philosophi* are but an accident in the history of Greek Literature. The popular handbooks still say that philosophy began by being poetical, and only found its more natural expression in prose at a later date; but the fact is quite the other way. The original language of European philosophy was Ionic prose, and there were never more than two strictly philosophical poems in the language. Everything else in this volume—Xenophanes, Timon, Krates, and the rest—might have found a more appropriate place in some other part of the series; and, since it is the poetry and not the doctrine that the series has chiefly in view, it would hardly have been amiss to associate even Parmenides and Empedokles with the *Orphica*.

Professor Diels has evidently felt these difficulties, and has done his best to break through the barriers imposed by the nature of the series. He says (*Praef.* p. vi.) *poetas edere, non philosophos, huius Corporis instituto iubeor*, but he has found it impossible to carry this out. Unless the most difficult parts of the poems were to be left

unexplained, it became necessary to add a pretty full doxography to each. Nor was it possible to adopt the plan of arranging the fragments of Parmenides and Empedokles according to the alphabetical order of the names of the authors who quote them. The general disposition of the two poems is so clear that it would have been sheer wantonness to disturb it. All this is true; but, if we once admit it, we are committed to an edition of philosophers and not of poets, and the incompleteness caused by the omission of the prose fragments becomes glaring. I do not think this criticism (which does not apply to Professor Diels, but to the plan of the series) is mere cavilling. It is a question of the evolution of 'literary kinds,' and it is important to note that, while Greek literature does recognise didactic poetry as a 'kind,' philosophical poetry is not one at all, and should not, therefore, be given a volume to itself. In such a case, the good may easily prove the enemy of the best.

At the very outset, we are met by the case of Thales. By great good luck, an early and anonymous *Ναυτική αστρολογία*, of which not a word remains, was sometimes attributed to him, though the better opinion referred it to Phokos of Samos. This gives the editor a pretext for eighteen pages of valuable work on the biography and doxography of the founder of the Milesian School, including a new recension of the 'Life' in Diogenes Laertius. Unfortunately it did not occur to anyone to ascribe a metrical *περίπλους* or a poem on the *gnomon* to Anaximander or Anaximenes, and so, after a page on Kleostratos of Tenedos, we pass straight on to Xenophanes. The gap is very sensible indeed.

The treatment of Xenophanes himself is one of the most masterly things in the book. To give an idea of the style of the brief exegetical notes, I will extract one or two from this section. It will be seen that they say all that requires to be said on the vexed question of the monotheism of Xenophanes, on which many (including the present writer) have spent more words than was needful. On *fr.* 23 (1 K. 12 Cr.) *εἰς θεὸς ἐν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος*, we have this—

εἰς θεός] scil. ὁ οὐρανός cf. Arist. [*Met.* A 5. 986^b 24 *εἰς τὴν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἰραῖ φησι τὸν θεόν.*] *ἐν κ.τ.λ.*] cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 573 Sol μέγας

ἐν θεοῖς ἐν θνητοῖσι τε δαίμων; Plato Symp. 178 A οὔτι μέγας θεὸς εἴη ὁ Ἔρως καὶ θαυμαστὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θεοῖς, loquitur ex vulgi opinione more antithetico pervulgato cf. Hom. Θ 27; T 95.

This is enough to settle the point, though it might have been well to add the words of Herakleitos κόσμον τόνδε τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε.

On fr. 32 (13 K. 24 Cr.) ἦν τ' Ἴριν καλέουσι, νέφος καὶ τοῦτο πέφυκε, κ.τ.λ. we have—

καὶ τοῦτο] ut Sol et cetera astra, quae cum in nebulas evanescerent, decorum simul opinio casura erat cf. Arch. f. G. d. Phil. X 533.

Lastly, on fr. 34 (14 K. 19 Cr.) καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές οὗτις ἀνὴρ γένετ' οὐδέ τις ἔσται εἶδος ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων κ.τ.λ. we have this—

θεῶν populares deos intellego i.e. inprimis astra et elementa cf. ad fr. 23, 1 περὶ πάντων, ἄσσα λέγω (sic iungendum) explico περὶ τῶν γεννητῶν, non περὶ παντός (cf. fr. 25), illa dubia, hoc (quod est unum et deus) certum Xenophani, Parmenidis magistro.

Many of the notes on Empedokles are similarly illuminating, but it would take too much space to discuss them here, and the publication of this volume will certainly lead in good time to a fresh examination of all the difficulties. There is, however, one very small point in the *Testimonia Doctrinae* (p. 53) on which I should like to say a word. After quoting the well-known passage in Plato (Theaet. 181, a) about οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται, Diels proceeds to cite 'Sext. adv. math. x. 46 οὗς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης [scil. in dialogis, Platonis i.e. secutus, non recte om. Rose Ar. Pseudep. 718] στασιώτας τε καὶ ἀφυσικούς κέκληκεν, στασιώτας μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως κ.τ.λ.' Now, it is quite likely in itself that Aristotle should have used any given phrase of Plato's in his dialogues, but it is less likely that he should have mis-translated it. In Plato, οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται merely means 'the partisans of the whole,' and has nothing to do with their making it stationary. The word means the adherents of a *στάσις* and nothing else, and the whole context bears out this rendering. It is surely better to leave the credit of the other (which still holds its ground in the handbooks) to Sextus himself, who is *capable de tout*.

With Empedokles, Greek philosophical poetry in the strict sense comes to an end (for the Hymn of Kleantes is excluded), and most of the rest of the volume is taken up by Timon and Krates. Even after Wachsmuth's labours, Diels has been able

to do much for Timon. The account of the Silloi given on pp. 182-184 is as nearly convincing as such an account can be.

It need hardly be said that the text of all the fragments given is thoroughly sound and conservative. Even the temptation to normalise the dialect has been resisted. In the present state of our knowledge, we can never be certain that an apparently anomalous form does not represent a real tradition. It is a great advantage to have a text which represents the best *παράδοσις* rather than the modern reconstruction of it. There are many places, of course, where the reader may think he can see behind the tradition, but it is impossible to discuss these in detail here. What has been said will be enough to show the value of the present instalment of the work we still expect from the editor. It makes us all the more eager for the rest.

Dr. Jackson's book is also a tantalising one; for it is designed to illustrate a course of lectures which few of us will be privileged to hear. We want the lectures to illustrate the texts as well as the texts to illustrate the lectures. Without these it would be presumption to criticise the selection of passages. It is to be regretted that Diels's volume was not published in time for Dr. Jackson to take his texts as a basis instead of Stein's and Mullach's. It would have been possible for him, however, to make more use than he has done of the separate edition of Parmenides which Diels published in 1897. The plan of the book excludes both critical and exegetical notes, and this has some serious inconveniences. Some of the readings are Dr. Jackson's own, and call for a word of explanation and justification. Those who are not in the secret will hardly be able to construe—

οὐ γὰρ μῆποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα.

A reference to the editor's article in the *Journal of Philology* (xvi. 72) would not have taken up much space, and might have saved students a good deal of trouble. However, it must be remembered that the texts are chiefly meant to illustrate the editor's own lectures, and, though the ordinary student will not always be able to find his way without a guide, those of us who are acquainted with Dr. Jackson's views will understand and appreciate the principle on which the selection of passages is made. If we admit, as I at least am unwilling to admit, that Plato and Aristotle can be profitably studied in selections at all, there

can be no doubt that this selection is admirably made. It is likely to stimulate interest in the more strictly metaphysical side of Plato's later teaching, and even those of us who cannot accept all his views

on that subject will be ready to admit that no one has done more than Dr. Jackson to give life to that most important but little understood part of the history of Greek philosophy. JOHN BURNET.

ROBERTS' DEMETRIUS DE ELOCUTIONE.

Demetrius on Style: The Greek text of *Demetrius De Elocutione*. Edited after the Paris manuscript with Introduction, Translation, Facsimiles, etc., by W. RHYS ROBERTS, Litt.D. Pp. xi, 328. Cambridge University Press. 1902. Price 9s. net.

THIS is another of those volumes well and accurately printed, attractive in form and in binding, which men have lately been accustomed to expect from the Cambridge University Press. It is furnished also with two admirable facsimiles of the notable manuscript of which the *Demetrius* forms a part, which on this evidence would seem to be almost as fair and legible as the print of the Cambridge Press.

I wish it were possible for me to speak of the book throughout in the same way. The editor is so eager and enthusiastic that it will seem to him perhaps ill-natured, or even malevolent in any critic to express the opinion that, if this rendering of the *De Elocutione* be exact and adequate, then the *De Elocutione* does not quite deserve to be set in so beautiful a frame. The Introduction, the Translation, the Notes, and the 'Glossary' all bear so many marks of haste, that I can hold this opinion easily together with the other opinion, or rather, together with the conviction that Professor Rhys Roberts has already proved and is sure to prove often hereafter that he can achieve work of wholly another order.

The bustling haste, quickening often into a scamper, makes of the 'Notes' a sort of *locus paenitentiae* both for text and translation. Thus it is from the Notes that a reader first discovers that others besides himself have stumbled at *ἡμετέροις* in 66. 7 (I quote by the pages of this edition); *κατακεκομμένη* 68, 21; *ὑπερβολή* 94, 8; *ὀνόματι* 114, 31: etc., etc. It is from the Notes too, that he discovers that he has perhaps rightly queried the translation of *ἡδύχρουν* by 'dulcet-coloured' in 156, 17; of *διαμόρφωσις* by

'detail' 160, 12: of *αὐτόθεν* by nothing 162, 27; of *βεβαιοῦσαν* by 'steady-going'; 172, 2: of *μηχανῆς* by 'ex cathedra' 176, 9: of *χαμαιόπῃ* by 'earthward-hurled' and *παρὰ πλῆγᾱ* by 'slant-shelving' 192, 21: of *ἄχαρις* by 'repulsive' 206, 10. The same note, not valuable in itself, may appear more than once e.g. *ἄγροικον*: specifically Attic word' appears on p. 240, and again on p. 248.

A like hurry manifests itself in every page of the translation. The wrong word would seem often to be preferred to the right. Of course this is not the case—the translator can write admirable English when he chooses—but the rendering for some reason or another has been made in such a hurry that the mind has not been given time for the weighing and selecting of words, and now and then for the catching even of common idioms in Greek construction. It were possible, no doubt, to find Greek terms which ought to be translated, 'like as a horse untethered bounds proudly prancing over the plain'; but the line from Xenophon (§ 89) does not furnish them, but common words that should be Englished: 'like a horse unbridled bounding freshly across the field and kicking up his heels.' In another place (§ 76) horses in a cavalry charge are spoken of as 'running' and their riders as 'falling earthward.' In § 28 'he will have spoken with feeling and from the heart' and again 'he will not excite pity or compassion,' make the reader think that *Demetrius*, writer on style though he be, is *ἀδολεσχής*, till he turn to the Greek and find out that 'and from the heart' has usurped the place of 'and expressed sorrow' and that 'pity' ought to be 'emotion.' When the translator does not work against time, he knows certainly what *ἱερὰ καὶ ὁσὰ* means, and would never translate (§ 258) *ἀνέτρεψεν . . . τὰ ἱερὰ τε τὰ ὁσὰ τε* as he does—'he turned upside down . . . things sacred, and things holy too.' In § 160 *Demetrius* says: 'And there is mirth too in

likening one thing to another thing, the cock to a Mede because he wears his turban cocked, or to a king because a king dresses in rich colours': καὶ εἰκασίαι δ' εἰσὶν εἰχάρτες, ἂν τὸν ἄλεκτρούνα Μήδω εἰκάσῃς, ὅτι τὴν κύρ-
 βασίαν ὀρθὴν φέρε· βασιλεῖ δέ, ὅτι πορφύρεός ἐστιν: the editor renders, nor gives any proof that *κυρβασία* is ever used for a cock's-comb. 'Comparisons also are full of charm—if (for instance) you compare a cock to a Persian because of its stiff-upstanding crest, or to the Persian king because of its brilliant plumage.' The somewhat quotidian expression φύσει κινδυνώδης is split in two without cause and ennobled in part in § 127: ὁ δὲ καὶ μάλιστα θαυμάσειεν ἂν τις Σαπφούς τῆς βίας, ὅτι φύσει κινδυνώδει πράγματι καὶ δυσκατορθώτῳ ἐχρήσατο ἐπιχαρίτως: 'Indeed one cannot sufficiently admire this in the divine Sappho that by sheer genius she so handles a risky and seemingly unmanageable business as to invest it with charm.' But this surely is to give with the one hand and to take back with the other. Sappho may have handled risky businesses so as to invest them with charm, but her 'more golden than gold' is not one of them. What the translator would have said, if he had had the time, would have been this or something far better:—'Indeed in the genius of Sappho there is nothing more deserving of admiration than the grace with which she handles matter so refractory in nature that failure with it is almost inevitable, and success with it hard to achieve.'

The author's characteristic turns are apt to lose their point, e.g. § 246.—'Even sounds that offend the ear are often forcible, as rough roads are forcible: δεινὸν γὰρ πολ-
 λαχοῦ καὶ τὸ δύσφθογγον, ὥσπερ αἱ ἀνώμαλοι ὁδοί: has all its pith removed when rendered:—'Yes, in many passages harshness gives all the effect of vehemence, as though we were jolted on rough roads.' § 274.—'The forcible style means sharp work and short, as when blades cross: ἡ δὲ δεινότης σφοδρόν τι βούλεται καὶ σύντομον καὶ ἐγγύθεν πλήττονσιν ἵκεν: is hardly recognizable in:—'The forcible style demands a certain vehemence and terseness, and resembles combatants dealing blows at close quarters.'

When late uses of words crop up, they are apt to give trouble, and renderings like the following will have a familiar air to those who know the editor's earlier works.—§ 195 ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα θεωρήματα ὑποκριτικά: 'Other aspects of the actor's art deserve attention.' But a more serious example occurs in § 122, where imagining that στρατηγός can mean nothing but

'military commander' he proceeds to insert a conjectural ἦ, and annuls thereby the excellent sense of the whole passage.¹

It is by hurry too that I should like to account for the frequency with which little Greek words important to the sense are ignored in the translation. Such is the αἰτῶν, last word but three in § 180. Everything turns upon it; yet it is ignored. Dionysius is speaking of the effect upon the ear of metrical feet adroitly concealed in the close sequence of the words.—'Indeed we,' (who have put them there) 'should ourselves be unable to detect their presence except by taking the sequence to pieces and analysing it.' Among other instances of this sort of omission are καὶ ἀρχὴν 39: ἐν 56: οὐδέ 110: τάχα 181: πάντων 190: πᾶσα 272:

I have said nothing yet of that side of the book, which is all-important. The *De Elocutione* is a τέχνη or methodical treatise providing rules based upon principles. The words in such a book, if it is worth anything, are chosen with care and used in an exact way. Moreover, technical terms are frequent, and if these are not rendered with knowledge, the meaning, not only of single sections, but of whole chapters may become obscure, or perhaps vanish altogether.

If the criticisms hitherto made, which concern only the untechnical parts, are well founded, then the translator is likely to prove an untrustworthy guide to rhetorical doctrine expressed in terms of art. Should anyone take me for a harsh critic here, he has but to read the translation of §§ 128—190, and ask himself what

¹ Radermacher also would mark a lacuna after *καταρθωκότα*, so I shall translate the passage as it stands; 'There is another way, however, in which little things are turned into great; and this way is not by sinning against good taste, but on occasion by calling them great because we must; as when we desire to extol a magistrate for rectifying little things as though he had rectified great, e.g. because a Spartan ephor flogged a man who had played a game of ball with un-Spartan eagerness. This as first told to us being a little thing, we descant upon it, saying that to let bad customs of a trivial sort alone is to open the way for bad customs of a more serious kind, and that we had better inflict punishment when the law is broken in trifles, and not wait till it is broken flagrantly; and we shall go on to quote the proverb ἀρχὴ δέ τοι ἦμισιν πάντός just as though it were applicable to the little error in conduct with which we deal; or we shall even assert that no error in conduct is trivial. In this way then we may have leave to give to that which is a little reform the dignity of a great reform, yet not by sinning against good taste; but just as a good purpose is often served by belittling what is great, so also may that which is little be magnified.'

he has learned thereby. Before I had read a word of the rendering, there were things even in the brightly written Introduction which made me unsanguine. Professor Rhys Roberts has translated in an earlier book a passage of Dionysius about Thucydides from which he ought to have learned for good, the meaning of *λέξις ἐξηλλαγμένη* as applied to the style of Thucydides; nevertheless in his sketch of the history of Rhetoric in a passage where accurate language is of consequence (p. 22) he translates *ἐξηλλαγμένη* by 'highly-wrought,' a meaning which this verb neither has nor can have (cp. 'Glossary,' p. 280, and Translation of § 77). Some pages further on (p. 27) in defining the place of Hermogenes in the history of Rhetoric, he misrepresents his doctrine to a serious degree. Among the seven (!) qualities or features of style, concerning which Hermogenes discourses in the work from which Professor Rhys Roberts here quotes, are *γοργότης* and *ῥθος*: and these Professor Rhys Roberts translates by 'poignancy' and 'characterisation.' What poignancy is in style I scarcely know, but *γοργότης* as explained by Hermogenes himself (W 3, 295 = Sp 2, 343) is not poignancy, but briskness of movement or spiritedness. Then in his account of what he meant by *ῥθος* Hermogenes is at particular pains to say that characterisation is just what he did not mean. The passage (W 3, 303 = Sp 2, 350) is a capital example of late Greek, expressing straightforward reasoning in straightforward and accurate language, and I give a translation of it below.¹ It leaves no doubt in my own

mind that by *ῥθος* Hermogenes meant something which may approximately be represented by 'air of good feeling.'

The degree to which men's knowledge of the analysis of Greek style as conducted by the Greeks themselves, has suffered owing to the way in which the Romans misapprehended and misapplied Greek methods, and owing to the persistence of the crude Roman tradition to the present day, is even at the present day seldom realised. The Greek language, accurate, flexible, and resourceful, because those who made it had precision and nimbleness of mind, and a turn for search, furnished Greek students of Greek literature with natural and exact terms, whereby to express their shrewd guesses respecting the causes of literary effect or respecting the origin of sundry distinctions in style. But of course these terms were meant to be significant and informing to Greeks alone. The conceptions expressed by them had in every case been formed by somebody who looked at things as a Greek could not but look at them. Thus it is the spoken word, not the written word, which is in the mind of a Greek when he speaks of Homer or of Sophocles or of Demosthenes as a master of effect. To a Greek the passion which excites him as he listens to the Iliad is Homer's passion; the natural sentiment that wins him when he hears the Odyssey is Homer's own. 'The orator,' likewise for any triumphant portrayal of motive in an adversary or in a client receives from his

the art of speaking for a living, or be such as are in particular designated *ἡθικοί*, the glutton, for example, the coward, the miser, or the like. Yes, and we shall see when we discuss the perfect orator (viz. in W. 356 ff. = Sp. 390 ff.) which features (in the spoken word) are appropriate to this person, and which to that. But the other kind, that meant here, may be employed either alone or in its varieties throughout anything you may say at any time, just as reverence of tone, or severity of tone, or any of the other features may be employed; and it may be employed too after the same manner as are they, and in any several passage may be used with advantage, as may be found to be the case frequently in Demosthenes. My meaning will no doubt become clearer when you study what I say of him.

Now *ῥθος* in speech is the product of reasonableness and of simpleness, and furthermore of the impression given respecting either that it is real and represents the mood of the moment (is intuitive). The aggrieved tone falls under speech affected by *ῥθος*, does not however constitute it, as do simpleness, and reasonableness, and the note of truth and the air of intuition; no, nor can the aggrieved tone be studied in itself, as can each of the features heretofore discussed, but simpleness or reasonableness, or some other of the things connected with *ῥθος*, must in every case accompany it in a greater measure or in a less.

¹ The manner in which speech is made clear and stately, and further, is invested with beauty too and with spiritedness, has been explained in what precedes; and thereupon should follow as of course our account of *ῥθος*. It is of no ordinary concern that on the one hand you should be told how this feature too of the spoken word, that, namely into which *ῥθος* enters, is produced, and that on the other hand being able yourself to produce it, you should either, if occasion there be, impart this kind of *ῥθος* to the spoken word from first to last, or again should combine it with any or all of the features already described, with violence of tone, for example, or with reverence of tone, or with beauty, etc.; for by *ῥθος* here I mean not merely that only which cannot but declare its presence in the spoken word from first to last, just as the colour of a substance cannot but declare itself in that substance; but I mean further that which by its nature is fitted to combine with any other feature whatsoever, with violence of tone, and with severity of tone, and with the other features one and all. The former kind will arise as often as the words which you assign to the persons whom you may represent, belong to them and suit them, be they magistrates, for example, or men who practise

countrymen credit full and direct. The passions and the sentiments whereby the one person or the other is made to live and move, are spoken of by Greek critics as belonging to the orator from whose creating mind they have emerged. Shift the point of view to that with which some other race is familiar, and the terminology may become at once far-fetched and unnatural, and the men who use it look foolish or affected. Now this, or something like this, did take place when Rome borrowed from Greece her complete system of literary criticism and her complex grammatical and rhetorical terminology; and when the next step was taken, when Rome passed on both the system of criticism and its terminology to Spaniards and Gauls and Britons, the whole art and its methods were changed in nature.

This artificial Latin tradition begotten of Roman insensibility and Roman precipitancy in appropriating, this system in which natural Greek ideas are often turned askew, and expressive Greek terms are often changed to mere tickets, is always the prime obstacle in the path of him who would understand and appraise the methods of Greek Rhetoric: He has to rid himself of so many prejudices and ingrained prepossessions, and has to unlearn so many misnomers and misstatements. But as Demetrius says:—*ταῦτα μὲν δὴ παρατεχνολογείσθω (παρατεχνολογήσθω?) ἄλλως*. These things mean much in themselves, and have a direct bearing upon this version of the *De Elocutione*; but all that they need be held to mean here is that the use by Hermogenes of the term *ἦθος* to designate the subtle and elastic element in the spoken word which issuing from the speaker's self determines the manner in which his hearers shall hear, is a use natural in itself and in no sense contradictory to the other and commoner use, if only the term be regarded in each case from the stand-point of the Greeks themselves.

With any purification of Greek literary criticism from Latin influence, any attempt to study it as a thing entirely Greek, Greek in origin, Greek in development, Professor Rhys Roberts has, I should say, little sympathy. He would seem to be a convinced Romanist and to prefer the 'hit-or-miss' renderings of Tully or of Fabius to the veritable meaning of the technical terms employed by the Greeks: and here of course

ὡσπερ ἡ ποίησις διαιρεῖται τοῖς μέτροις ὅσον ἡμιμέτροις ἢ εξαμέτροις ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἐρμησίαν τὴν λογικὴν διαιρεῖ καὶ διακρίνει τὰ καλούμενα

he is in excellent company. Yet it may be that this attitude, like other things in which I believe him to be mistaken, is after all but the outcome of haste. It takes time and patience to ponder and brood over technical terms, and to find, if find one can, simple English equivalents for them. Nevertheless I am surprised that he has not made more use of a solid and informing, if a dull and unattractive book, by one who also was a Romanist, Ernesti's *Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae*, which would have saved both version and 'glossary' from some disfigurements. Take for example the word *χρεία* occurring in § 170; for nothing can better serve than this seemingly simple term to show how wary the translator of a *τέχνη* must be. Demetrius there says: *τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα γελοῖα χρείας λαμβάνει τάξιν καὶ γνώμης*; and this is translated thus: 'Such jests in fact play the part of maxims and admonitions.' Now every pupil in the lecture-room of Demetrius had in his day written and recited many exercises of the kind called *χρεῖαι* and many of the kind called *γνώμαι*. A reference is given in 'Ernesti,' which if followed up would have kept a translator straight, even if he had not read largely in Hermogenes. What Demetrius does say is this: 'Are of the same order as instructive acts or sayings by well-known men and as maxims from the poets.' In the 'glossary' there is vouchsafed strange matter. '*χρεία*. 170. *Maxim*. Lat. *Præceptum*. Possibly the treatment of *χρεῖαι* which we find in Hermogenes originated, together with other *προγυμνάσματα*, among the rhetoricians of Pergamus. Between them, *χρεία* and *γνώμη* seem to cover the whole ground of sententious philosophy: 'wise saws and modern instances.' Cp. Quint. i. 9 3-6, and see s.v. *γνώμη*, p. 272 supra.' Here again it is manifest that the editor in his haste has not read the authors whom he quotes—he simply could not so write, if he had read them or any other of the authors who tell us what *χρεῖαι* were—and the talk about the Pergamene School is surely *πρὸς οὐδέε*.

This mote moving on the surface shows how the current goes. The brisk and humorous lecturer, who knows his own mind and can make others know it, is changed into a clumsy and somewhat prosy writer treating of things which he does not wholly comprehend.

As verse is articulated by measures (such as the hemistich, the hexameter, and the like), so also is prose articulated and differentiated by what are called

κῶλα, καθάπερ ἀναπαύοντα τὸν λέγοντά τε καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα αὐτά, καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ὅροις ὀρίζοντα τὸν λόγον, ἐπεὶ τοὶ μακρὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀπειρος καὶ ἀτεχνῶς πνίγων τὸν λέγοντα.

These are the words with which Demetrius begins,¹ and his interpreter begins. But in the Greek there is nothing at all about differentiation, διακρίνειν having the same sense here as it has in § 180, namely, 'to break up' or 'sunder, part from part,' although in a note to that passage the editor repeats that it means 'differentiate' in this. But from what is it 'differentiated'? Not from poetry, as the shape of the sentence clearly shows. 'Just as . . . so also.' In the sections next following the translator by rendering διάνοια more than once in accord with the distorting Romanist tradition by 'sentence' imports into the treatise another conception alien from the mind of Demetrius, e.g. 'Accordingly, as I maintain, a member must be understood to comprise a thought, which either is a complete sentence, or forms an integral part of one. But what Demetrius really says is this: 'I aver therefore that in all circumstances, in every case, the member shall contain a thought either complete in itself, or a part complete in itself of such a thought.'

This process, this endosmosis, if I may so call it, whereby ideas foreign to Demetrius are gradually transfused into the reader's brain, continues without intermission, and creates in the long run, an odd sense of mystification and of insecurity. Nobody but fails at times to catch another's meaning, but haste, I believe, is the cause of downright misrenderings such as are the following:—p. 74, 1-6: 76, 21-23: 106, 2: 118, 7: 160, 15-16: 162, 2-4: 168, 21: 176, 10-14: 192, 29: 194, 4-7: 198, 8: ib. 14. They contribute to the mystification and the sense of insecurity, but they are not the principal cause of either. That, as I have said before, is misapprehension, due itself also to haste, of the technical terms, which in a τέχνη cannot well be avoided, and in any version of a τέχνη ought to be

'members.' These members give rest, one might say, to the speaker and his discourse; they set bounds to its various parts, since it would otherwise extend itself without limit and would simply run the speaker out of breath.

rendered with the most minute and deliberate exactness.

Perhaps no part of the translation is quite so bewildering as that relating to the 'light style' (ὁ γλαφυρὸς λόγος). It is here that the Romanist predilections of Professor Rhys Roberts lead him furthest astray from the purpose and meaning of Demetrius. Following tradition, he renders the cardinal term γλαφυρὸς by 'smooth,' and then all the subordinate terminology goes wrong. There is one passage from which he might have learned for certain that 'smooth' does not render γλαφυρὸς, at least in Demetrius, namely, § 183; but this contains technical terms unfamiliar to him, and is so rendered that it does not represent in any sense what Demetrius says. But though more frequent in this section, the enigmas are not confined to it. If the translator had known anything of the class of elementary exercises in rhetoric to which Demetrius alludes with some humour in § 201, he would have understood the term πλαγίῳττες better in § 198, and would not have translated the following ἐξ εὐθείας exactly as he has done. From another order of exercises for boys attending rhetorical schools he would also have learned the correct signification of ἦθος in § 28.

It has puzzled me why one of the most interesting and informing terms in the whole book, τὸ καλούμενον ἐσχηματισμένον ἐν λόγῳ, i.e. 'what is termed an attitude struck in speech' or 'a pose in speech' (an effect in language corresponding to some movement of the body or some expressive look) is translated by 'covert allusion' and is not thought deserving of a place in the 'glossary.' To Demetrius, who is interested and particularly interesting in this part of his theme, it is part of the πλάσμα λόγου (§§ 296, 298). He begins his discussion of it in § 287.—'What is termed an attitude struck in speech takes an absurd form in the practice of the present day in which it is coupled with a use of words surcharged with meaning of a vulgar and suggestive kind; whereas any real pose of language is meaning so expressed that these two things go with it, decorum and avoidance of risk,' and ends it thus, § 298:—'Respecting the form given to things by language and the sundry poses which speech assumes, this must suffice.'

¹ 'Just as the continuity of poetry is broken by its metres, e.g. < > meters or hexameters, etc., so also in the expression of thought in prose, the κῶλα or members, as they are called, break and sever the continuity, giving thereby rest, it may be said, to the meaning itself no less than to him who expresses the meaning, determining too, it may be said, the spoken word at many determinate points, when it would indeed be long and indeterminate, and would strangle outright him who spoke it.' What is meant by μακρὸς and by ἀπειρος is brought out after the manner of Demetrius in §§ 47 and 202.

It would make a long list if I were to register by the page and the line the cases in which the translator seems to me to have perverted the signification of technical terms. In one place he may hit on the right rendering and, when the word recurs, may forget it and hit on the wrong. In § 45, for instance, he gives what is at least the Romanist equivalent for *παραγωγή*, but in § 202 he gives the most perverse meaning to the same word, although, as it happens, Demetrius uses it in both places in a comment upon the same sentence from Thucydides. *Ἀλληγορία* is usually rendered simply, but in § 151 for some reason or another it is given the preposterous sense of 'veiled meaning.' In §§ 25, 26, 29 *παρόμοιος* is misrendered 'symmetrical' but in § 247 where the meaning is identical it is again inadequately turned by 'parallelisms of words.'

If only I knew how to handle τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον ἐν λόγῳ, I might have discovered five words like Plato's οὐ, ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ γὰρ ἦσαν, in which, if Demetrius is right, Plato packed with such decorum a whole critical review of the character of Aristippus and Cleombrotus, that he incurred no risk in affronting the school of Aristippus. As it is, I have spoken my mind in perfect frankness, knowing withal that though this work has shortcomings—grave shortcomings they appear to me—nevertheless the fact that it exists at all is by itself a proof of very unusual devotion to learning in him who has written it. If Professor Rhys Roberts were an ordinary man, he would never have made the time in which to write the very considerable books that he has published in quick succession in the course of a few years. It is one thing to write in leisure, and wholly another to write amid the infinite distractions of an absorbing professional life in which few tranquil hours can be obtained except when other men sleep. Although aware of all this, I have spoken notwithstanding in open sincerity everything that I think, and I am confident that this will not offend for long, if it offend at all, a fellow craftsman; for he will understand that this sincerity is one way of abetting the very aims in scholarship which he himself pursues earnestly.

I may append one or two conjectures—§. 48 καὶ ὁ Θουκυδίδης δὲ πανταχοῦ σχεδὸν φεῖγεται τὸ λέειν καὶ ὁμαλὲς τῆς συνθέσεως, καὶ αἰεὶ μᾶλλον τι προσκρούοντι ἔοικεν ὥσπερ οἱ τὰς τραχείας ὁδοὺς πορευόμενοι, <οἶον>, ἐπὶ ἀν λέγει—the omission being due to haplography

of οὐαῖ when οἶον was written in abbreviation. §. 68 δὲ οὐτε ἡχώδη ποιεῖν τὴν σύνθεσιν, ἀτέχνως αὐτὰ (i.e. τὰ φωνηέντα) συμπληρῶντα καὶ ὡς ἐτυχε διασπασμῷ γὰρ τὸ λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ διαρρήξει ἔοικεν οὐτε μὴ παντελῶς φυλάσσεσθαι τὴν συνέχειαν (leg. συνηχίαν) τῶν γραμμάτων. 'For your part you ought not so to order your words that they jar on the ear, as will be the case if you let the vowels clash in a bungling manner and for no reason—That is to speak in such a way that the words are violently sundered and flung apart.—On the other hand you should not avoid entirely the chime of the letters (the vowels).' Cp. § 73 ποικιλία ἐκ τῆς πολυηχίας. The converse error προσήχεις for προσεχέεις is found in the MSS. of Plut., Alex. 17. § 80 οἶον εἰ τις τῷ τότε τῷ Πύθωνι τῷ ῥήτορι ῥέοντι καθ' ἑμῶν προσθεῖς εἶποι <ὥσπερ>, ὥσπερ ῥέοντι καθ' ἑμῶν. §. 93 δεαδεχόμενοι ὀνόματι, οἶον. Read διαδεχόμενοι [ὀνόματι], οἶον. The ὀνόματι written οἶον is due to dittography with οἶον written of. § 94 By the insertion of ὁ the difficulties of this passage disappear. ἔοικεν γοῦν <ὁ> ὀνοματουργῶν τοῖς πρώτοις θεμένοις τὰ ὀνόματα. The whole will then mean 'They (i.e., words new-made) are particularly impressive because they are in a manner like to sound and are particularly impressive too by virtue of their novelty. They are not the utterance of existing words, but of words coming into being at the time they are used; and the creation withal of a new word looks like a triumph of invention, equal to the creation of language itself. At any rate the coiner of words may be compared with those who first gave names to things.' § 96. I am not sure that we should not read σκυθίζειν τις δόξει <χρῶμενος> μεταξὺ Ἑλληνικοῖς ὀνόμασιν. § 101. σκότῳ is a mere guess of Victorius and could not well have given rise to the αὐτῷ of the MS. I would suggest ὥσπερ ἐν <ὀνείρ> αὐτὶ καὶ νυκτὶ and in the next line τῷ <ὀνείρ> αὐτὶ καὶ νυκτὶ. ΩCΠEPENONEIPA TI The reader's eye ran from the EP to the EIP and he wrote ὥσπερατι, afterwards corrected by someone to ὥσπερ ἐν αὐτῷ. § 249. Does not the MS. plainly suggest ἄνθρωπος ὀδυνήσει σε for the second place? In this case ὀδυνήσει σ' ἄνθρωπος should be written in the first. § 260 τοῦ ὀπλίτου δραμόντος: the active aorist will not translate unless in this race there were but one runner; but can Demetrius have written a form like δραμόντος?

§ 285. To read ἐπεὶ . . . ἀπολλύεν is easier than to read ἐπὶ <τοῦ> . . . ἀπολλύεν.

§ 256. It is difficult to see how an intel-

ligible and simple word like Radermacher's otherwise excellent suggestion of προστεχνησόμεθα could have been replaced by προστοχασόμεθα. Perhaps Demetrius, who is fond of proverbs, plays here upon the proverb πρὸς μυρρίνην ἄδεν explained in Hesychius thus:—'Αἰδεῖν πρὸς μυρρίνην ἔθος ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον ἄσαι δάφνης κλῶνα ἢ μυρρίνης λαβόντα πρὸς αὐτὴν ἄδεν. In a passage upon the theme κακοφωνία δεινότητα ποιεῖ, which is supported by the line:—

Τρῶες δ' ἐρρίγησαν ὅπως ἴδον αἰόλον ὄφιν,

there is some appropriateness in the oddity, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τύχην ἀσόμεθα τὰ ἄμωια: 'We shall sing to hazard the other things like in kind (i.e., we shall allow words to

come in any order, however much they jar on the ear), saying πάντα ἔγραψεν ἂν for πάντ' ἂν ἔγραψεν and παρεγένετο οὐχί for οὐ παρεγένετο.' § 291. I would suggest as the easiest way out of the difficulty, and as providing just the sense required:—πολλαχῇ μέντοι καὶ ἔπα<νοὶ ἔπα>μφοτερίζουσιν' οἷς εὐκείναι εἰ τις ἐθέλοι καὶ ψόγους, ἢ καὶ ἀψόγους εἶναι θέλοι τις κτέ.: in many cases even praise is equivocal; whereto if you would have even censure to be like, nay, would have it to be unlike itself, etc.

One thing more, in the shape of a comment. The οἰκτρὸν ὄνομα referred to in the last sentence of § 57 is no doubt κινέρεσθαι.

W. G. RUTHERFORD.

MONUMENTA PALAEOGRAPHICA.

Monumenta Palaeographica: Denkmäler der Schreibkunst des Mittelalters. Herausgegeben von Dr. ANTON CHROUST. Lieferungen v.-viii. (München, Verlagsanstalt F. Bruckmann, A-G, 1901-1902). Each 20 M.

THE publication during the past year of parts 5-8 of Dr. Chroust's great work (see *C.R.*, vol. xv., p. 373 ff) completes the first volume of the first series, which is designed to deal with Latin and German palaeography of the Middle Ages. Hitherto the MSS. represented have been almost entirely Latin, and consequently have an interest for palaeographers in general, and not merely for those who are concerned with German handwritings; and it may be said at once that, within its own limits, this work fills, and fills adequately, a place of definite usefulness. It does not compete with the Palaeographical Society (now in course of resuscitation) in trying to represent the general history of writing in western Europe, or in the study of the art of illumination; but it confines itself to a special department of that history—a department hitherto comparatively neglected—and is consequently able to illustrate it with greater thoroughness and completeness.

The department in question is that of Latin writing in Germany, and especially in the region of which Regensburg, Salzburg, and Würzburg are the principal centres. The four first parts dealt mainly with MSS. written at the first-named place; part 5 is

drawn almost wholly from Würzburg; parts 7 and 8 entirely from Salzburg; while part 6 is more widely distributed. By having recourse to the registers of the great monasteries in these towns, Dr. Chroust is able to lay before us a long series of approximately dated hands from each of these centres, and so to provide the materials for a study of local schools of handwriting. Monastic and episcopal registers in all countries provide a rich field of materials for such studies, enabling us to observe both the contemporaneousness of dissimilar, and the long continuance of similar, hands—a study admirably well calculated to promote diffidence in assigning precise dates to MSS. on their handwriting alone.

Part 5 begins with a series of exceptionally interesting MSS.: the unique MS. of Priscillian, written probably in North Italy, in two fine uncial hands of the sixth century, now in the University library of Würzburg, where it was discovered and edited by Schepss; another Italian uncial MS., containing Jerome's commentary on Ecclesiastes, of special interest to us as having been at Worcester about A.D. 700, although it had moved on to Würzburg before 900 (a good illustration of the freedom with which MSS. travelled in the early Middle Ages); it is written in several hands, apparently Italian, one of which is compared by Dr. Chroust to the well-known Bobbio MS. (k) of the old Latin Gospels, though the resemblance is not really very close; and the Würzburg palimpsest fragments of the Old Latin Penta-

teuch and Prophets, a sixth century uncial, perhaps written at Bobbio, underlying a Merovingian minuscule of the eighth century. These uncials are followed by some examples of Caroline minuscules; a MS. of Bede, *De temporum ratione*, which Dr. Chroust thinks to have been written in north France from an English archetype in or about 800; the Canons of Dionysius, apparently of the ninth century, and perhaps written at Würzburg or Fulda, in a hand in which the Caroline style has not wholly superseded the earlier elements; a copy of the Books of Chronicles, written for Bishop Hunbert (832–842), and an Aldhelm *de laudibus virginis* written for his successor, Bishop Gozbold (842–855), both produced at one or other of these same places. The special characteristic of this part, therefore, apart from the early uncials contained in it, is its ample illustration of the hands of Würzburg and its neighbourhood in the course of the ninth century.

The sixth part likewise opens with two very interesting manuscripts. The first is the copy of the Old Latin Gospels known as *g*, formerly at Freising but now at Munich, written in north Italy in the seventh century, in a thick uncial hand. It shows an amount of colour and ornamentation unusual in so early a volume. The other is the Evangelium of Burckhard, now at Würzburg, written in a hand which distinctly recalls the Codex Amiatinus. Its birthplace is a matter of doubt. It contains lections for festivals of a specially Neapolitan character, which naturally recalls to Dr. Chroust's mind the similar phenomenon in the Lindisfarne Gospels, copied in Northumbria from a Neapolitan MS. In text, however, the Würzburg book belongs rather to the Kentish group (Wordsworth's O and X), with the exception of a few leaves inserted in a different hand, in which the text is closely akin to that of the Amiatinus. All this inclines Dr. Chroust to look to Northumbria for the home of his MS.; but the proof of English origin is hardly convincing. The texts of the Amiatinus and the Lindisfarne book, written though they were in Northumbria, are really Italian in origin; Northumbria was not the only place to which Abbot Hadrian brought his Neapolitan Bibles; and it is only the character of the text (since the type found in OX has Irish affinities, and is at present known only in MSS. connected with Canterbury) which at all requires us to look outside Italy itself for the origin of the Würzburg book. There is nothing English about the hands employed in it; indeed,

wherever written, the scribe of it (like the scribe of the Amiatinus itself) can hardly have been other than an Italian.

The remainder of part 6 is less interesting, consisting only of two examples of ninth century minuscules, and a number of German documents of 1427–1437. Parts 7 and 8, on the other hand, not only contain some MSS. possessing individual interest, but also are of special value as a study of a group of hands from a single locality, namely the Salzburg hands, from about 800 to 1245. They begin, it is true, with a manuscript not of German but of English origin, the Evangelium of Cutbercht, or Cuthbert, written (perhaps on the continent) by an English monk of that name in the early part of the eighth century. Within a century, however, of its production it is found at Salzburg, where Dr. Chroust thinks it may have formed a model for the scribes of the nascent local school. This, though an interesting suggestion, can hardly be taken as proved, since it is difficult to see that any traces of its influence appear in the examples of genuine local origin which follow. Six MSS. are then shown which represent the development of the Caroline minuscule at Salzburg from 798 to 874. In their rather dull and lifeless script they well indicate the character of this minuscule when it spread eastward from the lands of its origin. With the tenth century we reach the beginning of the registers of the cathedral and monasteries of Salzburg, and these provide a continuous series of dated specimens of writing from 934 to 1245, with which date part 8 comes to an end. No doubt the writing of monastic registers does not cover the whole ground of palaeography, even within their own period. The hands suitable to such records of monastic property were not ordinarily applied to the transcript of Biblical MSS., and works of theology or literature. Before we can be said to know the German hands of mediaeval times, we must have examined their Bibles, their service-books, their chronicles, and their romances. Only one book belonging to these categories is included in the Salzburg MSS. from which Dr. Chroust has hitherto drawn his examples. This is the Antiphonal of St. Peter's, of which three pages are shown in part 8; one being entirely occupied by a large miniature (a characteristic example of the Carolingian style as modified in Germany, which lagged behind both France and England in this branch of art development), while the second contains a large initial letter, with text in a bold

hand of early twelfth century type, and the third shows text of a similar type but on a smaller scale.

It will be seen, then, that plenty of material is left for the two remaining volumes of Dr. Chroust's first series, and we shall look forward with interest to their appearance. Meanwhile he has laid a good foundation by steadily working at a special department, which some students (especially those of the artistic side of palaeography) may consider comparatively uninteresting, but which nevertheless is of great import-

ance for a thorough knowledge of the subject. Dr. Chroust's descriptions of the plates continue to be very careful and complete, and the photographs themselves are good, though sometimes of a rather unpleasant yellowish tint. If the recently founded New Palaeographical Society can do with the registers of the great English monasteries and cathedrals something of the work that Dr. Chroust has done with those of Salzburg and Würzburg, it will have good reason to be satisfied.

F. G. KENYON.

SAMUELSSON'S *ADVERSARIA ON APOLLONIUS RHODIUS*.

Ad Apollonium Rhodium Adversaria, scripsit
J. SAMUELSSON. Upsala and Leipzig,
1902.

THIS interesting dissertation discusses over fifty passages in Apollonius concerning which Mr. Samuelsson declares his object to be 'rather to illustrate the received text by a fresh interpretation than to restore the true reading by emendation.' While on the one hand several passages are considered that present little or no difficulty such as i. 237, 362, iii. 1354, and iv. 1596, on the other we should have been glad to see included i. 516, 1276, iv. 289, 1203. But we must be grateful for what we have received and certainly many *loci vexati* are here discussed. In many of them we cannot get beyond an expression of opinion after all is said—the material for a decisive judgment not being at hand. I now propose to deal with most of the passages brought forward by Mr. Samuelsson (henceforward Mr. S.), and use the numeration adopted by him which is that of Merkel's ed. min.—the Teubner text.

i. 8 *δηρὸν δ' οὐ μετέπειτα τέρην κατὰ βάξιν ἴησαν* κ.τ.λ. Mr. S. here keeps *τερην* of the codd. (*τοίγην* is in the margin of two inferior codd.), referring to Apollo who has been invoked in ll. 1-4. The objection to *τερην* appears to be that the ancient poets after the invocation is over do not recur to it. It can in fact be separated from the poem itself, and this consideration probably accounts for the unanimity with which *τερην* has been rejected by the commentators. Merkel's *ἐτεῖν* seems to me the best conjecture.

i. 18 *ἦν μὲν οὖν οἱ πρόσθεν ἔτι κλείουσιν ἀοιδοὶ* κ.τ.λ. Mr. S. keeps *ἔτι κλείουσιν* of

the codd., by taking *οἱ* as the dat. of the pronoun and *πρόσθεν ἔτι* together *iam antea*. This is ingenious, but that *οἱ πρόσθεν* go with *ἀοιδοὶ* is shown by l. 20 *νῦν δ' ἂν ἐγὼ* κ.τ.λ. Accordingly it is better to accept Brunck's slight correction *ἐπικλείουσιν*.

i. 383 *τοὶ δὲ παρ᾽ ἄσσαν | ᾧ κράτει βρῖσαντε μὲν ἢ στυφέλιξαν ἔρω ἢ* κ.τ.λ. Should we read *βρίσαντε μὲν* with the codd. (Guelph., however, one of the best, has *βρίσαντες μὲν*) or *βρίσαντες ἢ* with Brunck? This raises the question of the alleged use of the dual for the plural. Most critics now agree that there is no certain case of it in Homer. In later epic, however, it is distinctly found. There is also a clear case in *Hymn. Ap.* 487 *ἰστία μὲν πρῶτον κάθετον λύσαντε βοείας*. In this passage of Apollonius all editors but Merkel adopt Brunck's conjecture and Mr. S. considers it certain. It is, however, not so certain, for the dual is supported by iii. 206 *ἀλλ' ἐν ἀδελφῆτοισι κατελύσασι βοείας* where no change can easily be made (S. suggests *κατελύσασι* depending on *θέμις* in the preceding line). Merkel considers that the line last quoted is an imitation of *Hymn. Ap.* l.c., and this is probable. Upon this Mr. S. observes 'vix credi potest Apollonium ineptissimam imitationem propter verborum consonantium conformationem solam sensus ratione neglecta admisisse,' but Apollonius certainly admits this sometimes, e.g. iii. 750 *ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὐ Μήδειαν* (cf. E 407), and K. Lehrs in his *Quaestiones epicae* has noted this kind of imitation in Apollonius.

i. 671 *τῇ καὶ παρθενικαὶ πίσυρες σχεδὸν ἰδριώντο*
ἀδμήτες λευκῇ σιν ἐπιχνοόου-
σαι ἰθείρας.

In this interesting passage, which Mr. S.

discusses with much acumen, the correction of Passow *ἐπιχνοαούση* is generally received but it is far from being satisfactory, for (1) we do not expect to hear anything of the old woman's hair but of that of the maidens, (2) the words *χνοάω* and *χνοάζω* are used of the growing hair of youth except in the one line (*O. T.* 742) *χνοάζων ἄρτι λευκανθές κάρα*, and (3) the shortening of *-η* is very rare in Apollonius. But the true remedy is not easy to find and I fear we must acquiesce in *ἐπιχνοαούση* provisionally. The question is, can *λευκός* be used except of grey hair? Mr. S. quotes from Strabo *λευκοτριχύν = ξανθοτριχύν*, but the point is not what Strabo wrote but what Apollonius could have written. Is he not bound by the conventional meaning of *λευκός* when applied to hair? I think he is, and Mr. S. thinks so too, for he hazards a conjecture which he admits to be 'incertissimum incertorum.'

i. 755 τὸν δὲ μεταδρομάδην ἐπὶ Μύρσιλος ἤλασεν ἵππους. I confess I do not see much difficulty here, nor any need to read τὸν δὲ μετὰ (not μέτα as given, for the δὲ prevents anastrophe) with Mr. S. The line refers evidently to E 80 and the metre shows that τὸν cannot be governed by ἐπὶ, but why should not ἐπήλασεν here take a double accusative?

i. 788 ἐνθα μιν Ἰφινόη κλισμῷ ἐνὶ παμφανόοντι | ἐσσημένως καλῆς διὰ παστᾶδος εἶσεν ἄγωνα | ἀντία δεσποίνης. All modern editors have accepted Rutgers' *δια παστᾶδος* from Et. Magn. s.v. *παστᾶς* for the meaningless δι' ἀναστᾶδος. On the word *παστᾶς* = corridor or portico supported by columns, see Jebb's appendix on *Antig.* 1207. To this Mr. S. objects 'illius pulchrae *παστᾶδος* subita inductio molesta et quae cum ceterae orationis serie parum constet videtur' and suggests a *vox nihili* *διανασταδόν*, but I do not see the force of his objection.

i. 888 νίσσο, καί σε θεοὶ σὺν ἀπηρέσειν αἰτῆς ἐταίροις κ.τ.λ. Here Mr. S. with Wellauer keeps the reading of the codd. *ἀπήμοσιν*, a word quite unobjectionable. The reason why *ἀπηρέσειν* of Brunck, Beck, and Merkel is preferable is because Et. Magn. s.v. *ἀπηρέης* quotes this line to illustrate the use of the word.

i. 1187 αὐτὰρ ὁ δαίνυσθαι ἐταίροις εὖ ἐπιτεῖλας (Laur.), . . . ἐτάροιςιν εὖ . . . (Guelph.), others ἐταίροις οἷς εὖ or ἐταίροις εὖ οἷς. No good emendation of this corrupt line has yet been made. Mr. S. proposes αὐτὰρ ὁ εὖ δαίνυσθαι οἷς ἐταίροις ἐπιτεῖλας which is better than most.

ii. 111 οὐτα Βιαντάδαο κατὰ λαπάρην

Ταλαοῖο. The slight confusion of construction seems to be due not so much, as Mr. S. takes it, to the double construction of οὐτάω (οὐτημι) as to the Homeric line καὶ βάλεν Ἀτρεΐδαο κατ' ἀσπίδα πάντοσ' ἔισην.

ii. 207. αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσι μάλα μόλις ἐξ ὑπάτοις στήθεος ἀμπνεύσας. Three pages are given to the word ὑπατος and Mr. S. cannot resist the conclusion that here and in iii. 1212 *κευθμών ἐξ ὑπάτων* the word = *lowest*, whereas according to Greek of the time it should mean *highest*. We must leave it so. In two other passages (iv. 282 and 506) he is successful in showing that ὑπατος does not mean *last* but *furthest* to the north. See Prof. Jebb on *Antig.* 1331.

ii. 328 οἰωνῷ δὴ πρόσθε πελειᾷδι περιήσασθαι

νῆος ἅπο προμεθέντες ἐφίεμεν.

The construction here is very harsh, ἐφίεμεν (infin. for imper.) governing περιήσασθαι *tradite conatum columbae*, and the weight of MS. authority is for *περιήσασθε*. Moreover the dat. οἰωνῷ goes better with *περιήσασθαι* than with ἐφίεμεν. Mr. S. therefore suggests *προμεθέντας ἐφίεμεν* (1st pers. plur.) = ἐφίεμεθα which is meritorious. The conjecture of Madvig *προμεθέντας ἐφίεμαι* is also good. In ii. 501 Mr. S. gives good reason for keeping ἀρωγῇ the reading of the best codd. Since Brunck ἀρωγῇ has been read by all editors.

In ii. 567 after ἐκέντυπον Mr. S. shows it to be very probable that two lines (573½–575½) ἄκρα δ'...λαχον should come in. This certainly gives a reference for ταίγε in 574 and greatly improves the concinnity of the whole passage, but the difficulty is how to account for the present dislocated order.

ii. 767 ὅσσα τε Κύζικον ἀμφὶ Δολιχίην ἐτέλεσαν. Mr. S. takes Κύζικον to refer to the king (as Schol. does) and not to the city. This is plausible but by no means certain as the following line refers to places and Κύζικον as the name of the city has already appeared (i. 1076), which is quite enough warrant for its appearance here.

ii. 830 ὀρέξατο δ' αἰψ' Ὀλοοῖο | Πηλεὺς αἰγανὴ φύγαδ' εἰς ἔλος ὕρμηθέντος | καπρίον. Mr. S. here agrees with me in reading φύγαδ' with Guelph. instead of φρυγᾶδ' with all other codd. and all modern editors. There can be little doubt about it. Merkel's emendation αἰγανὴν for αἰγανέρην is also necessary.

ii. 923 καί ρ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὺς ἔδυνε μέλαν ζόφον. 'Sic codices et veteres editores,' says Mr. S., but one Vatican cod. has μέγαν which has been adopted by Merkel who

compares μέγας αἰθήρ, μέγας βυθός. This seems the best thing to be done. Prof. Bywater has suggested ἔδω μέλανα ζόφον. Mr. S.'s own proposal is μελάνζοφον from Et. Magn. But the word is an adjective.

ii. 1241 ἦ δ' αἰδοῖ χώρῳ τε καὶ ἦθεα κείνα λιποῦσα | Ὀκεανὶς Φυλὴρῃ εἰς οὐρεα μακρὰ Πελασγῶν | ἐνθ', ἵνα δὴ Χείρων...τέκεν. In 1243 most editors read ἦλθ' which has only very weak MS. authority, Laur. and Guelph. both having ἐνθ', and Mr. S. rightly questions it, for how can we account for ἐνθ' if ἦλθ' is right? I have myself in the Oxford text taken ἦλθ', but am now disposed to keep ἐνθ' with Merkel's larger edition, and suppose an ellipse of a verb of going which is not difficult. Mr. S. suggests ἦθε' ἵκανε for ἦθεα κείνα which labours under the fatal objection that Apollonius does not, any more than Homer, allow trochaic caesura of the fourth foot except under certain very strict conditions.

On iii. 160 foll. Mr. S. refers to my note on this passage in *Class. Rev.* xiv. 164, but the difficulty I find is not in the text of 163 which Mr. S. discusses, but in the sense generally of 161 and 162. On this Mr. S. does not give any opinion, nor has any solution appeared in the *Cl. Rev.*

iii. 466 ἦ μὲν ὁ φέλλεν ἀκίρως ἐξαλείσθαι. The difficulty of course is that the form of wish refers to past time, whereas in fact the contest has not yet taken place. Most translators, as far I know, give *utinam saluus evadat* which is impossible. Mr. S. is right in translating *utinam saluus evasisset*. Medea means 'would that it were over and that he had already escaped safe and sound.' She refers rhetorically to the event as if it were already past.

iii. 497 τετράγωνον δ' ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἐφίετο νεῶν ἀρόσσαι. It is rather tempting to read ἐπὶ as Mr. S. proposes, but I think ἐπὶ can mean almost the same thing lit. *on the terms of them*, i.e. having them or *with them*.

iii. 641 ἔμπα γε μὴν θεμένη κύνειον κέαρ, οὐκέρ' ἄνευθεν | αὐτοκασιγνήτης περήσομαι, εἰ κέ μ' ἀέθλω | χραισμεῖν ἀντίσθην. Here Mr. S. is clearly right in taking θεμένη κ. κ. as *assumpta impudentia*, but he can hardly be right in taking οὐκέρ' ἄνευθεν as equivalent to οὐκέρ' ἄνευθεν οὔσα *non iam sola, remota*. It seems to me better to consider that αὐτοκασιγνήτης goes both with ἄνευθεν and with περήσομαι, 'I will no longer keep away from my sister but will make trial of her to see whether,' etc. Prof. Robinson Ellis, I know, also translates in this way.

iii. 740 τὴν δέ μιν αἰθὺς | αἰδώς τε στυγερὸν τε δῖος λάβε μινωθεῖσαν. The text is highly

suspicious, but, as no satisfactory emendation has been made, most editors keep it. Mr. S. defends the text by quoting iv. 1314 αὐτὸν δέ μιν ἀμφαδὸν οἶον | . . . ἀνυζόμενον προσείπον, but μιν αὐτὸν is Homeric, and in iv. 1407 he would read τὰς δέ σφε παραγορέσκε λιτήν for τὰς δέ σφε π. λ., but this is only to support a doubtful reading by a still more doubtful conjecture.

iii. 774 πρὶν τόνγ' εἰσιδέειν, πρὶν Ἀχαιῶδα γαῖαν ἰκέσθαι | Χαλκίωπης νῆας. The sense required seems to be *præusquam in Graeciam abirent* and van Herwerden has conjectured ἰεσθαι, which is impossible, as the initial *i* is always long in Epic. Mr. S. however, would keep ἰκέσθαι suggesting that Medea at the moment imagines in her distraught condition that the sons of her sister Chalciope have actually reached Greece and returned. He supports this by the words of Aetes to the Argonauts (l. 375) αὐτίχ' ὁμαρτήσαντες ἀφ' Ἑλλάδος where ὁμαρτ. = *accompanying* not *starting*, and especially by 775 Χαλκίωπης νῆας τοὺς μὲν θεὸς ἦ τις Ἑρμῆς | ἄμμι πολυκλαῖτους δεῖρ' ἤγαγε κείθεν ἀνίας. All this is most ingenious and gets over a great difficulty. Perhaps it is also right.

In iii. 891 for μὴ ἵμεν of the codd. which is hardly translatable and for which Merkel reads μῆνιμ'. Mr. S. proposes ἔμμεναι—a good conjecture, but not convincing.

iii. 1137 ἐδεύετο δ' ἡματος ὄρη, | ἄψ οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι ἐν μετὰ μητέρα κούρη. For the difficult ἐδεύετο Mr. S. proposes ἐδύετο. I still think, however, (see *Cl. Rev.* iv. 117 and vi. 394) that ἐδεύετο can stand, 'the time of day (or the day) was failing for her to return,' i.e. the day was falling short to allow her sufficient time to return, ἐνλείπετο ἢ τῆς ἡμέρας καιρὸς is the second explanation of Schol. Merkel (proleg. cxxxiv.) discusses the passage at length but without any satisfactory conclusion.

iii. 1333 εἶπετο δ' αὐτὸς | λαῖον ἐπὶ στιβαρῷ πῖεσας ποδί. Here Laur. has λαῖον *supra*scr. γρ. βαθμὸν and Guelph. has λαῖον. The vulgate has βαθμὸν. Editors since Wellauer read λαῖον, *cutter aratri*. Mr. S. rightly objects (1) there is no evidence that λαῖον, = *cutter* but only δρέπανον, (2) that the *cutter* would not be the part of the plough to be pressed by the foot. The first objection is much more weighty than the second. Mr. S. very well suggests λαῖω, in which case we must also read στιβαρῶς. He thinks βαθμὸν may have displaced the true reading in order to provide an object for ἐπιπίεσας. In any case we may compare Ov. Tr. iii. 10. 68, *nec quisquam presso vomere sulcat humum*.

In iii. 1352 it seems, as Mr. S. says, that we ought to read *βεί* for *βέε*. If *βέε* is kept the reference must be to Jason, not to the boar.

In iii. 1383 *ῥῶων* is probably wrong as it spoils the graduation of the passage. We should expect *γνίων*, *γούνων*, or *κώλων*, but it is not easy to account for *ῥῶων*.

iv. 415 foll. In this difficult passage I agree with Mr. S. that *εἰ κέν πως* κ.τ.λ. (417) go with what precedes not with what follows, but I do not take it as a *sententia subsequitiva* as Mr. S. does, but as the protasis to 415, the words *σὺ δέ μιν φαιδροῖς ἀγαπάζεις* in 416 being parenthetical. The general sense is, 'I will persuade him to come into your hands (do you receive him kindly) if only I can persuade the heralds to go away and send him (Absyrtus) to meet me alone. Then, if you like (I have no objection), kill him and fight the Colchians.' Mr. S. apparently takes the sense to be, 'Do you receive him kindly in the hope that I may persuade the heralds,' etc. I do not see any meaning in this.

iv. 501 *ῥηιδίη δέ κεν ἄμμι κεδασθέντων δίχα λαῶν*, | *ἥδ' εἴη μετέπειτα κατερχομένοισι κέλευθος*. Mr. S. approves of my interpretation which is indeed that of the old editors, *facilis autem nobis, dispersis populis, illis haec erit postea reversuris via*. Merkel, not seeing that there is no opposition between *μετέπειτα* and *ἥδη νῦν* in 495 makes for himself great difficulties by reading *ἥτ' εἴη*.

In iv. 785 Mr. S. discusses the expression *πυρὸς θέλλαι* as referring to the Symplegades as 'aestum fervoremque rupium colliden-

tium.' 'I have adopted Merkel's *πάρος... θέλλαι*. But, as Mr. S. points out, there are other difficulties in the passage such as *πλαγκτὰς* for the Symplegades (readers of the Argonautica will remember that the Argonauts pass through the Symplegades on the outward voyage and past the Planctae on the return voyage). Schneider proposes, therefore, *δι' ἀπλάστας* for *διὰ πλαγκτὰς*. Also we should expect a reference here to the Planctae as well as to Scylla and Charybdis. Is it possible that there is a lacuna somewhere about and that 784, 785 really refer to the Planctae?

iv. 1115 *αὐτὸς ἐκὼν* for *αὐτὸς ἰὼν* is a good emendation.

iv. 1197 *σὺ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκας* | *Ἀρήτης, πυκινὸν φάσθαι ἔπος Ἀλκινόοιο*. Mr. S. is thrashing a dead horse in objecting to Merkel's absurd conjecture (in his ed. min.) *Ἀλκινόονδε* which only arose from misunderstanding the sense. In his larger edition it does not appear, but it still disfigures the Teubner text, and has apparently led Dr. Leaf, in his note on Ω 338, into the mistake of quoting *Ἀλκινόονδε* from Apollonius.

In iv. 1596 Laur. has *εἴτε σε Τρίτων*, Guelph. *εἴτε σὺ γε Τρίτων*. One Paris cod. has *εἴτε σε γε Τρίτων* which Merkel has rightly taken in his larger edition and I have also adopted it. In his ed. min. Merkel reads *εἴτ' οὖν σε Τρίτων* which is the not very happy conjecture of Köchly. Mr. S. takes up two pages in defending *γε* against Köchly—surely an unnecessary labour.

R. C. SEATON.

HERWERDEN'S SUPPLEMENTARY GREEK LEXICON.

Lexicon Graecum Suppletorium et Dialecticum, composuit HENRICUS VAN HERWERDEN, Professor ord. in Academia Ultraieetina. Lugduni Batavorum apud A. W. Sijthoff, MDCCCII. 28 M.

THIS dictionary will meet a long-felt want, not only in summarizing the numerous works on Greek dialects, but still more so, as it appeals to a wider circle in recording and explaining the words found on inscriptions. The non-expert who wishes for one cause or another to refer to the inscriptions, even to such compilations as Cauer's *Delectus*, is for ever coming across difficulties which he cannot solve without a teacher, and to him this book will be a god-

send. It is in fact what it pretends to be, a supplement to the lexicons, which for all but literary Greek are nearly useless. The book is of course mainly a compilation; but there is at least one new inscription published—it (*s.v.* *Βυφραίων*), together with a number of the editor's own conjectures or suggestions: *e.g.* that *ἐπαφή* means 'demoniacal possession,' that *ἐθειροδράκοντες* be read for *χειροδράκοντες* Eur. *El.* 1345; *ἐπιθαλύπτωσι* for *ἐπιθαλάμοντι* in Hesychius; and that *γαιδάριον* (p. 937) in the Amherst Papyrus is 'an ass,' which is borne out by modern Greek. The references collected under *ὄρκος*, *φρατρία*, and other words of importance to students of antiquities will prove very useful. The alphabetical list in-

cludes not words only, but morphological elements, such as the case-endings, and grammatical categories (Infinitive and so forth).

It is a pity that no other device suggested itself for marking elements which are not words than a line over the top; this is so misleading in the case of single vowels as to suggest quantity, as on page 1, line 7. It would have been better, too, to place all words with initial digamma together under that letter in its place; at present they are to be sought under the vowel which follows the digamma. No further criticism need be added on the general plan, or indeed on the execution, which is excellent; but I add the misprints I have noted, together with a few suggestions. P. 1, line 4 read Λ for Δ . P. 4 read $\alpha\beta\sigma$ for $\alpha\beta\delta$. P. 6 under $\alpha\gamma\gamma\alpha\rho\sigma$, read 'postboat' for 'postboot.' P. 40 read $\alpha\lambda\gamma\theta\iota\omega\nu$ for $\alpha\lambda\gamma\theta\iota\omega$. P. 50 *s.v.* $\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\iota}\varsigma$, $\Gamma\rho\acute{o}\phi\omega\nu$ is probably the participle of $\gamma\rho\acute{o}\phi\omega$ (see the word). P. 53 under $\alpha\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$, $\alpha\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\gamma\epsilon$ $\pi\omega\varsigma$ should be mentioned. P. 67

s.v. $\alpha\nu\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota$, its use in *devotiones* should be added (it is mentioned on p. 76). P. 116 *s.v.* $\alpha\rho\chi\acute{\epsilon}\phi\omicron\delta\omicron\varsigma$ read 'Chief' for 'Chef.' P. 116 for $\alpha\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ read $\gamma\alpha\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$. P. 232 *s.v.* $\epsilon\gamma$ the volume of *C.I.A.* has been omitted. P. 252 last line, read 'Rome' for 'Rom.' P. 492 the *locus classicus* for the $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\beta\eta\varsigma$ currency. Prof. Ridgeway's book, is not mentioned. P. 805 *s.v.* $\tau\epsilon\lambda\alpha\mu\acute{o}\nu$ a reference to Argos may be added, *Inscr. Pelop. Ins.* i. 517. A few words we have not been able to find are: $\alpha\tilde{\epsilon}\tau\eta\mu\alpha$ Cretan for $\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta\mu\alpha$ (*Mon. Ant.* iii. 402), $\alpha\rho\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ = $\epsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ (*Od.* xiv. 446), $\alpha\iota\tau\omicron\sigma\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ with first element indeclinable (Cauer, 40. i. 124), $\beta\acute{\alpha}\tau\alpha$ $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ a Samian name (Hesych.) $\pi\iota\tau\tau\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\omega\nu$ = $\pi\iota\nu\acute{\alpha}\kappa\iota\omega\nu$ (*Bull. Corr. Hell.* xx. 58), and some verb-forms, such as $\delta\rho\acute{\omega}\rho\eta\kappa\alpha$ Herondas, $\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\eta\sigma\epsilon$ papyri and Demetrius. But some omissions are sure to occur in such a book; there seem to be very few in this.

W. H. D. ROUSE.

OERTEL ON LANGUAGE.

Lectures on the Study of Language. By HANNS OERTEL, Professor in Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Edward Arnold. 1901. Pp. xviii, 346. Price, \$3 net.

PROFESSOR OERTEL'S work is a notable contribution to scientific philology. If all her bicentennial publications reach this level, Yale may well be proud of the series. The volume before us shows not only learning and acuteness above the common; but what is perhaps rarer, sobriety in speculation and a sound historical sense. Professor Oertel has besides a gift of exposition and writes in general a pure and lucid style. Though a German born, he has but few Germanicisms such as the order of words "wrong... is therefore everything which" (p. 90), an arrangement which English writers may admire but must not imitate. Exception may also be taken to 'resurrect' and to 'preempt,' while 'normative grammar,' in the sense of 'didactic grammar,' with an adjective apparently coined on the analogy of 'formative' does not strike us as a very happy invention. Professor Oertel (p. 59) after M. Bréal rightly insists upon the mischief which metaphors, such as that in the much abused 'root,' have done to the science

of language. (The dread of this mischief or the example of Steinthal have led him into a frequent use of mathematical symbols which I fear may deter some people from reading his book, and which would be just as useful to everybody concerned if they were in the notes instead of in the text.) Metaphors, however, are a necessary means for the communication of ideas that are novel or complex. To avoid figurative language is impossible, nor indeed does Professor Oertel avoid it. Witness the following sentence, p. 152: 'There is no psychical Hades in which sensations, as such, may lead a shadow-life, like Homer's $\nu\epsilon\kappa\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ $\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\rho\eta\nu\alpha$, waiting for a sip of dark blood.' Figures are not dangerous to free thought until they are enshrined; and the true safeguard against the abuse of metaphor is its frequent and varied use.

His first lecture is an illuminating survey of the development of the ideas and methods of scientific philology up to the present day, and is one of the best things of its kind that I know. Out of a number of excellent characterisations I may single out for special mention the estimates of Wolf and Grimm. His historical sketch of the progress of phonetics will however remain incomplete until it recognises the

contributions of Alex. Bell, A. J. Ellis, and their successors in the English school.

Lecture II. deals with the classification of similar speech into dialects and languages, and the nature of inferred parent languages. In this very important chapter, after some sound observations upon the respective provinces of didactic grammar which tells us what shall be said, and of historical grammar, which tells us what has been said, Professor Oertel proceeds to investigate the concept of a dialect. In this investigation he appears to have designed not only to arrive at a result in the given case, but to furnish an example of the method of ascertaining the content of language-concepts in general. If this was its object, the economy was one of rather dubious value. An illustrative example of the methods of any science should be chosen from outside the region of its terminology. Letting this pass, it may be said that Professor Oertel's treatment is very suggestive. Its psychological colour will be obvious from a couple of quotations (p. 95):

'The knowledge which we obtain concerning speech is either subjective or objective. The knowledge which is based upon the direct acoustic sense-impressions conveyed to our brain by the speech-sounds—I term subjective. Objective knowledge of speech, on the other hand, is based on a direct examination of the stimuli producing our sensations.'

In the naïve observation which formed the concept of a dialect the objective method played no part. It was formed wholly subjectively, *i.e.*, it is based on sensations only, not on a knowledge of the stimuli which gave rise to these sensations.'

And again (p. 108):

'Subjective uniformity makes the dialect...The question whether the inhabitants of two villages, A and B, belong to the same dialectal group can only be answered on the testimony of the villagers as to whether they believe they speak alike' (p. 109).

There is a good deal here upon which it is tempting to comment, but I must forbear. Proceeding further, Professor Oertel, with the help of mathematical symbols, sets forth the relation as he conceives it of a dialect to a language, *e.g.*, Latin, and of a language to a language-family, *e.g.*, Indo-European. He arrives first at the conclusion that 'an insurmountable bar separates language-forms from dialect-forms, for the latter, being subjectively identical with the momentary utterances of a definite person are perceptual objects, while the former are abstractions, purely classificatory devices' (p. 112). Again, 'As little as we can see a bird' (meaning an embodiment of the class-name *bird*), 'just as little can we hear

a language-form.' On the second question, after a statement of the serious difficulties which beset those who would reconstruct a parent language, in which I find much to agree with, he concludes that 'the essential point for us is that we cannot speak of a primitive homogeneous parent speech' (p. 127).

Lecture III. deals with 'changes in language,' and first with 'Imitative and Analogical changes.' The author lays stress, and proper stress, on the difference between what he calls 'primary' and 'secondary' changes. 'The causes for a change can only be studied where the change is *primary*. In the case of secondary or imitative changes we must seek for *reasons for their adoption*' (the italics are mine). The importance of social influences in determining the direction and spread of imitation in language is well brought out. 'Analogy is next treated of, and both by symbols and examples. Here, as in several other parts of the book, the influence of Wundt is very noticeable.

Lecture IV. is upon Phonetic Change. Professor Oertel takes up a sceptical attitude as regards several of the causes (*i.e.* 'ultimate causes') alleged to produce phonetic change: (1) the influence of climate and environments; (2) the influence of race mixture; (3) the anatomical change of the organs of speech; (4) physiological changes in the cerebrum. In the present state of our knowledge caution is justifiable; but perhaps Professor Oertel is too cautious. Under (3) he does not apparently quote all the cases where a certain configuration of the organs is said to have modified the sounds of speech. The one best known to me is the alleged development of the Indian 'cerebrals' through the greater height of the native's palatal arch. I should be glad to see a definite statement on the point. Professor Oertel rightly, as it would appear, finds a 'principal' cause of phonetic change in the 'change of speed' of articulation. Accelerate the rate of speaking, and the balance of the elements of speech is disturbed. He protests against the view that 'ease of utterance' is the aim of such changes, or a desire to get rid of what is insignificant, that is valueless, in language. The insensible influence which children exert in changing the sounds of a language so that the 'new generation' articulates differently from the old is brought into great and justifiable prominence. In his treatment of the vexed question of the 'uniformity of phonetic law' Professor Oertel adopts a sceptical attitude.

Three of his criticisms may be quoted: 'The whole theory rests upon three fundamental errors: (1) It tries to explain linguistic facts as the product of the individual instead of regarding them as social products; (2) It sees in social intercommunication a conservative factor only, while in reality social contact and the imitations which it entails are at the bottom of all changes as well; (3) It fails to distinguish between the origin of a change and its spread.'

The length of this chapter (85 pages), whose contents I have made no attempt to exhaust, contrasts with that of the next lecture on Semantic Change, the province of the science of meaning, which consists of only 54 pages. The author, indeed, is not responsible for this disproportion; in fact we may commend him on the ground that it is no greater. All the same it is here that lies the chief weakness of the book. The author is undoubtedly well acquainted with the literature of the subject, and his accounts and estimates of the various contributions are both full and sound in the main; in particular we may note with pleasure his references to Abel's work and Heerdegen's 'epoch-making' treatise on *orare*. Professor Grote's papers in the *Journal of Philology* (vols. iv. and v.), which anticipated a good deal since published, have however (not unnaturally) escaped him, and I am certainly surprised to see no reference to K. Brugmann's monograph on the 'Concept of Totality.' I, however, doubt whether the author has fully realised the exact relations and the actual situation of this branch of our science. Professor Oertel's sole bias appears to be towards a psychological treatment of language. This is not strange in a thinker who has been so deeply influenced by Wundt. The same tendency may be noticed in the work of a colleague, to whom Professor Oertel pays a very high compliment in his preface, Professor Morris, whose psychological chapter appears to me the most valuable part of his recent book. Now I hope no one will accuse me of being one to undervalue the use of psychology to the students of language whether natural or formal. There are scholars, whom I am not going to name, for whom I should prescribe it in large doses. In particular I think it is the one thing that can bring textual criticism, radical as well as conservative, to its senses. But in this regard the proper function of psychology is to interpret the results of linguistic inquiry, not to colour or overshadow their investigation. It is a facile and tempting way of obtaining 'results' to

apply the conclusions of one science straight off to the material of another; but this cheap deduction proves very costly in the end. So, when Professor Morris (*Principles and Methods in Latin Syntax*, p. 109) speaks of the advance in the science of Semantics since 1883 as if it were something considerable, and Professor Oertel, his colleague, utters no word of dissent, I must protest that this is by no means the case. By far the largest part of the work of the science of meaning is yet to be done, for unless it differs radically from all other anthropological sciences, it must work in the same way, that is to say by the most rigorous application of the inductive method to the whole available material. Until this is done, the science of meaning will not shake off the triple reproach of being casual, superficial and arbitrary. Professor Oertel may, of course, be aware of this, but it is much to be regretted that his readers will glean no hint of it from his pages.

I will make a further criticism. It is concerned with terminology, but is for all that a matter of some importance. Professor Oertel, through ignorance or neglect (the former, as I think) of an innovation in nomenclature which I proposed several years ago, gets into difficulties when he surveys the material of Semantics, as he employs only the current appellations which were designed for popular, not scientific use. Thus he diverts the meaning of 'name' (as a substitute for 'root,' of which he does not approve) to express a definite group of sounds which is the symbol for a perceptual or imaginary thing, quality, action, or state (cf. p. 283). Now to call *run* in 'a run' 'to run' 'we run' 'a runner' (the examples are mine) a 'name' is not exactly felicitous, and 'word,' which Professor Oertel must often have recourse to, is still less appropriate. I have, therefore, recommended the term *rheme*, whose convenience a single instance will show. *Upset* is one word, one rheme; *set up* is two words, and still one rheme. Professor Oertel's three fundamental categories (1) names; (2) expressions for the attitude of the speaker; (3) expressions of 'relation' coincide with my division into *rhemes* and *epirhemes*, except that *epirhemes* are further divided into two.

I have noticed very few errors or slips. What may be called psychical ones, I here set down in order that Professor Oertel may use the material that he has himself supplied. P. 101, fifth paragraph, (c) 'variable qualities,' 'mutable qualities' was meant; p. 112, end 'exactness'; p. 157,

middle 'Latin' read 'Greek'; 'Latin' occurs three lines above. In a new edition the blocks of German which occur with so

much frequency in the notes should be translated into English.

J. P. POSTGATE.

RECENT WORKS ON THE RIGVEDA.

Vedische Mythologie, von ALFRED HILLEBRANDT. Dritter Band. Breslau, 1902. Pp. xxii + 464. 22 M.

Die Sagenstoffe des Rgveda und die indische Itihāsaträdition, von EMIL SIEG. I. Stuttgart, 1902. Pp. vi + 152. 6 M.

THESE are works of first-rate importance for the study of the Rigveda. Professor Hillebrandt completes an undertaking in which he has been engaged for twenty-five years, and gives us a general view of Vedic Mythology with naturalistic interpretations, illustrated and enforced by his unrivalled knowledge of the ritual books. Dr. Sieg, who appears before the public for the first time, does not claim to have given as yet more than the comparatively short period of ten years to his work. His position is that the Indians possessed a body of mythological material in the form of tales of the gods, of which the kernel had been handed down from the times of the Rigveda, and which at one period was embodied in a formal collection, recognised as a 'fifth Veda.' This collection has been lost, but large parts of it remain in the form of extracts or paraphrases in the Brāhmanas, the Vedic commentaries, and the epic poems. This material he proposes to collect and arrange, and finally to apply to the interpretation of the Rigveda.

Both writers are of course aware that the principles on which their work is based are very far from being undisputed. Hillebrandt recognises that he stands alone in his position as a belated adherent of theories of the 'sun-myth' type. His disclaimer of any special reverence for naturalistic theories may readily be accepted, as well as his statement that newer theories as to ghosts and wizards, tree-spirits and totems are even less successful in giving a reasoned explanation of the Vedic cults. He has also made an advance on his predecessors in recognising that we have in the Rigveda successive strata of belief, and that the writers of the hymns were in greater or less degree ignorant of the history of the gods they worshipped. But these qualifications are very far indeed from

producing any confidence in the writer's explanations. He has chosen to regard the Vedic deities as a series of puzzles, for which he provides definite solutions. Mitra is the Sun, Indra is the Sun, Soma is the Moon, Varuṇa is the Moon, Agni is the Sun or the Moon or the household fire, Vṛtra is the Winter, and so on. For these theories as a whole it may be shortly said that there is no case. The interpretations suggested are read into the text of the hymns with much ingenuity, but few if any of them could occur to a student of the Rigveda who did not begin his work with the same prepossessions as the author. The whole argument falls to the ground as soon as it is recognised that naturalistic interpretation is later in date than the Vedic poems. The Brāhmanas and the ritual books are thick with interpretations of the Vedic deities of the same type as Hillebrandt's: the very multiplicity of them makes them mutually self-destructive. In Greco-Roman philosophy we have just the same process: but it has not occurred to modern critics to interpret Homer by the aid of Stoic speculations as to the nature of the gods.

But if Hillebrandt's main positions are untenable, there is still much to be learnt by the way from his essays. If he complains that the Rigveda is uninteresting, that its hymns 'in endless monotony' invite the gods to drink the Soma, and torment themselves in order to adorn the uniform appearance of the (sacrificial) flame with fresh similes, we obtain here at least a starting point for understanding what the Vedic poets actually meant: namely, that Soma *is* a drink, and not the Moon: and that Agni *is* a flame, and neither the Sun nor the Moon, at any rate so far as these poems are concerned. Further we have the statement of a problem which really presses for solution, namely, who the gods are to whom the sacrificial fire appeals, and who are invited to share the Soma-drink. And on this last point in particular Hillebrandt's new volume throws considerable light.

Hillebrandt brings out very clearly the

fact that Indra, the most prominent god in the Rigveda, is a late arrival in the pantheon (see especially p. 169). He is selected by the gods to be their king, as being the strongest amongst them: he receives a share in offerings originally designed for others. These earlier deities Hillebrandt recognises in the Ādityas: and without accepting any definite number for this group of gods, he treats as belonging to them Mitra, Varuṇa, Aryaman, Bhaga, Dakṣa and Aṅga: to which list some would be inclined to add Savitar. All these are distinctively gods of the sky and of light: they are also distinguished by being protectors of the moral law. Oldenberg, as is well known, believes them to be a non-Aryan group of deities, and would like to connect them with the Sun, Moon, and five planets. It is interesting to note that Hillebrandt agrees with Oldenberg in identifying Mitra with the Sun, and Varuṇa with the Moon: and supports the latter position very ingeniously with arguments drawn from the ritual. The whole line of argument, however, with both writers starts from the assumption that the Vedic Mitra, like the Persian Mithra of a much later period, was a sun-god: and of this there is no trace in the Rigveda itself. Personally I find this identification quite unconvincing: but if we put it aside, almost all that Hillebrandt says of the character and importance of the Ādityas as the immediate predecessors of India is worthy of attention.

In his treatment of the Ribhus Hillebrandt departs from naturalistic interpretation. He regards them as the gods of a clan in which the art of chariot-building stood in special honour: and believes that the Vedic clans accepted the clan and its gods together as members of their community, owing to the great importance they attached to the art.

Dr. Sieg opens his book with a very fair account of the differences of opinion which exist as to the value of the Indian interpretation of the Rigveda, and also of the various schools of interpretation amongst the Hindus. He admits frankly that amongst all schools fantastic and contradictory interpretations are prevalent, and that the only question that is open is whether there may not be found here and there, amongst so much that is worthless, fragments of a genuine tradition. This question, he rightly says, can only be determined by an examination of all the

material: and we therefore turn with interest to the hymns of which Dr. Sieg specially treats, to learn whether he can throw new light upon them. The hymns chosen are chiefly the following: *i. 170 (Indra and the Maruts), *i. 179 (Agastya and Lopāmudrā): *iv. 18 (Indra's birth): iv. 24 (sale of Indra): iv. 26, 27 (Indra and the eagle): v. 2 (Vṛṣa Jāna): v. 61 (Rathavīti): *x. 98 (Devāpi) and *x. 142 (burning of the Khāṇḍava wood). It may be noticed at once that five of these ten hymns, namely those to which an asterisk is prefixed, belong to the late Rigveda. These may be first discussed, because the hope of a real contact between these hymns and the later tradition is greater. Only in the case of one of these hymns does Sieg contend that the later tradition anywhere contains a true representation of the facts, viz. x. 142. In this case he thinks the verses may well be put in the mouths of the personages who appear in the tale of Mandapālā in the Mahābhārata, to which Sāyana also refers. Unfortunately the first six verses of this hymn are quite of the ordinary type of an Agni hymn, and only the last two are specially appropriate to the occasion: of a forest conflagration there is no trace in the hymn. In x. 98 a certain Devāpi appears as Purohita of Çamtanu, and makes prayer for rain: but again of the myth in which Devāpi is dispossessed of his kingdom by Çamtanu there is no trace. In i. 170 and i. 179 we have unquestionably Vedic myths; in i. 170 Indra seizes an offering designed for the Maruts: in i. 179 Agastya, who has made a vow of chastity, is induced to break it by the solicitations of his wife Lopāmudrā. In both cases the tradition retains the central position as exhibited by the hymn, but mixed with elements entirely foreign to it: and it is impossible to say whether the tradition has any other basis than a partial comprehension of the meaning of the hymn. Finally iv. 18 contains, in the form of a dialogue between Indra and his mother, an account of the birth of the former through his mother's side. The tradition so completely misunderstands the position as to assert that the miraculous birth is that of the poet Vāmadeva, and Dr. Sieg admits that the myth contained in the hymn belongs to a class 'of which practically every trace is lost in the later literature.' This is a significant fact. If Vedic myths as to the personality of the chief god in the Pantheon became completely strange to the Hindus of later

periods, the hypothesis of a continuous tradition must clearly be restricted to a very narrow range.

If we now turn to the five hymns that belong to the Rigveda proper, we notice that two (iv. 26, 27) which really contain a myth are interpreted by Sieg without any reference to the tradition. 'It is a reasonable matter for surprise' he says 'that so simple a story has so completely disappeared from the later tradition.' In iv. 24 the traditional version serves a useful purpose in preserving the meaning of a Vedic phrase, though the story as a whole is worthless. Finally in v. 2 and v. 61 we have hymns which are quite of the ordinary Vedic type except that they consist of somewhat disconnected fragments, and for which the traditional interpretation is only mentioned by Sieg in order to be abandoned in its most essential features.

On the whole it appears that nothing has

yet emerged from the mass of traditional comment to give it a direct value in Vedic exegesis: indeed a bias in favour of the tradition is one of the standing dangers to which Vedic scholarship is exposed. A correct tradition as to any sacred text is indeed almost inconceivable in itself, since the commentators naturally desire to make it support the views which they themselves favour. But indirectly a study of the later Vedic literature promises much, for in no other way can a thorough familiarity with an idiom approximating to that of the Rigveda be obtained. Dr. Sieg has possibly been hunting for a non-existent treasure, but a rich crop may certainly be looked for from the soil he has turned up so diligently. He possesses a singular fairness of statement and breadth of view, and has established a claim to a position in the front rank of Vedic scholars.

E. V. ARNOLD.

BRIEFER NOTICES.

The Antigone of Sophocles, with a Commentary, abridged from the large edition of Sir Richard C. Jebb. By E. S. SHUCKBURGH. Cambridge, University Press. 1902. Pp. xl. + 252. 4s.

THIS edition by Dr. Shuckburgh comes very quickly on the heels of Mr. Bayfield's edition. But both are welcome. Mr. Shuckburgh has made a most judicious abridgment of Prof. Jebb's edition by omitting, as he says, 'the notes containing discussions of the views which the commentator rejects,' which, however valuable they may be, are more suited for advanced students. The introduction also has been considerably shortened by the omission of certain paragraphs, but everywhere Prof. Jebb's language has been adhered to, while all that is essential in it to the comprehension of the play has been retained. Prof. Jebb's reasons for considering ll. 905-920 to be spurious are very shortly given. Some German scholars, e.g. Bellermann and Steinberg still consider them genuine. Dr. Shuckburgh's work has been almost wholly confined to selection. Only very rarely has he added a few words or a quotation. It is in fact difficult to see how the abridgment could have been better made. Perhaps a subject-index might with advantage have been

interwoven with the grammatical index, as Prof. Jebb has done.

R. C. SEATON.

De Aristophanis in Nubium fabula consilio atque arte. By J. HELDER. Haarlem, Kleyenberg, 1901.

It is difficult to find anything new and original in these 196 pages. The language runs in and out of Dutch and Latin, and the content consists largely of quotations. The subject is perhaps to blame. To interpret the mind of an ancient author is the privilege of the mature and of the exercised. The young should be turned to the collection of details, from papyri or inscriptions, which may establish some matter of fact, and dissuaded from topics which invite to unsubstantial rhetoric. *Fecimus et nos haec iuvenes*, but in this country we do not continue it beyond our College literary society.

The two instructive things which have been of late said about Aristophanes' 'Ars et Consilium,' are to my knowledge, Kaibel's remark that the Old Comedy was a critic ex professo, and the Athenian government from Pericles onwards progressive; and

that we thus account for the conservative tone of Comedy—and the demonstration of Alessandro Chiapelli (knowledge of which I owe to Professor Burnet), that the Socrates of the Clouds is historical, I can find no trace of either of these views in Mr. Helder's thesis.

T. W. ALLEN.

An Elementary Greek Grammar. By the late J. B. ALLEN. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1902. Pp. iv. + 194. 3s.

THIS appears to be an excellent little book. Mr. J. B. Allen died in the autumn of 1901

leaving some of the Syntax unrevised. Mr. Mairs has however carried out all the revision that was necessary, thereby greatly adding, no doubt, to the value of the book. It would have been more convenient, I think, if the irregular verbs had been put all together and in a tabular form, as they appear in Dr. Rutherford's *First Greek Grammar*. Also the statement that 'accents [instead of marks of accent] did not exist in the times of classical Greek, but were invented about 200 B.C.' might lead some to think that classical Greek was pronounced without accents.

R. C. SEATON.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ON PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*, P. 488.

I CANNOT reply to Professor T. D. Seymour's observations without a few words of preliminary explanation.

1. The volume of Text in the Jowett-Campbell edition was printed before the lamented death of the late Master of Balliol (see the Preface, p. ix), and the marginal analysis was transferred to it from the second edition of his Translation. Hence the words in parenthesis '(the people in their better mind)' are not mine, and I should not have chosen them to render *γενναῖον*, which expresses Plato's half-humorous pity for the grand, ingenuous, simple being, that is thus coerced or cajoled. See, in what follows, *μὴ πᾶν οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγορεῖ* (499 D)...*ἀφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾶον ὄντα* (*ib.* E).

2. Having referred to the Translation, let me further explain that any obscurity or uncertainty hereabouts may be due to a difference of opinion which often arose between myself and the Translator in considering the latter portion of the sentence.

3. I have always understood *ναύκληρον* to be the owner of the ship; and it had not occurred to me that any reader of our commentary would imagine otherwise. Professor Seymour's note, however, shows that 'Captain' is not free from ambiguity. But 'Master' is no better; and 'Shipowner' (a clumsy word) is not altogether adequate, because the owner is in this case on board the vessel, and is of course in command:

i.e. he has the right at any moment to determine who shall navigate the ship.

4. The only difference, then, between my view and Professor Seymour's, that is not merely verbal, lies in the acceptation of the words *ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει ἂν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἂν τε μὴ, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην οἰόμενοι δυνατόν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν*. I take the indefinite subject of *κυβερνήσει* to be the individual sailor, who aims at becoming steersman (*i.e.* *προστάτης τῆς πόλεως*). I would explain the plural *τινές* to include all whose opposition is to be overborne. And I understand *τὴν κυβερνητικὴν* to mean the true science of navigation (*i.e.* of government). This the actual pilot has never taken the trouble to acquire, because such an effort would have interfered with the one study which appeared to him worth while, *viz.* the art of being the helmsman (*i.e.* of being in power).

This seems to me to agree better than the other interpretation with *ἕκαστον οἰόμενον δεῖν κυβερνᾶν* and *τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου περὶ μὴδ' ἐπαίοντες* in the preceding context.

LEWIS CAMPBELL.

S. ANDREA, ALASSIO, ITALY.
Nov. 14th, 1902.

P.S.—The passage of Aristotle's *Politics* quoted in Professor Seymour's P.S. seems

rather to be a reminiscence of Plato's *Politicus*, p. 296, where the philosopher's attitude towards the people, and towards mankind in general, is considerably changed.

L. C.

Since the above was in type, I have seen Mr. Adam's Commentary. He has weighed the conflicting arguments with great care, and his conclusion differs from mine. I will state here very briefly the grounds on which I still adhere to my own view.

1. Schneider's suggestion, 'ὅπως ad τούτου spectans modum et rationem potius quam

finem significat,' is incompatible with the correspondence of ὅπως κυβερνήσει to ὅπως ἄρξει *supra*, where ὅπως is clearly final. And κυβερνήσει also corresponds to δειν κυβερνᾶν *supra*, where κυβερνᾶν is not 'to steer rightly,' but 'to be steersman.'

2. For τέχνη ironical, see the Gorgias: and for μελέτη apart from philosophy, cf. Phaed. 82 B.

3. The notion of compulsory government is irrelevant to the main drift of the passage and alien to the spirit of B. vi.: cf. 502 B. πόλιν ἔχων πειθόμενην.

L. C.

REPORTS.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE OXFORD PHILOLOGICAL SOCIETY.—MICHAELMAS TERM, 1902.

ON October 31st, in Trinity College, Professor ELLIS read a paper on Ibis 607, 8 *Qua sua Penteliden proles est ulta Lycurgum, Haec mancat teli te quoque plaga novit*. He thought that the distich might be explained by the story recounted in Parthenius, *περί ἐρωτικών παθημάτων* c. xxxv. Parthenius' story is as follows:—

Cydon, a dynast in Crete, had betrothed his daughter Eulimene to a leading Cretan named Apterus (King Apteras, as he is called by Eusebius, Chron. II 30). Eulimene, however, was beloved by another Cretan named Lycastus. Some of the Cretan towns having revolted from Cydon and conquered him, he sent to Delphi to inquire by what means he was to be successful against them. The oracle commanded him to sacrifice a virgin: lots were cast, and Eulimene was selected. Lycastus in alarm confessed that he had long loved and consorted with Eulimene. The people assembled, we may suppose, to judge the case, were more than ever determined that she should die. After the execution, Cydon ordered the priest to cut open the womb, upon which she was found pregnant. Then Apterus, incensed at the indignity put upon him by Lycastus, laid an ambush and killed him.

Reading *Prataliden Lycastum* for *Penteliden Lycurgum*, he would translate the distich thus: 'May the stroke that is in store for you be dealt by the same unlooked for weapon by means of which Lycastus' unborn child punished its father.' The barbarous outrage (on Eulimene's body,) of which Lycastus was the ultimate cause, brought him in his turn the surprise of an equally unlooked for death; in this way the unborn child punished its father.

If *Lycastum* in the Ibis-distich was corrupted to *Lycurgum*, it is nothing strange to find *Prataliden* has become *Penteliden*, or *Pentiladen*, (so the excellent Gale MS), or *Penteliden* or *Penthidem*. Such transformations of proper names are common generally; very common in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and in the *Ibis*. What is more to the purpose, we have a corruption of an almost identical kind in v. 447 of this very poem; for *Panthoides* has there become *Penthides*, *Pentelides*, *Pithoides* in different MSS.

That *Lycastus* is called *Pratalides* I infer from Anth. P. VII, 449, 450, two epigrams which have become amalgamated, but which are certainly distinct as Stadtmüller has shown.

For further proof see American Journal of Philology vol. xxiii. pp. 204–5, where the paper is printed entire, with some new emendations of the text of Parthenius.

After this, Mr. E. O. Winstedt read to the Society another paper by Professor ELLIS giving a short account of the Professor's latest exploration of Catullian MSS in Italy (1901–2). This was supplemented by a short notice of the unique MS. of the *Hisperica Famina* in the Vatican; the complete paper is printed in *Hermathena* for 1902.

On November 7th at Exeter College, Dr. FARNELL read a paper on the Greek festival of the Thesmophoria and the meaning of the name *θεσμοφόρος*. After an examination of the records concerning the various Thesmophoria-festivals in the Greek world, he argued that the name *θεσμοφόρία* must have arisen from *θεσμοφόρος*, not vice-versâ: that the ritual which was very archaic, entirely failed to bear out the interpretation of the latter word as 'Legifera,' 'the giver of Law,' which for other reasons was improbable; and that the other interpretation 'the bringer of marriage' also clashed with the facts of the festival, and was linguistically unsound. He suggested that *θεσμοφόρος* as a ritualistic word must originally have had some physical and material sense, and probably preserves some old Ionic use of *θεσμός* that had almost died out: such a use as that attested for Anacreon, *θεσμός = θησαυρός*: so that *θεσμοφόρος* might have designated Demeter as 'the bringer of the heaped-up pile,' the 'wealth-bringer': and that this interpretation was entirely in harmony with the ritual, which looked primarily to the fertility of the fields and secondarily to the increase of the family. He further discussed the exclusion of men and the supremacy of women in the management of the festival, and argued that this phenomenon, neither here nor in the other instances of its occurrence in Greek ritual, could be reasonably regarded

as a reflex of an earlier stage of society based on Mutter-recht or gynaeocracy: that it was probably due to the very wide-spread belief that women have the stronger vegetation-magic, and can work certain kind of ritual to secure fertility better than men.

On November 21st at Queen's College, Mr. A. C. CLARK read a paper on the contents and value of the ancient MS. of Cicero's orations discovered by Poggio at Cluni and since lost: the results of Mr. Clark's researches will be shortly published in the *Anecdota Series* of the Clarendon Press.

On November 28th at a meeting in the Ashmolean Museum, the theories of Wickhoff as to Roman and early Christian art were discussed by Professor GARDNER.

On December 5th at Trinity College, Professor

PELHAM read a paper on the recent evidence as to the Roman Imperial Domains:

The paper summarised the additions made to our knowledge of the imperial domains during the last ten years—Especially attention was devoted to the evidence from Egypt and to two important African inscriptions—the 'lex Hadriana de rudibus agris' and the 'lex Manciana.'

It was argued, in general agreement with Mitter's 'Geschichte der Erbpacht': that the new evidence pointed to the coexistence under the Caesars of different 'customs of the land' on Imperial estates in different provinces; and to the gradual assimilation of these under the unifying influence of the central imperial authority.

L. R. FARNELL.
Hon Sec.

Jan. 1903.

THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION OF SCOTLAND.

(Communicated by MR. W. COUTTS, Secretary of the Association.)

THE changes brought about by the working of the Leaving Certificate examinations of the Scotch Education Department, and by the Preliminary and Bursary Examinations of our four Universities led several Teachers of Classics to the conviction that the time was opportune for the inauguration of a Society which should aim at bringing together for practical discussion all who desired to see the best traditions of Classical Scholarship in Scotland maintained and extended. Such a Society, it was felt, would be likely to be helpful and stimulating to the teachers of Classics by the communication and exchange of ideas regarding the best and latest methods of instruction. For it has not always been realised, even by the teachers of Classics themselves, that these methods must change, and adapt themselves to the ever-changing condition of knowledge and thought.¹ Moreover the Association will, it is hoped, do good service by affording a rallying point for all friends of the *litterae humaniores*, in days when in Scotland as elsewhere attacks are continually being made on the Classics in the name of efficiency and utility. But as the President, Professor Ramsay of Glasgow, pointed out at the first meeting, the Society will not exist as a defence Association, nor for the purpose either of 'axe-grinding' or of barren controversy with the 'Moderns.'

The first meeting took place in Edinburgh on March 1st, 1902. [See *Class. Rev.*, 1902, p. 181.] At it officials were appointed, and rules drawn up of which the following indicates the scope and aim of the Association.

Rule 2. 'The objects of the Association shall be to bring together for practical conference all persons interested in Classical Study and Education; to promote

communication and comparison of views between Universities and Schools, to discuss subjects and methods of Teaching and Examination, and any other questions of interest to Classical Scholars that may from time to time arise.'

The First General Meeting was held in the Royal High School of Edinburgh on November 29th, 1902, when the President delivered to a large and representative audience his Inaugural Address entitled 'Efficiency in Education.'² At the same meeting papers were read by Dr. Heard on 'Classical Study in the face of Modern Demands,' and by Professor Baldwin Brown on 'Some Archaeological Aids to Classical Study.'

The Association has naturally secured the adherence of practically all the Classical Professors and Teachers of Scotland. It has also been fortunate in enlisting the sympathy and support of many other distinguished scholars and public men, among whom may be mentioned Mr. Andrew Lang, Professor Saintsbury, the Very Rev. the Moderator of the Church of Scotland, Professor Dr. Laidlaw, Rt. Hon. Sir J. A. Campbell, M.P., Rt. Hon. R. B. Haldane, K.C., M.P., J. Parker Smith, M. P., Sir John N. Cuthbertson, LL.D., Dr. James Adam of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, Gifford Lecturer in the University of Aberdeen, &c.

The Association meets twice a year in each of the four University towns in rotation. The Annual subscription is five shillings, or two guineas for Life Membership. It is intended to print in book form an annual volume of the Transactions of the Association for circulation among the Members.

The Treasurer is Mr. W. Lobban, Girls' High School, Glasgow, and the Secretary, Mr. W. Coutts, George Watson's College, Edinburgh, from either of whom any further information may be obtained.

¹ See the extremely important points discussed by Professor Postgate in his article 'Are the Classics to go?' *Fortnightly Review*, 1902.

² [*Supra*, p. 2.]

VERSION.

THE DESTRUCTION OF SENNACHERIB.

The Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold,
And his cohorts were gleaming in purple
and gold ;
And the sheen of their spears was like stars
on the sea,
When the blue wave rolls nightly on deep
Galilee.

Like the leaves of the forest when summer
is green,
That host, with their banners, at sunset
were seen ;
Like the leaves of the forest when autumn
hath blown,
That host, on the morrow, lay withered and
strown.

For the angel of death spread his wings on
the blast,
And breathed in the face of the foe as he
pass'd ;
And the eyes of the sleepers wax'd deadly
and chill,
And their hearts but once heaved, and for
ever grew still !

And there lay the steed with his nostril all
wide,
But through it there roll'd not the breath
of his pride :
And the foam of his gasping lay white on
the turf,
And cold as the spray of the rock-beating
surf.

And there lay the rider distorted and
pale,
With the dew on his brow and the rust on
his mail ;
And the tents were all silent, the banners
alone,
The lances unlifted, the trumpet un-
blown.

And the widows of Asshur are loud in their
wail,
And the idols are broke in the temple of
Baal ;
And the might of the Gentile, unsmote by
the sword,
Hath melted like snow in the glance of the
Lord.

BYRON.

οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἐπεσσεύοντο λύκος ὡς εἶς' ἐπὶ μῆλα

χρυσῷ στίλβοντες καὶ εἵμασι πορφυρέοισι,

αἰχμῶν δ' ἀπέλαμπ' ὡς ἀστέρος ἡνίκα λάμπει

καλὸν νυκτὸς ἐπὶ γλαυκῇ Γαλιληίδι λίμνῃ.

ὡς φύλλων γενεὴ θέρους νέον ἀρχομένοιο

ἐσπέριοι μακροῖς φάνεν ἔγχεσι τηλεθόοντες,

ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὀπωρινὰ φύλλ' ὑπὸ λαίλαπι πίπτει ἔραζε

ἔκταθεν ἡοιοὶ καὶ σύγχυθεν ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ.

ἦλθε γὰρ αἰνὸς Λοιγὸς ἅμα πνοιῆς ἀνέμοιο,

καὶ παριὼν λαοῖς χέ' ἀντμένα κῆρα φέροντα,

ὅσσε δ' ἐκάστω πῆγρυνθ' ὅτε γλυκὺς εἰλέ μιν ὕπνος,

καὶ θνήσκων ἥσπαιρε μίνυνθά περ οὔτι μάλα δῆν.

κεῖτο μὲν ἐνθ' ἵππος πάρος ἀγλαΐῃφι πεποισῶς,

ῥίνας δ' οὐ διάη πνοὴ μάλα πεπταμένας περ,

ἀφρὸς δ' ἀσθμαίνοντος ἐλεύκαινε χθόνα διαν,

ὡς ὅτ' ἐπὶ σκοπέλῳ ψυχρῇ ἐπιτέτροφεν ἄλμῃ.

κεῖτο δ' ὁ πρόσθ' ἐπιβὰς ἐλατήρ ἡσχυμένος αἰνῶς,

ἔντεα μὲν εὐρὺς κροτάφους δ' ἔχε θῆλυς ξέρση,

κειναὶ ἔσαν κλισίαι, κειναὶ πολέμοιο γέφυραι,

ἴαχεν οὐ σάλπιγξ, οὐ χεῖρ ἐπemaίετο λόγχην.

κλαίουσιν λιγέως χῆραι κατὰ Σοῦσα γυναῖκες,

Βηλοῦ δ' ἐν νηοῖσιν ἀγάλματα φαίδιμ' ἔαγεν,

ἐπειδὴ νιφάδεσσιν ἀλγίκιος οἰχεται αὐτῶς

Βάρβαρος ἄφανστος ξιφίων ὑπὸ δέργματι θείῳ.

ROBERT YELVERTON TYRRELL.

ARCHAEOLOGY.

INFANT BURIAL.

IN Vol. ix. p. 247 of the *Classical Review*, Dr. Jevons discussed certain provisions in the funeral law of Iulis in Ceos (Roehl, *Inscr. Antiquiss.* No. 395) and the funeral legislation of Solon at Athens (Dem. c. *Macart.* § 62). One was that which both at Athens and Ceos forbade any woman (at Athens any woman under sixty years of age) to enter the room from which the deceased had just been removed, unless she was the daughter of a cousin of the dead or was still more nearly related. Dr. Jevons illustrated these funeral regulations from German folklore, with the purpose of showing that their object was 'to secure the re-birth of the soul of the deceased in his own family.' I have lately had occasion to collect certain observances in the funeral rites of different tribes, which may serve to illustrate the doctrine of re-birth. From the Jesuit Relations¹ of their missions to the North American Indians we learn that a Huron chief once explained that there were two sorts of souls. One separates itself from the body at death and after a time goes away to the village of the Dead in the West. The other sort is bound to the body and informs the corpse. It remains in the ditch of the dead and never leaves it, unless someone bears it again as a child. How else is it that the living resemble the dead? (x. 287). With this we may compare what Plato says in the *Phaedo* about the souls of the wicked. In the Niger Delta we are told that no one's soul remains long below. The soul's return to its own family is ensured by special *ju-jus*. As the new babies arrive, they are shown a selection of small articles belonging to deceased members of the family. The child is identified by the article which first attracts its attention. 'Why, he's Uncle John, see! he knows his own pipe,' etc.²

The Greek belief in the possibility of re-birth may be illustrated by the words *δευτερόπορμος* and *ιστερόπορμος*, and by Plutarch's statement (*Roman Questions* 5) that, if a man had been given up for dead or his funeral solemnised or prepared and then he recovered, he was solemnly committed as an infant new-born unto women to be washed,

to be wrapped in swaddling clothes and to be suckled. His soul had got back into its former habitation, and logic required that in spite of any appearances to the contrary he must begin life again.

In the case of children, it seems that precautions were taken to render re-birth easier. The Jesuits relate that among the Hurons there were special ceremonies for little children who died at less than two months old. Their bodies were not put in coffins in the cemeteries, but buried upon the pathway in order that they might enter the body of some passing woman and so be born again (x. 272). It should be remarked that no part of the souls of little children went away after death to the Village of the Dead, toward the setting sun, because their limbs were not strong enough to make this voyage (x. 143). In West Africa we are told that the bodies of little children are also thrown near the path in order that their souls may choose a new mother from the women who pass by.³

In Central Australia also the spirit children are born in a similar way. With these savages there are certain totem centres connected with different localities, and the child belongs to the totem associated with the locality in which the mother was at the time of conception, not at the time of birth. For instance an Emu mother conceived when she was in the locality of the Witchetty Grub totem. The child was born 100 miles off in the Emu territory, but all the same it counted as a Witchetty grub.⁴

I do not know of any special form of burial in Greece for infant children analogous to these practices of savages. At Rome Pliny says, *Hominem prius quam genito dente cremari mos gentium non est* (*Nat. Hist.* vii. 72), and Juvenal says, *Terra clauditur infans et minor igne rogi* (*Sat.* xv. 140). In illustration of this, it may be noticed that the Hindus, who practise cremation, are directed by the code of Manou not to burn but to bury the bodies of infants, if under two years of age, or unless they have cut all their teeth. If burned, such infants would become malevolent demons.⁵

Similarly the Maoris of New Zealand believe that disease is specially caused by

³ Miss Kingsley, *op. cit.* p. 478.

¹ The *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, Cleveland edition, 1896.

² Miss Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, p. 493.

⁴ Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 124, 265.

⁵ Cf. Ridgeway, *Early Age of Greece*, i. 532.

the spirit of an infant or an undeveloped human being.¹

To return to the Romans; upon the authority of Fulgentius, a writer of the sixth century A.D., it is stated that children under 40 days old were buried under the eaves overlooking the court of the dwelling-house in a *subgrundarium*. For what conclusion, if any, can be gathered from this I must refer to the discussion in Vol. xi. p. 33 ff. of the *Classical Review*. I cannot quote anything to show that the Romans entertained any belief like that of the Hindus in reference to the spirits of infants, or that, like the Hurons, they had any notion of facilitating the re-birth of infants by giving them a special form of burial. Virgil (*Aen.* vi. 427) speaks of the souls of infants, dead before their time, bewailing their fate on the threshold of the world below. As a rule, it may be said, in spite of the instances of the Hindus and Maoris, that the spirit of a dead child is regarded as an object of pity because it must be so helpless. The Hurons thought that the souls of little children were not strong enough to take the journey to the Village in the West. The Eskimos put a dog's head upon the tomb of a child, because a dog can find its way anywhere and can therefore help the child. A tribe of Melanesians, when a favourite child dies, sacrifice the mother's aunt or the grandmother to go and look after it.

No reason is given for the special nature of the burial of infants at Rome. But we know that the idea of re-birth was familiar to the Greeks, and we have seen that it is familiar to different races in different parts of the world. If it were the case that infants were originally buried in the houses at Rome, this practice, like burial by the pathway, might imply a desire to render their re-birth easier. In Cumberland Valley, Tennessee, there were found 70 houses in an ancient village. Under the floors of hard clay were found graves of children—one to four in nearly every house—along with pearls, shell beads and pieces of pottery for them to play with. In the burial mounds of the village only the remains of adults were found.²

A good deal of evidence from different parts of the world, and from races of various degrees of civilisation, can be collected to show that there was a different mode of burial for infants as distinguished from

adults. I would suggest that the explanation is to be found in the doctrine of re-birth.

J. E. KING.

FOUCART'S MYSTERIES OF ELEUSIS.

Les Grands Mystères d'Eleusis. Personnel—Cérémonies. Par M. P. FOUCART. Extrait des Mémoires des l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Tome XXXVII. 1900.

FIVE years have been allowed by M. Foucart to elapse between the publication of the first and second parts of his discussion of the Eleusinian Mysteries. His '*Recherches sur l'Origine et la Nature des Mystères d'Eleusis*' appeared in 1895, and the origin of the Mysteries was boldly declared to be Egyptian. In 1899 Mr. Andrew Lang, in his *Homeric Hymns* (p. 81), examined the 'alleged Egyptian origins.' In 1900 M. Foucart published his second part, '*Personnel et Cérémonies*,' and, apparently in blissful ignorance of the whole onward march of comparative anthropology, of the investigations of Dr. Frazer, and the particular criticisms of Mr. Lang, he reasserts, re-emphasizes his statement, Egypt was the source, the one and only source, of all that was mysterious at Eleusis.

It is scarcely necessary now-a-days, in England, though apparently not superfluous in France, to say that, broadly speaking, Mr. Lang has established his point that 'for all Greek Mysteries a satisfactory analogy can be found'; that rites of sympathetic magic, pantomimic performances, mystery dances, holy apparitions, Baubo's gestures, and 'Books of the Dead,' are not peculiar to Egypt, or Greece, or Phrygia, or the Khonds, or the Pawnees, but are human, fundamental, it would almost seem perennial. This is all true and needed assertion and emphasis, and yet we believe that M. Foucart's position is also *mutatis mutandis* true, and perhaps in view of the present dominance of the 'comparative' method it needs even more imperative reassertion.

A simple instance will make this necessity clear. M. Foucart believes that not only did corn and agriculture come to Greece from Egypt, but also that second great ingredient of the mystery melting-pot, the belief in immortality. The Orphics had, we know from the gold tablets of Lower Italy and Crete, some sort of 'Book of the

¹ Tylor, *Prim. Culture*, ii. 127.

² First Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1879-1880, p. 116.

Dead'; some instructions and itinerary for the guidance of the soul in the next world; the Fijians have, as Mr. Lang rightly points out, a 'Path of the Shades.' On the Orphic Petelia tablet the soul comes to a tree and a well, or rather a tree and two wells; he drinks of one of the wells and passes on to the abode of the heroes. Mr. Lang is ready with a primitive analogy. The shade in Fiji, after various adventures, comes to a spring and drinks and forgets sorrow. At the spring is Wai-na-dula, the 'Water of Solace.' Then he passes on to the dancing-grounds of the gods. Mr. Lang concludes: 'Tree and spring and peaceful place, with dance, song, and divine apparitions, all are Fijian, all are Greek, yet nothing is borrowed by Fiji from Greece'; 'the precepts are not so much Egyptian as human.' This is broadly true, and yet, more closely examined, almost wholly misleading. The Fijian shade drinks of Wai-na-dula, Water of Solace, and why? Mr. Basil Thomson, from whom Mr. Lang quotes the account, is quite clear: the relations of the shade in the upper world are tired of mourning; savage etiquette prescribes that, as long as the dead soul remembers, his relations must remember too; they find it tedious, so the shade drinks of the Fijian Lethe and they are released. Now for the Orphic. He may not drink of Lethe on the left, he *must* drink of Mnemosyne on the right; he claims to do so because he is divine. It is in embryo the doctrine of the Platonic ἀνάμνησις, it is the Eunoia of Dante, the remembering again of divinity which is humanity, and has as a necessary corollary immortality. The average Greek, by the mouth of Pindar, says: 'θανὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει,' 'μὴ ματεύσῃ θεὸς γενέσθαι'; the Orphic says to the believer: 'θεὸς ἐγένου ἐξ ἀνθρώπου,' 'καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὁμ(ω)ν γένος εὐχομαι ὀλβιον εἶναι.' The dead Egyptian claimed that he became Osiris, he prayed that Osiris would give him the cool water. Surely the Egyptian 'analogy' is a little nearer than the Fijian. The mysteries brought to Greece an outlook on this life and the next wholly foreign to their normal, national character. They asserted the divine in man, and the method of development of this divinity was by assiduous personal purification.

In a word a caution is necessary. The seeds of things may be the same all the world over, but the articulate growths, the flowers of human thought are otherwise, and here the local soil, race, and atmosphere, yes and the crossing and fertilizing of one plant by another cannot be disregarded.

To drop metaphor we gratefully acknowledge the lesson of comparative anthropology that man is much the same everywhere, but we still believe that the mysteries of Greece borrowed substantially certain alien characteristic doctrines from Egypt.

A bridge has been built between Greece and Egypt in the space of the last five years and that bridge is the broad island of Crete. M. Foucart in a postscript to his second issue hails the discoveries of Mr. Arthur Evans, the full import of which when he wrote was scarcely yet realized. This is not the place to discuss these discoveries. For all who have spent even an hour in the museum at Kandia know two things, that the great sea kingdom of Minos is a living reality to be reckoned with, and that the art, architecture, whole civilization of that kingdom was not Egyptian, but soaked through and through with Egyptian influence.

With so much premised from archaeology we turn with fresh eyes to the long neglected evidence of literary tradition. Orpheus gave to Athens her mysteries, mysteries in general of which those at Eleusis obtained accidental political prominence, and Orpheus came from Egyptianized Crete.

Diodorus¹ states the truth broadly in a passage of singular significance. According to Cretan tradition, he says, mysteries in Crete at Cnossos were not mysterious and Crete gave to the rest of the world, to Eleusis, to Samothrace, to Thrace their mysteries. τὰς δὲ τιμὰς καὶ θυσίας καὶ τὰς περὶ τὰ μυστήρια τελετὰς ἐκ Κρήτης εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους παραδεδόσθαι λέγοντες, τοῦτο φέρουσιν ὡς οἴονται μέγιστον τεκμήριον τὴν τε γὰρ παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἐλευσίνι γενομένην τελετὴν, ἐπιφανεστάτην σχεδὸν οἶσαν ἅπασων, καὶ τὴν ἐν Σαμοθράκῃ καὶ τὴν ἐν Θράκῃ ἐν τοῖς Κίκοσιν ὅθεν ὁ καταδείξας Ὀρφεὺς ἦν, μυστικῶς παραδιδόσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Κρήτην ἐν Κνωσὶ νόμιμον ἐξ ἀρχαίων εἶναι φανερῶς τὰς τελετὰς ταύτας πᾶσι παραδιδόσθαι καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ παραδιδόμενα παρ' αὐτοῖς μηδένα κρύπτειν τῶν βουλομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα γινώσκειν. Allowing for some patriotic exaggeration the Cretan tradition reflects historical fact. Crete and her local winds as Mr. Evans has shown look north and south. Orpheus was blown northwards to Thrace and dropped his rites as he went on many island stepping-stones, at Lemnos, at Imbros, at Samothrace. Athens liked to forget her debt to Crete though she was forced to remember her ghastly tribute to

¹ Diod. v. 77.

the Minotaur, but in the hour of her need she sent to the ancient home of the mysteries and Epimenides the Orpheus of history, the 'new Koures' came with orgies and purifications. Demeter herself in the Homeric Hymn¹ when asked whence she came says:

νῦν αὖτε Κρήτηθεν ἐπ' εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης
ἦλυθον.

Even Homer, who knows so little of religion knows of the marriage between Iasion and Demeter, a marriage mysticized by the Orphics, but to Hesiod a bit of primitive sympathetic magic in Crete.

Δημήτηρ μὲν Πλοῦτον ἐγένετο δια θεῶν
'Ιασίῳ ἥρωϊ μίγεισ' ἐρατῇ φιλότῃ
νεῖφ ἐνι τριπόλῳ Κρήτης ἐν πίονι δήμῳ.²

The chorus of mystics whose confession as given by Euripides³ is our chief document for Orphic ritual comes to Minos, Minos

ἀνάσσω

Κρήτης ἑκατομπολιέθρου

and comes professing himself Διὸς Ἰδαίου μύστης.

Last but not least though the greater number of the Orphic tablets, our earliest and safest sources of Orphic doctrine come from Lower Italy, from the tombs of the disciples of Pythagoras, one, that in which the sacred well herself speaks, comes from a tomb at Eleuthernae in Crete⁴ and from Crete we may still hope for others. Nor can it be forgotten that to Crete according to tradition recorded by Porphyry⁵ Pythagoras himself went and was initiated by one of the Idaean Dactyls; they purified him with a thunderbolt-symbol, vehicle of the Great Mother, made him lie on the shore face foremost from dawn, and at night by a river crowned him with the wool of a black sheep, and finally initiated him in the mysteries of the Idaean cave. Thus again and again did Greece by Epimenides and Pythagoras return to the primitive source of her mysteries.

Diodorus⁶ says that Orpheus went to Egypt to learn his ritual and theology, but in the light of the new Cretan evidence and of all this ancient tradition, we see, M. Foucart will see and even Mr. Andrew Lang perhaps may own that, though Orpheus

learnt of Egypt, he needed not to leave his island home.

JANE E. HARRISON.

THE GODS OF THE SEVEN DAYS.

Die Tagesgötter in Rom und den Provinzen.
VON ERNST MAASS. Berlin: Weidmannsche
Buchhandlung, 1902. Pp. viii. 311. Mk. 10.

PROFESSOR MAASS has grouped together under this title a series of interesting discussions. He begins with the Septizonium of Septimius Severus upon the Palatine, and inquires what was its purpose. He rejects the view which refers the name to the seven planetary spheres (20 ff.) as distinguished from the seven planets. Nor, we are assured, is the building a temple of the nymphs (40 ff.). This topic furnishes the author with the occasion of considering a series of buildings devoted to the supply of water, and among them a fountain of victory which Domitian erected upon the Esquiline (63 ff.): to this building two trophies are to be referred, the *trofei di Mario* of the Capitol, and Prof. Maass explains them by Domitian's triumph over the Chatti and Daci of the year 89 A.D. (79). Returning to the Septizonium, after these excursions, the author will not see in it a water tower, but simply 'a substructure intended to bear something and to make it visible from afar along the Appian Way.' For want of more definite information, we are now referred to the name itself in the hope that etymology will help us out; and here the wavering of the manuscripts between the spellings, *septizonium* and *septizodium*, leads to the rejection of the traditional spelling in favour of the latter form. Such a conclusion being accepted, it follows next that we have to find the meaning of the term *Zwidiön*, and this is declared to be 'a planet.' The discussion is illustrated by a list of the days of the week from Dositheus, a list which is headed *septe(m)zodi dies*, in the Greek parallel passage *ἐπὶ τὰ Ζωιδίων ἡμέραι* (132), 'the days of the seven planets.' But this proves too much. The term *septizodium* seems to have been understood to mean the week from the time of Dositheus, and it does not seem an appropriate term for a building, while at the same time it may very well explain the wavering of the MSS. in the spelling of *septizonium*. Nor is it necessary to adopt the form with *d* in order to accept Prof. Maass's hypothesis

¹ Hom. *Hymn. ad Cer.* 123.

² Hes. *Theog.* 969.

³ Eur. *frag.* 476.

⁴ Joulin, *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* xvii. 1893, p. 122.

⁵ Porph. *Vit. Pythag.* 17.

⁶ Diod. iv. 25.

that the building of Septimius Severus was in honour of the gods of the seven planets.'

The author does not entirely succeed in his attempt to prove that the building was not seven stories high. Lanciani has pointed out that it would need a very high building indeed to act as a screen for the confused masses of the palace of Severus which towered behind it. (*Ruins of Ancient Rome* 183). And the excessive height of Roman buildings is itself a presumption in favour of interpreting Septizonium as a reference to seven stories. I cannot but think that Prof. Maass is led by his thesis to do less than justice to the gloss upon *HEPTIZONION* (sic) which he quotes (p. 12, n.). *Dictum latine septizonium domus cenaculorum septem*. The passage in which Vitruvius is speaking of the height of Roman buildings, ii. 8, 17, illustrates exactly the use of the term *cenaculum* in the sense of story, *altitudines extractae et contiguationibus crebris coactae cenaculorum ad summas utilitates perficiunt dispartitiones*. 'The heights of the buildings constructed etc., and joined together by frequent floors produce a division of the stories to the utmost advantage.' The English translation of Vitruvius by Gwilt makes nonsense of all this by translating 'excellent dining-rooms.' In the light, then, of the gloss, and of the passage from Vitruvius, more evidence is needed than we are furnished with, in order to reject the traditional name of the building.

Passing now to the purpose of the building; Prof. Maass has made out a very strong general presumption in favour of the seven gods of the planets. But the weight which in particular he lays upon the term *septizonium* as directly proving this dedication must be laid rather upon the general analogy of the seven-storied building to the buildings in seven stages which were so characteristic of Babylonian and Assyrian architecture and devoted to similar purposes, (Perrot and Chipiez *Art in Chaldaea and Assyria*, Vol. I. c. iv.). For although many of the ancient seven-staged towers were in ruins, the number seven played a sufficiently large part in eastern architecture to prepare the minds of the troops who had fought in the east or had been recruited thence for the symbolism of the Septizonium.

There is a passage in Dio Cassius xxxvii. 19, which scarcely receives the prominence to which it is entitled, and may be used to explain the relation of the planetary gods

to the days of the week. If each hour is assigned to one of the seven gods in turn, then the god of the first hour of the first day being Saturn, the god of the first hour of the second day will be the Sun, the god of the first hour of the third day will be the Moon and so on. In this way it becomes clear why the order of the gods of the days seems at first sight to be at variance with the order of the periodic times of the planets. According to the latter they should of course run, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, the Moon. Prof. Maass traces in a most interesting way the spread of the week, and of the connected worship of the seven gods, a worship which in the form of astrology was and is still so powerful. It is to be noted, however, that astrology is not the only explanation of this spread of the week of the seven days. The dispersion of the Jews and then the rise and prevalence of Christianity were perhaps more important factors even than astrology. It is interesting to note that the German and English and other western races took the week from astrological rather than Christian sources, if we may judge by the pagan names of the days of the week, and if we compare them with the Greek names. The church attempted, with only partial success, to replace the astrological, by the Christian week. Books continued to be current in which illustrations were used to explain the figure and attributes of the seven gods, and it is pointed out (260) that they had a considerable influence upon mediaeval ideas concerning the classical mythology. In a paschal letter of Athanasius, which is quoted in the Coptic life of Theodore, we find a reference to books of astrology in which the saints take the place of the heathen gods. 'They have made books which they call books of designs (*ἀστρογάρμων*) showing the stars to which they give the names of the saints.' Athanasius in speaking further of 'a deceitful and contemptible science,' almost certainly refers to the current astrology. (*Annales du Musée Guimet* xvii. 239). Prof. Maass quoting Irenaeus I. 30, 9 is not correct in saying that the Ophites revered the week as *sancta hebdomas*. The term *hebdomas* means the seven spirits into which the Divine Majesty unfolded itself (for details Möller, *History of the Christian Church*, 137). Curiously enough Irenaeus in the next section to that which is quoted (140), seems to say, that the Jews spoke of a *sancta hebdomas*: '*septem dies quos et sanctam hebdomadem vocant*,' but the word *dies* is almost certainly a mis-

translation from the Greek original and should be replaced by *lumina*.

I have noted one or two other points which seem to require correction. 'Roman priest of Zeus' is to say the least an awkward translation of *flamen dialis* (133). Horapollon is entirely unreliable as a witness to the meaning of Egyptian hieroglyphics (193). The ram of Panopolis was the embodiment of the god Min or Amsu and has nothing to do with the zodiac (268). The zodiac was a late importation into Egypt (Letronne *Recueil* I. pref. xx. ff.). It is news to me that Clement of Alexandria was a bishop (268).

But these are not very serious blemishes, and the book may be recommended as a suggestive and valuable example of archaeological method. And in order that I may end upon a note of praise, Prof. Maass has given a most convincing emendation of the lines quoted by Eusebius (*Præp. Ev.* v. 14, 1).

FRANK GRANGER.

WILLER'S HEMMOOR BRONZE BUCKETS.

Die römischen Bronzezeimer von Hemmoor, nebst einem Anhang über die römischen Silberbarren aus Dierstorf, von HEINRICH WILLERS. Hannover, 1901. 8vo. Pp. viii + 252. 15 M.

THIS handsome volume might be more accurately described as 'Records of some local discoveries and researches suggested by them.' It has really two objects, which are not clearly distinguished in its arrangement. One object is to describe minutely, with full details of place and time and circumstance, certain discoveries of Roman antiquities in the province of Hannover—the ornamented bronze buckets from Hemmoor and the inscribed bars of silver bullion from Dierstorf. The other object is to consider the whole class of Roman bronze buckets found in north-western Europe, and to estimate therefrom the trade of the Roman Empire with the lands beyond the Rhine and the Danube. But the discussion is not strictly confined to these topics, though the attempted estimate of Roman trade refers especially to the bronze buckets and less than might be expected to coins and other Roman objects occurring in the north. The result is a very interesting and suggestive volume which presents this problem to the reviewer that the points which might

be selected for notice or for criticism (and some of the details are perhaps open to discussion) are various and scattered. It must suffice to say that Mr. Willers makes a distinct attempt to work out some aspects of the trade (such as it was) between Germany and Italy, that he has collected some valuable material relating to certain kinds of Roman metal manufactures, and that the Dierstorfer bullion throws considerable light on the character of the Roman Imperial currency in the fourth century. Also he has provided his volume with a great plenty of admirable illustrations, which would be well worth having, even without the text; and he has indexed both text and plates in a most convenient fashion.

F. H.

MONTHLY RECORD.

CRETE.

Palaiokastro.—Preliminary excavations were made here by the British School during April and May last. There are no traces of any important settlement of classical times, but a considerable town and cemetery belonging to the Mycenaean period have been discovered. A large mansion, the plan of which does not diverge greatly from that of the classical Greek house, has been excavated, no fewer than thirty-six rooms having been brought to light. An upper storey had evidently been added later in brick, for considerable remains, including part of a fresco, were found in the lower rooms. In the cemeteries one Mycenaean tomb was opened and yielded vases and implements of bronze. In an enclosure were found vases of Kamárais ware, a three-sided seal with pictographic characters, and a series of carved miniature vessels, all heaped together amid a confused mass of skulls and bones. It is hoped to excavate a similar bone enclosure next spring.¹

Phaestos.—The excavation of the palace has been finished, the work in the women's quarters having led to the discovery of a vestibule and portico with elaborate paintings of foliage and flowers. Trial pits dug at Hagian Triada, near Phaestos, have revealed the presence of a 'Minoan' mansion. The finds already made include wall-paintings with representations of animals and a vase of steatite with a procession of peasants dancing and singing carved in low relief.¹

¹ *Journ. of Hell. Stud.* 1902, part 2.

GREECE.

Leukas.—Dr. Dörpfeld, in his search for the palace of Odysseus, has discovered an extensive prehistoric settlement, and has come upon an ancient conduit, formed of conical earthenware pipes leading to the plain from the hills on the west.¹

Corinth.—Professor Richardson of the American School was at work here from the beginning of March to the middle of June, and discovered a fresh region of the Romanised city, including a public square, shops, and porticoes. A Hellenic stoa with Doric front and an interior line of Ionic columns came to light; also several water conduits, in one of which was found a large number of ancient lamps of various dates. Small antiquities were very numerous, including old Corinthian and proto-Corinthian pottery, terracotta figurines, and several archaic Greek inscriptions, one in the local Corinthian alphabet of the sixth century. A trial trench cut across the orchestra and stage buildings of the theatre led to the discovery of a fine head of a young man in Parian marble.¹

Argos.—Mr. Vollgraff of the French School carried on excavations from May to September. On the top of a rounded hill, known anciently as 'Αρπύς, to the north of the present town, the foundations of a prehistoric dwelling-house came to light; lower down was a terrace with cyclopean walls, on which were remains of several houses of a date anterior to the Mycenaean period. Outside this ran the foundations of a polygonal wall, perhaps of the seventh century. On the south shoulder of the hill were found well-preserved remains of a reservoir, probably of the Mycenaean age.¹

Samos.—Excavations conducted by the Greek Archaeological Society since the beginning of October on the site of the Heraeum have resulted in the discovery of twenty bases of columns in two rows in the length of the temple and of three rows on the east side; also of an altar in the north-west corner. Architectural fragments of porous stone from an older temple, also in Ionic style, have appeared, built into the foundations of the marble temple. It seems therefore that the latter was constructed on the site of an earlier temple.²

Kos.—Prof. Herzog has discovered the temple of Asklepios; a Christian church had been built into it in later times. A fragment of a relief of Hygieia with a

snake and several inscriptions have been found.³

Tenos.—Members of the French School have discovered the temple of Poseidon and Amphitrite. It was approached on the east and west sides by a flight of steps. In the neighbourhood have been found works of art representing sea-monsters, dolphins, &c., appropriate symbols of the sea-god's power, and several statues, decrees, and votive inscriptions in his honour. North-east of the temple the foundations of a large building came to light, very probably used for the accommodation of visitors. Among the smaller objects found are a female head, two female statues with the upper part mutilated, forty-eight coins (Roman, Byzantine, and local) mostly in bad condition, fourteen inscriptions, and numerous fragments of statues.³

ASIA MINOR.

Tralles.—An important discovery of sculptures of the Hellenistic period has been made among the ruins of this place. They consist of a colossal female head and figures of a Nymph, a Caryatid, and an Ephebos. The colossal head is very well preserved, with wavy hair parted in the middle, falling on the neck and shoulders and half-covering the ears. The head is prepared for fitting on to a statue. The Nymph has the head and most of the arms wanting and is of no great interest; the Caryatid wears a thin chiton with straight folds and a himation which she grasps at the edge with her right hand; the left hand had been raised to support the burden on the head, but is missing. The most remarkable of the discoveries is the figure of the Ephebos, which is slightly under life size. His left shoulder leans against a pillar, and he appears to be taking rest after athletic exercise. The head, which looks downward with a calm expression, is very fine. The body is covered to the knees with a loose mantle, which conceals the arms; the feet are wanting.⁴

Pergamum.—The Germans are proceeding steadily with the excavation of the city, which was conducted from the beginning of September to the beginning of November by Dr. Dörpfeld. The lower market place and the remains of the S. portico have now been completely cleared. A terrace, probably belonging to the boys' gymnasium, has been discovered and an inscription of the time of Attalus II. with the names of

¹ *Ibid.* 27 Dec. 1902.

⁴ *Arch. Anzeiger*, 1902 (3).

² *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 29 Nov. 1902.

100 boys found there. A second and higher terrace, possibly connected with the gymnasium of the Ephebi, has not yet been completely excavated; a long inscription in honour of Attalus III. has been found on it. Further search in the neighbourhood of the great altar has led to the discovery of an inscription which establishes Attalus II. as its builder; other inscriptions give information as to the restoration of the altar by Augustus.³

ITALY.

Rome.—In the course of tunnelling operations under the Quirinal some interesting finds were made. The marble head of a Greek στρατηγός was discovered, probably a copy of a 4th century portrait. In the remains of an ancient house four marble slabs with reliefs came to light. These represent masks of the beardless Dionysos, Pan, Satyrs, and Silenos, and female masks. Two of the slabs are sculptured on both sides, the other two have one side left smooth. There was found also an archaic statue of Priapos of fine workmanship; the type is unusual and approaches that of the oriental Dionysos. It is probably a Roman copy of a Greek original.⁵

Tusculum.—In the wood of Camaldoli remains of an ancient villa have come to light, very possibly belonging to the Furi, whose tombs were long ago discovered in this neighbourhood.

Remains of another villa with mosaic pavements, etc. have been found. A fragmentary inscription reads:

Λ ΜΗΙ
ΑΠΕΛΘΟΥΣΗC
ΟΙΛΑΜΠΡΟΤΑΤΟΙ
ΠΑΤΕΡΕC

The presence of a marble and two leaden crosses, coupled with the discovery of columns, makes it probable that the ruins are those of a mediaeval chapel built upon the site of an ancient Roman villa.

Among the remains of tombs about the 12th milestone of the Via Latina was found the following inscription:

//// M
FABIO AVGVSTALI
BENE MERENTI
FECIT CHARITO
FRATER

It is suggested that it may be in memory

³ *Bull. della Comm. Arch.* 1902, pp. 3 ff.

of one of the Augustales Castoris et Pollucis of Tusculum.⁶

Pompeii.—No very important discoveries were made during April and May last, though numerous small objects were obtained. Four skeletons were found in a house and with them large gold bracelets in the form of serpents confronting one another; two gold rings with stones inset, a pair of earrings, one gold coin of Nero and two of Domitian, 29 silver coins, and a mirror of bronze silver-plated were also discovered. This house had in the tablinum paintings representing the four seasons, and in the atrium one of Mercury with purse and caduceus.⁷

F. H. MARSHALL.

Numismatic Chronicle, Part 4, 1902.

W. Wroth, 'Greek coins acquired by the British Museum in 1901.' The number of the Greek acquisitions is 1,069, an unusually large total mainly due to the purchase of the Gaulish collection of Léon Morel of Rheims. The most remarkable coin of the year in point of rarity and artistic excellence is a didrachm inscribed ΑΧΑΙΩΝ. *Obv.* Female head, of fine work. *Rev.* Zeus seated. From its style, this coin must belong to *circ.* B.C. 370-360 and it was apparently issued by the earlier Achaean Federation of which the famous league (B.C. 280) was a revival. The mint-place was doubtless Aegium. *Athens.* A specimen of the tetradrachm (*circ.* B.C. 83) showing the figure of Harmodius brandishing his sword. *Aegium in Achaia.* A coin of Aegium of Antoninus Pius reproducing the statue of the boy Zeus by the sculptor Agelaidas. The subject is identified by the inscription ΖΕΥC

ΠΑΙC. *Mytilene.* A bronze coin of Imperial times, with portrait-heads of 'Sextus the new Makar,' (or Makareus), and 'Andromeda the new Lesbos.' These must have been Lesbian worthies like those described in *Class. Rev.* 1894, p. 226. *Side in Pamphylia.* A coin of Gallienus with a figure of Asklepios holding a staff entwined by a serpent with a human head. A remarkable variation on the common type of Asklepios. *Cremna in Pisidia.* Bronze of Aurelian. *Rev.* DONATICO COL. CREMN. Annona (?) with modius.—Sir John Evans. 'On some rare or unpublished Roman coins.' 1. A remarkable *denarius*, doubtless struck under Galba:—*Obv.* 'Hispaniarum et Galliarum concordia.' Busts of Spain and Gaul. *Rev.* 'Victoria P.R.' Victory in biga. 2. An *aureus* of Balbinus found in 1902 near Alexandria in Egypt. Gold coins of this emperor are described by some of the 18th century numismatists but till now were not known to be extant. 3. Two gold coins of Carausius, one inscribed 'Pax Carausi Aug.' Also a unique *denarius Rev.* 'Clarit. Carausi Aug.' Bust of the Sun-god. 4. A gold coin of Licinius junior with *Rev.* 'Iovio (sic) Conservatori Caess.' Jupiter standing.

Revue Numismatique. Part 3, 1902.
J. Rouvier. 'Les rois phéniciens de Sidon d'après leurs monnaies, sous la dynastie des Achéménides.'

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 102 ff.

⁷ *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1902, p. 276.

(continued).—A. Dieudonné. 'Monnaies grecques récemment acquises par le Cabinet des Médailles.' Coins of Pamphylia and Pisidia, including a coin of Side with the head of Aemilian, an emperor rarely represented on Greek Imperial money.—Svoronos. 'La prétendue monnaie Thibronienne.' Θιβρωνίων (cod. Θιβρώνιον) νόμισμα ἔδωκε ἀπὸ Θιβρωνος τοῦ χαράξαντος εἰρησθαι. Photius, *Lex.* s.v. This passage has been often discussed by numismatists and there are divergent opinions as to the nature of the coin and the identity of the Thibron who issued it. There is reason to think that it was a false or debased coin, for in Pollux *Onomast.* iii. 86 we find χαλκόκρατον followed (in two MSS.) by the word Θιβρώνιον. Svoronos suggests that there may have been a coin called ΦΕΙΔΩΝΕΙΟΝ (cp. Φειδώνεια

μέτρα) and that this word through an error of transcription had become ΘΕΙΡΩΝΕΙΟΝ and was corrected by Photius to ΘΙΒΡΩΝΕΙΟΝ. It is further suggested that certain ancient forgeries of the coins of Aegina are the false coins to which the term 'Phaidonian' was applied.—Tachella. 'Monnaies de la Mésie Inférieure.' A description of thirty-one coins in the National Museum at Sofia, not included in the *Corpus Numorum*.—J. Roman. 'Médaille de consécration de Tétricus père.' A bronze coin of Tetricus, inscribed 'Divo Tetrico Aug.'; of semi-barbarous work, struck after the time of Tetricus.

The *Revue Belge de Num.*, 1903, pt. 1, contains a paper by E. D. Dutilh on the Nome coinage of Egypt.

WARWICK WROTH.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS

American Journal of Philology. Vol. xxiii. No. 3. 1902.

Problems in Greek Syntax (III. with Addendum), B. L. Gildersleeve. *The Tale of Gyges and the King of Lydia* (I.), K. F. Smith. *Θετικώτερον* (Cicero *Q. F.* iii. 3. 4), E. G. Sihler. *The Ablative Absolute in Livy* (I.), R. B. Steele. *Early Parallelisms in Roman Historiography*, J. P. Wolcott. Notes. *Tennysonianism*, W. P. Mustard. *καίτοι with Participle*, G. M. Bolling. Reviews. *Pessels' Present and Past Periphrastic Tenses in Anglo-Saxon*, Callaway's *Appositive Participle in Anglo-Saxon*; *Cesareo's D. Iunii Iuvenalis Saturae* (H. L. Wilson, unfavourable). Reports. Brief Mention. (Here in the course of comments upon textual criticism, the editor draws attention to the fact that he had pointed out in *A.J.P.* ix. 126 that the conjecture *utulum* for *ut tuum* in Persius 3. 29 [see *C.R.* 1902, pp. 283, 319] was published by Heinrich in 1844.) *Necrology*, A. W. Stratton (Maurice Bloomfield).

Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. Vol. 57. 2. 1902.

H. Usener, *Milch und Honig*. On the use of milk and honey in the ancient mysteries, and in the early Church. W. M. Lindsay, *De fragmentis scriptorum apud Nonium servatis*. G. Knaack, *Hellenistische Studien*. I. On the legend of Nisos and Skylla in Hellenistic poetry. H. Peter, *Die Epochen in Varros Werk De gente populi Romani*. Discusses the passage in Censorinus (*De die nat.* 21, 1) in which the three epochs of Varro are mentioned. A. Furtwängler, *Zu der Inschrift der Aphaia auf Aegina*. Directed against the conclusions of M. Fränkel in the last No. Maintains that Aphaia possessed the whole temenos. K. Mangold, *Legionen des Orient auf Grund der Notitia dignitatum*. About 400 A.D. we find about 92 legions in five groups, called respectively, *palatinae*, *comitatenses*, *pseudocomitatenses*, *riparienses*, and the rest without any special name. C. Fries, *Τυφλὸς ἀνὴρ*. On the legend of Homer's blindness. L. Radermacher, *Ueber eine Scene des euripideischen Orestes*. On a hydria of Caere of the sixth cent. B.C. which depicts the scene described in *Or.* 1487 sqq. W. Crönert, *Herkulanensische Bruchstücke einer Geschichte des Sokrates und seiner Schule*. M. Siebourg, *Ländliches Leben bei Homer und im deutschen Mittelalter*. Comparison of the descriptions

in the Shield of Achilles with those of mediaeval writers. G. Wörpel, *Ad libellum περὶ ὕψους*. A note on the text. F. Schöll and L. Radermacher, *Vir bonus dicendi peritus*. On this phrase of the elder Cato. Atticaster, *Boötisches*. On an inscription of Akraiphiai. M. Ihm, *Zu lateinischen Inschriften*. E. Wölfflin, *Die Reitercenturien des Tiberius Priscus*. E. Lattes, *Zu den etruskischen Monatsnamen und Zahlwörtern*.

Part 3. F. Buecheler, *Coniectanea*. F. Solmsen, *Die Berliner Bruchstücke der Suppho*. The text with notes. L. Gurllit, *Facetiae Tullianae*. On various passages in the letters. R. A. Fritzsche, *Der Magnet und die Athmung in antiken Theorien*. On the sources of *Lucr.* vi. 906-1089. M. Manitius, *Aus Dresdener Handschriften*. Here are printed some Scholia to Vegetius and to the Thebaid of Statius. K. Fuhr, *Zu griechischen Prosaikern*. On mistaken corrections in Plat. *Gorg.* 522a and Isocr. *Phil.* § 46. On ἰθὺς and ἰθὺς in the orators. On the rhetorical writings of Philodemus. R. Kunze, *Unbeachtete Strabonfragmente*. Additions to the fragments from the commentary of Eustathius on Dionysius Periegetes. J. Raeder, *Analecta Theodoretiana*. On a Vatican MS. of Theodoret's *Oration*. G. Wörpel, *Eine Auspielung in dem Zeushymnos des Kallimachos*. On ll. 79 sqq. Th. Kakridis, *Plautus Amphitruo*. Is the *Amphitruo* a *comœdia contaminata*? F. Schultess, *Randbemerkungen zu Horaz*. R. Wünsch, *Zu Ciris* 369-377. O. Rossbach, *Agroccius et Plinius de Delphica*. O. Neuhaus, *Zu Trogu Pompeius Prol. X.* J. E. Kirchner, *Zu C.I.A. II. 996*. L. Radermacher, *Drei Deutungen*. (1) On ἡ-ἡ. (2) εἰς νέων = εἰς νέων. (3) δέ in Epicharmos fr. 149 Kaibel.

Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik. Vol. xiii. 1. 1902.

R. Thurneysen, *Zu den Etymologien im Thesaurus linguae latinae*. AB—ARCESSO. E. Wölfflin, *Alliteration und Reim bei Salvia*. E. Wölfflin, *Mandare* = manum dare. G. Lehnert, *Zu Ps.-Quintilian, decl. mai. 4. 1*. W. Meyer-Lübke, *Albarus*. W. Heraeus, *Con und com vor Vokalen in der Komposition*. The evidence for *com* before vowels goes back to high antiquity. The irrational *con* before vowels is later. W. Heraeus, *Curva = meretric*. H. Jordan, *Melito und Novatian*. On the resemblances between the Pseudo-Cyprian *adversus Iudeos*, the Melito frag-

ments, and the newly discovered Pseudo-Origenistic Tractates whose author was Novatian. E. Wölfflin, *Das Breviarium des Festus*. I. On resemblances between Festus on the one hand and Eutropius, Florus, and the Epitoma of Livy on the other. C. Mayhoff, *Epitomae*. On the spelling. A. Klotz, *Disciplina disciplinarum*. May be an imitation of Themistius' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστημῶν and τέχνη τεχνῶν. A. Klotz, *Artificus*. On Poet. Min. V. 65, v. 30. Baehrens. F. Stolz, *Das Praefix dis.*—A. Klotz, *Sorsus*. This word in the Latin transl. of a fable of Babrius in the Amherst-Papyri may be a partep. from *sorbere*. J. Cornu, Cornua bei Sil. Ital. 15. 761. E. Lattes, *Etruskisch-lateinische Wörter der lateinischen Inschriften*. J. Cornu, Zu Lukan 2, 133. Reads *quod* for *quid*. J. Cornu, *Qui fugit patellam, cadit in prunas*. Gives romance parallels to this proverb which is quoted by Schol. ad Lucan. iii. 687. E. Nestle, *Andron*. An ex. of this word from an old Latin MS. of the Bible. W. Heraeus, *Aus einer lateinischen Babriosübersetzung*. A. Zimmermann, *Personennamen auf -utus, -utius*. W. M. Lindsay, *Parvum, parvum*. *Parvum* as a fuller form of *parum* occurs in the phrase in the comic writers *parvum est fides alicui*. O. Brugmann, *Andes*. This word like *Lucani* etc. is the name of a people not of a place.

Neue Jahrbücher für das Klassische Altertum, etc. Parts 6 and 7. 1902.

G. Thiele, *Die Anfänge der griechischen Komödie*. Thiele refers to the information of Aristotle, Sosibios of Lacedaemon, and Semos of Delos. The four kinds of ἐθελογὰς, φαλαοφόροι, αὐτοκῆδβαλοι, and ταυβοί are sprung from the same root of popular processions. The name τραφῆδός shows that at Athens for a long time the only dramatic play was the Satyr-play. From this was developed the serious heroic tragedy, but how this came about is uncertain. H. Lucas, *Die Knabenstatue von Subiaco*. Maintains that this famous statue in the Thermen-museum at Rome represents Ganymede fleeing before the eagle of Zeus. S. Reiter, *August Böckh* (1785–1867). With reference to M. Hoffmann's biography.

Wochenschrift für Klassische Philologie. 1902.

22 Oct. *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Mäander*, herausg. von O. Kern (O. Schulthess), favourable. *Ciceros Rede über den Oberbefehl des Pompejus*, erkl. von O. Drenckhahn (W. Hirschfelder), favourable. L. Messerschmidt, *Die Hettiter* (J. V. Präsek), favourable. J. Ziehen, *Über die Verbindung der sprachlichen mit der sachlichen Belehrung* (P. Cauer), very favourable.

29 Oct. H. Luckenbach, *Kunst und Geschichte. I. Abbildungen zur alten Geschichte*. 4 Aufl. (P. Weizsäcker), very favourable. B. Aeovdῆος, Ἡ Ὀλυμπία, favourable. J. Adam, *Texts to illustrate a course of elementary lectures on Greek philosophy after Aristotle* (A. Döring). 'Is to be welcomed with sympathy.'

5 Nov. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Die Textgeschichte der griechischen Lyriker* (J. Sitzler). D. Fava, *Gli epigrammi di Platone* (G. Wörpel), unfavourable. Fr. Matthias, *Über Pytheas von Massilia und die ältesten Nachrichten von den Germanen*. II. (P. Schulze), favourable. Cicero, *Oratio Philippica prima*, par H. de la Ville de Mirmont (W. Hirschfelder), favourable. H. Osthoff, *Etymologische Parerga*. I. (F. Solmsen). 'A very stimulating book.'

12 Nov. D. Laurent et G. Hartmann, *Vocabulaire*

etymologique de la langue grecque et de la langue latine (F. Solmsen), unfavourable. A. Trendelenburg, *Der grosse Altar des Zeus in Olympia* (Fr. Spiro), very favourable. *Der römische Limes in Österreich*. III. (M. Ihm). O. Stählin, *Clemens Alexandrinus und die Septuaginta* (A. Hilgenfeld). 'A careful investigation.' L. Weigl, *Studien zu dem unedierten astrologischen Lehrgedicht des Johannes Kamateros* (J. Dräseke), favourable.

19 Nov. *Homeri Ilias*, rec. A. Ludwich. I. A. Ludwich, *Beiträge zur Homerischen Handschriftenkunde—Über die Papyrus-Kommentare zu den Homerischen Gedichten* (C. Rothe), very favourable. *Aischylos' Perser*, herausg. von H. Jurenka (K. Busche), favourable. C. Kattein, *Theocriti idylliis VIII. et IX. cur abroganda sit fides Theocritea* (M. Rannow), favourable. Fr. Kampe, *Über die Adelphen des Terenz* (G. Wörpel). 'Learned and solid.' E. Thomas, *Pétrone l'évêque de la société romaine*. 2 ed. (v. Morawski), favourable. K. Horna, *Einige unedierte Stücke des Manasses und Italikos* (G. Wartenberg), favourable.

26 Nov. A. Pischinger, *Der Vogelgesang bei den griechischen Dichtern des Klassischen Altertums* (A. Biese), favourable. Aeschylus, *The Prometheus Bound* rendered into English verse, by E. R. Bevan (K. Busche), favourable. J. van der Valk, *De Lucretiano carmine a poeta perfecto atque absoluto* (G. Wörpel), favourable. R. Petersdorff, *Germanen und Griechen* (U. Zernial), unfavourable on the whole.

3 Dec. Demosthenes, *Ausgewählte Reden*, erkl. von A. Westermann, 1 Bändch. 10. Aufl. von E. Rosenberg (P. Uhle). W. Soltan, *Die Geburtsgeschichte Jesu Christi* (M. Zimmer). 'Helps thoughtful readers by its clearness and certainty.' F. Blass, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*. 2. Aufl. (J. Dräseke), very favourable. O. Basiner, *Ludi Saeculares* (A. Enmann), favourable. Seefelder, *Abhandlung über das Carmen adversus Flavianum* (R. Holm), favourable. J. Ashbach, *Zur Geschichte und Kultur der römischen Rheinlande* (C. Koenen). 'warmly to be recommended.' A. Mau, *Katalog der Bibliothek des kaiserlich. deutschen archäologischen Instituts in Rom*. II. (W. Amelung).

10 Dec. M. Collignon et L. Couve, *Catalogue des vases peints du Musée National d'Athènes* (P. Weizsäcker). F. Adami, *De poetis scaenicis graecis hymnorum sacrorum imitatoribus* (C. Haberland). 'Good but not easy to read.' J. Vendryes, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les effets de l'intensité initiale en Latin* (Draheim), very favourable. L. Valmagg, *Nuovi appunti sulla critica recentissima del Dialogo degli oratori* (C. John), favourable. E. Schwyzler, *Die Weltsprachen des Altertums in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung* (O. Weisse), favourable.

17 Dec. P. Pasella, *La poesia convivale dei Greci* (G. Wörpel), favourable. *Ignatii Antiocheni et Polycarpi Smyrnaei epistolae et martyria*, ed. A. Hilgenfeld (J. Dräseke), favourable. O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Unterganges der antiken Welt*. Anh. zum. 2. Bande (A. Höck), very favourable. *Griechische Erinnerungen eines Reisenden*, herausg. von Th. Birt (G. Wartenberg), favourable.

24 Dec. C. Wunderer, *Polybios Forschungen II. Citate und geflügelte Worte bei Polybios* (C. Haberland). 'Shows extensive reading.' E. Rosenberg, *Studien zur Rede Ciceros für Murena* (W. Hirschfeld). 'An excellent contribution to our knowledge.' F. Kaiser, *Quo tempore Dialogus de oratoribus scriptus sit* (G. Andresen), very favourable.